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I
Introduction
Most everyone knows what a book publisher does,1 but compara-
tively few understand the role of the music publisher. Not all copy-
right-based publishing relationships work the same way.2 Indeed, the
role of the music publisher is quite different from the role of the book
publisher. An agreement with a book publisher spells at least a cer-
tain level of success for an author.' Conversely, a songwriter's agree-
ment with a music publisher,4 while a significant step forward, is much
nearer to the beginning of the road to potential success.' It is more
analogous to an author's relationship with a literary agent.6 The other
major difference is that the songwriter almost always conveys the
copyright to the music publisher while retaining a contractual right to
royalties.7 An author, on the other hand, may retain the copyright
and license certain rights to the book publisher in return for royalties.8
1. For those who do not know, book publishers (usually with a literary agent as a go-
between) generally obtain book publishing rights from book authors (who often retain the
copyright itself). These rights usually obligate book publishers to print, market, and dis-
tribute the book (hardcover and softcover). In return, the book author receives royalties
(typically based on ten to fifteen percent of sales), with the literary agent receiving a por-
tion (usually ten to fifteen percent) thereof. The copyright-retaining author may then
grant other licenses, e.g., to a motion picture producer. There are other variations on this
theme; for instance, the book publisher may obtain from the book author serialization-
licensing rights. See John Vivian, The Media of Mass Communication 39-42 (3d ed. 1995).
2. This article mainly concerns the relationship between music publishing companies
and non-artist songwriters who are at or near the beginning of their professional songwrit-
ing careers.
3. Generally, such agreements guarantee that a beginning author's book will be pub-
lished; whether it proves to be a commercial success depends upon a variety of factors.
4. This article analyzes the long-term exclusive songwriting-music publishing agree-
ment and, in pertinent part, is written from the non-artist songwriter's perspective rather
than from the music publisher's perspective. The analysis takes this approach because mu-
sic publishers write these contracts, but songwriters would benefit from an abrogation of
forced adherence to them. This article then attempts to set forth such a contract from both
parties' point of view. This article is not meant in any way to denigrate the herculean
efforts that many music publishers engage in on behalf of songwriters.
5. See DONALD E. BIEDERMAN ET AL., LAW AND BUSINESS OF THE ENTERTAINMENT
INDUSTRIES 167-68 (1990).
6. Id. at 104.
7. Under 17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(3) (1994), however, the conveyance may be "termi-
nated" later. In most situations and upon request, copyrights granted from creators to
publishers or other persons or entities terminate "thirty-five years from the date of execu-
tion of the grant."
8. See BIEDERMAN ET AL., supra note 5, at 104-08.
A. The Fundamental Songwriting-Music Publishing Quid Pro Quo
From the songwriter's perspective, there are generally three ini-
tial considerations concerning a prospective music publishing contract:
(1) advances against royalties; (2) quality demonstration recordings
(demos) of the songwriter's songs; and (3) exploitation, or the active
"pitching"9 of the demos to the producers, artists, and others who
make the ultimate decisions concerning the selection of songs to be
recorded and released on the major labels.10 As important as these
matters are, especially as a songwriter is beginning her career, there
are other extremely significant interests. These include royalty rates,
matters of accounting, and the further exploitation or licensing of the
songwriter's "cuts."'" Beginning professional songwriters, however,
see nothing as more important than their ability to survive financially
while writing and for quality demos to be prepared and pitched to the
right people.12 However, for songwriters fortunate enough to 'have
written one or more hit songs, back-end considerations become the
principal focus of these agreements. The music publisher's greatest
desire is that the songwriter write "hit" songs.13
1. Advances Against Royalties
Virtually all songwriters come to town 14 on a wing and a prayer. 15
The most successful songwriters write songs virtually on a full-time
9. "A common term in the record industry, 'pitching' is the act of playing a song for
recording artists or record producers and manufacturers in order to interest them in per-
forming and producing the work." Peay v. Morton, 571 F. Supp. 108, 110 n.1 (M.D. Tenn.
1983).
10. See Al Caudell, Industry Executives Speak Out: Some Questions and Answers
About Music Publishing Today, AM. SONGWRITER, July/Aug. 1995, at 23 (paraphrasing
Clyde Lieberman, senior director, east coast creative operations, BMG Music Publishing).
11. Compositions which have been recorded and released at least one time.
12. See Michael Kosser, Do Songwriters Need Publishers? Or Can They Go It Alone?,
AM. SONGWRITER, July/Aug. 1995, at 36.
13. See Deborah Evans Price, Zomba Music: Truly International: Fostering Creativity
Means Positive Results, AM. SONGWRITER, July/Aug. 1995, at 26-27.
14. Principally Los Angeles, Nashville, and New York.
15. From the corners of the country
From the cities and the farms
With years and years of living
Tucked up underneath their arms
They walk away from everything
Just to see a dream come true
So God bless the boys who make the noise
On Sixteenth Avenue
But then one night in some empty room
Where no curtains ever hung
Like a miracle some golden words
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basis.16 And while commercially successful songwriters usually do not
need compensation in the form of advances against royalties, almost
all newly-signed songwriters do.17
2. Demonstration Recordings
In most genres of music, there is a rather considerable overabun-
dance of new songs, with supply exponentially outstripping demand.'
There may be a variety of ways to influence decision-makers to record
and release specific songs, 9 but the vast majority of songwriters be-
lieve the one absolutely essential tool is a quality demo. 0 While suc-
Roll off someone's tongue
And after years of being nothing
They're all looking right at you
And then for awhile they'll go in style
On Sixteenth Avenue
THOM SCHUYLER, God Bless The Boys Who Make The Noise On Sixteenth Avenue, copy-
right 1982, DebDave Music, Inc. (BMI) and Briarpatch Music (BMI) (this song, repre-
sented here by only two verses, describes one view of songwriting life on Music Row in
Nashville. It was written by Thorn Schuyler and made popular by country singer Lacy J.
Dalton).
16. "A lot of people have this idea that writers just wake up in the middle of the night
inspired. Sometimes that's true, but our writers come in every day, it's a job, it's competi-
tive." Al Caudell, Looking for Commitment and Quality: EMI Publishing is a Major
World Player, AM. SONGWRITER, May/June 1994, at 25 (quoting Celia Froehlig, vice presi-
dent and general manager, Nashville division, EMI Music Publishing).
17. There is also one other type of "advance against royalties." Some "[b]ankers who
specialize in working with music industry customers" offer loans using projections of public
performance royalties as security because they know "[u]nique cash flow problems often
plague songwriters." Lisa Harless, Royalty Advance Loans, AM. SONGWRITER, Jan./Feb.
1994, at 15.
18. "There [is] so much material ... the A&R people are inundated with material."
Vernell Hackett, Overview: The State of Songwriting in America, AM. SONGWRITER, July/
Aug. 1995, at 16 (quoting New York City-based songwriter John Zonars).
19. Such factors include the track records of the songwriters, the track record of the
plugger, the storied history of the publishing company, the degree to which the song "fits"
the direction of the project or the artist, etc. For a look at one facet of the relationship
between songwriters and music publishers on the one hand and producers on the other, see
Michael Kosser, Producers and A&R People, AM. SONGWRITER, Sept./Oct. 1995, at 24.
20. There is precious little agreement, however, on just how "produced" the demos
should be. One seemingly good piece of advice on this subject comes from songwriter-
producer Robert Byrne: "I'm about half and half between simple demos and using a full
band. As a producer, [I think] it depends on the song. I would encourage most songwrit-
ers to produce their uptempo material. For certain ballads, the bare bones approach is
okay." Al Caudell, Byrne Writes and Produces: Produces Hits and Writes Great Songs, AM.
SONGWRrrER, Sept./Oct. 1994, at 18 (quoting Robert Byrne). "[T]he demo is the song's
wrapper. That wrapper is a major sales tool." Cliff Williamson, Emotion Is Key to a Hit
Song: Lady Luck Is Not a Co-Writer, AM. SONGWRITER, July/Aug. 1993, at 16.
cessful songwriters desire this expense to be shared by the publisher, 1
songwriters beginning their professional careers find it indispensable
that publishers front or absorb this expense.22
3. Exploitation
The one thing that probably makes songwriters, both presently or
previously under contract to a music publisher, the most frustrated is
"unpitched" demos.23 Some songwriters pitch their own material,2 4
but most beginning songwriters have little opportunity to do so be-
cause they usually have considerably less access to the decision-mak-
ers. 5  Music publishing companies employ persons known as song
"pluggers, ' 'z6 whose jobs range from physically delivering demos to
the "A&R'2 7 people at the major labels, to maintaining intimate pro-
fessional associations with the successful artists and producers.2a
4. "Hit" Songs
For the music publisher, hit songs make the relationship worth-
while.2 9 Unfortunately, not all songwriters write hit songs. 30 Music
publishing companies spend considerable sums on advances, demos,
21. Demos cost at least several hundred dollars each. Thus, production quickly be-
comes expensive-even for successful songwriters. In fairness, it also becomes expensive
for music publishers.
22. A songwriter who needs a $200 per week advance against royalties to minimally
make ends meet obviously cannot afford to front the cost of demo production.
23. There are several facets to this, one of which is that "a songwriter's songs are
largely forgotten once the writer is no longer active with a publisher .... " NASHVILLE
SONGWRITERS ASSOCIATION INTERNATIONAL, THE ESSENTIAL SONGWRITER'S CONTRACT
HANDBOOK x (1994) [hereinafter NSAI HANDBOOK] (publication of the 4,000-plus mem-
ber Nashville Songwriters Association International).
24. See Vernell Hackett, Alternative Ways To Show Your Songs: Independent Plugger
Might Work For You, AM. SONGWRITER, July/Aug. 1995, at 28.
25. Id.
26. Term of art common to the sound recording industry. Simply put, pluggers pitch
demos.
27. This abbreviation stands for "Artists and Repertoire." Originally, the function was
that of the producer's function of today. A&R people at record companies now perform
various other tasks, such as screening demos from music publishers and recommending
new talent. See Marascalco v. Fantasy, Inc., No. CIV. 88-675, 1990 WL 257290 (C.D. Cal.
Oct. 24, 1990).
28. The biggest complaint that songwriters seem to have about songplugging is "the
fact that publishers have such vast catalogs, yet such a low ratio of songpluggers." NSAI
HANDBOOK, supra note 23, at ix-x.
29. Price, supra note 13, at 26-27.
30. "If it gets to the point where the writer is just not getting far enough along for us to
recoup our expenses, and they're going deeper in the hole, then we would decide if it was
in our best interest to renew." Caudell, supra note 10, at 22 (quoting Leslie Barr, creative
manager, Bug Music/Nashville).
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plugging activities, and general overhead for songwriters who never
have an important cut.3
B. The Songwriter-Music Publisher Contract Relationship
So under what circumstances do a songwriter and a music pub-
lisher form a contract?32 The simple answer is that the music pub-
lisher believes in the songwriter's ability to write hit songs and is
interested in signing the songwriter to a term exclusive agreement. 33
Commercially, the songwriter has the creative product and the music
publisher has the capital and the exploitative and administrative abil-
ity. It is entirely likely that any contract signed will have been drafted
by the publisher and, historically, few of its terms have been very ne-
gotiable.34 This inequity exists because the songwriter does not have
the capital to undertake the music publishing function herself. Conse-
quently, beginning professional songwriters are at an extreme bargain-
ing disadvantage. 35  At the first opportunity, many commercially
successful songwriters become their own music publishers.36
31. Id.
32. One view is as follows:
Rarely would songwriters list copyright ownership or royalty accounting as moti-
vations [for entering into a music publishing relationship]. They are part of the
mundane business world. Copyright administration is tedious, complicated, not
fun. Leave it to the music publishers.., and music publishers have been all too
happy to oblige .... For the opportunity to indulge their art and relinquish the
responsibility of marketing and administration, songwriters have been obliging, as
well, content to let music publishers define the rules and percentages. That is,
until the songs become hits, the money going to the publisher becomes substan-
tial, and the songwriter realizes he/she is no longer the owner nor controller of
the work ... Street Education 101!
NSAI HANDBOOK, supra note 23, at viii-ix.
33. The [term exclusive songwriter's] agreement is commonly used when the pub-
lisher wants to establish a long-term relationship with a writer believed to have
talent ... either as a result of having had songs recorded by recording artists or
because the publisher [simply] believes in the talent and future worth of the
writer.
EVAN MEDOW, ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRY CONTRACTS, NEGOTIATING AND DRAFTING
GUIDE, PART V-MusIc, TERM EXCLUSIVE SONGWRITER AGREEMENT 170-2 (1987) [here-
inafter MEDOW].
34. "Since the [contract language] almost always emanate[s] from the publisher, pub-
lishing agreements have over the years distilled the essence of what is to the publisher's
advantage." NSAI HANDBOOK, supra note 23, at xi. "The relationship between writer and
publisher historically [has] been slanted toward the publisher for too long and [has] inevi-
tably led to a feeling of inequity by many a songwriter." Id. at x.
35. "Professional songwriters come in roughly two varieties-those who have a strong
bargaining position with their publishers and those who do not." Kosser, supra note 12, at
36.
36. Many of them might not if the terms of their contracts were, in their view, more
equitable.
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There is a huge difference between contracts involving parties of
relatively equal bargaining strength and those in which a decided im-
balance exists. This is most pronounced where the contract is per-
formed over a substantial period of time37 and the contractual
relationship continues for decades beyond the expiration or termina-
tion of the agreement.38  The bilaterally bargained-for contract in-
volves a true meeting of the minds, 39 especially where it also involves
genuine mutual goodwill."n Because of disparities in bargaining
strength, many contracts do not meet this model of perfection. This is
not a new phenomenon. In a 1955 case concerning the validity of an
"open-ended contract" for the sale of goods, the court wrote:
One often has the impression of a kind of running battle between
draftsmen and the courts, with much shifting of ground on the part
of both. Back of this development lies a problem that touches the
basic philosophy of contract law. The law of contracts is founded
generally on the principle that it is the business of the courts to in-
terpret and enforce the agreements that the parties have negotiated.
This theory confronts the social reality that in many cases no real
negotiations take place, and the terms of the contract are in fact set
by the will of one party alone. This situation ... may result from a
superiority of bargaining power on one side. In such situations,
there seems to be a principle of law not yet frankly acknowledged
which might be phrased something as follows: where one party to a
contract has the power to dictate its terms, the terms of the contract
are subject to judicial review and may be modified by the court if
they are unduly harsh.4n
This article has five sections. Section I introduces the topic of
unequal bargaining positions between songwriters and music publish-
ing companies. Section II describes and analyzes the adhesion
37. Executory contracts are a great deal more susceptible to problems than are con-
tracts which have been completely performed at or near the time of contract formation.
38. For instance, where a songwriter receives a "cut" while under contract to a music
publisher, the songwriter must look to that music publisher (or its assignee) for royalties,
etc., during the entire pre-termination period even though the songwriter has not otherwise
been under contract to that music publisher for years.
39. A contract's failure to involve a "meeting of the minds" can invalidate it. See Rey
v. Lafferty, 990 F.2d 1379, 1386 (1st Cir. 1993) (dispute between book author and licen-
sees); Academy Chicago Publishers v. Cheever, 578 N.E.2d 981, 984 (I11. 1991) (dispute
between book publisher and widow of deceased author); Sian E. Provost, A Defense of a
Rights-Based Approach to Identifying Coercion in Contract Law, 73 TEXAS L. REV. 629,
643 nn.76-78 (1995).
40. See Donald G. Gifford, The Synthesis of Legal Counseling and Negotiation Models:
Preserving Client-Centered Advocacy in the Negotiation Context, 34 UCLA L. REV. 811,
862 n.162 (1987); Mark R. Lee, Antitrust and Commercial Arbitration: An Economic Anal-
ysis, 62 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1, 13 (1987).
41. Streich v. General Motors Corp., 126 N.E.2d 389, 396 (Ill. App. Ct. 1955) (citation
omitted). In the forty years following 1955, this concept definitely has been "frankly ac-
knowledged." See Harry G. Prince, Unconscionability in California: A Need for Restraint
and Consistency, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 459 (1995).
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problems inherent in the formation of many songwriter-music pub-
lisher agreements on the basis of relative bargaining strength and judi-
cial efforts (or lack of judicial efforts) to recognize and address such
problems. Section III quotes and analyzes a "standard-form" song-
writer-music publisher agreement, the various parts of which are
taken from several actual or proposed contracts. This section focuses
on the songwriters' problems have with much of the language in such
agreements and on case law concerning many of the individual provi-
sions. Section IV details the author's view of how an equitably-writ-
ten songwriter-music publisher agreement might read, together with
the author's view of why this contractual relationship is more fair.
Section V concludes that songwriters in disadvantageous bargaining
positions should take small steps in trying to work more equitable lan-
guage into future agreements and that songwriters in advantageous
bargaining positions should insist on completely equitable treatment
in their agreements with music publishers. Finally, this section in-
troduces the idea that songwriters should take more control in the
overall relationship.
II
The Formation of Long-Term Exclusive Songwriting-
Music Publishing Agreements
A. The Bargaining Positions
Courts have no problem recognizing the problems associated
with a party's weak bargaining position in the formation of a con-
tract. 2 Before showing the party in the weak position any contractual
mercy, courts insist that the party "show that the contract contains
harsh ... terms which the party would not have agreed to except for
his weak bargaining position."43 In a music copyright case explaining
42. Examples abound:
Exploiting the weak bargaining position of the mobile home owners may consti-
tute unfair competition or unfair trade practices .... The state has an interest in
protecting consumers deemed to be in an unfavorable bargaining position and in
preventing future exploitation of other consumers.
State v. Fonk's Mobile Home Park & Sales, Inc., 343 N.W.2d 820,822 (Wis. Ct. App. 1983).
We recognize that parties may agree to waive applicable provisions of the law.
However, such waiver may be unenforceable if public policy considerations so
dictate. * * * [The statutory authority the courts have to refund bond premiums
to prevent unjust enrichment] ... finds support when consideration is given to the
comparatively weak bargaining position one in need of a bond occupies vis-a-vis
that of the surety providing the bond.
People v. Walker, 665 P.2d 154, 156 (Colo. Ct. App. 1983) (citation omitted).
43. Connick v. Teachers Ins. and Annuity Ass'n of Am., 784 F.2d 1018, 1021 (9th Cir.
1986) (citing Keating v. Superior Ct., 645 P.2d 1192 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982)). "California law
why Congress added termination rights" in the 1976 Copyright Act
(the Act),4 5 the court recognized the "weak bargaining position"
concept:
Because of the impossibility of predicting the commercial value of a
work upon its creation and because of the weak bargaining position
of [songwriters], they sometimes assigned their copyrights in return
for very little remuneration, such as small lump-sum payments or
inadequate royalty rates, and were thus prevented from sharing
fairly, if at all, in the rewards from works that later became com-
mercial successes. The termination provisions give authors an op-
portunity to renegotiate in the light of more knowledge as to the
value of their works, and thereby obtain a fair share of the rewards
from their works.46
requires a party to show more than simply that a standardized legal form was used and that
the party had less bargaining strength than the other contracting party." Waggoner v. Dal-
laire, 649 F.2d 1362, 1367 (9th Cir. 1981).
In Croce v. Kurnit, 565 F. Supp. 884, 893 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), affd, 737 F.2d 229 (2d Cir.
1984), Ingrid Croce, widow of singer-songwriter Jim Croce, argued that the songwriter-
music publisher contract executed by her husband at the beginning of his career was un-
conscionable. In concluding that the contract could not be rescinded on the basis of uncon-
scionability, the court stated:
[T]he contract[ ] ... [was a] hard bargain[ ], signed by an artist without bargaining
power, and favored the publishers, but as a matter of fact did not contain terms
which shock the conscience or differed so grossly from industry norms as to be
unconscionable by their terms. The contract ... [was] free from fraud and
although complex in nature, [its] provisions were not formulated so as to obfus-
cate or confuse the terms. Although Jim Croce might have thought that he re-
tained the right to choose whether to exercise renewal options, this misconception
does not establish that the contract ... [was] unfair. Because of the uncertainty
involved in the music business and the high risk of failure of new performers, the
contract . . ., though favoring the defendants, [was] not unfair.
Id. at 893 (citation omitted). Just because a contract or some of its provisions comport with
the "industry standard," however, does not mean that the industry standard is "right" or
"fair," especially where one "side" of the industry has an extreme bargaining advantage
over the other.
Although the [music] industry is rife with conflicts of interest, this issue is seldom
litigated. When such cases do arise, American courts have routinely refrained
from interfering with standard industry practices. Although all contracts are typi-
cally reviewed with reference to their commercial setting and industry norms,
considering the historical exploitation and victimization of recording artists, this
general rule fails to adequately protect vulnerable artists. By relying on custom-
ary practices, the courts countenance a vicious cycle of exploitation.
Hal I. Gilenson, Artist-Personal Manager Conflicts of Interest in the Music Industry, 9 CAR-
DOZO ARTS AND ENr. L.J. 501, 504-05 (1991) (footnotes omitted).
44. 17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(3) (1988).
45. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-18 (1988).
46. Harry Fox Agency, Inc. v. Mills Music, Inc., 543 F. Supp. 844 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). The
federal district court for the Southern District of New York has stated:
The termination provisions were by no means the first attempt by Congress to
deal with unremunerative transfers. Such transfers have constituted an enduring
problem under the copyright laws. The 1909 Act sought to protect authors from
unremunerative transfers by splitting the period of copyright into an original and
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B. Adhesion Contracts
Adhesion contracts exist because of disparate bargaining
positions:
7
In many cases of adhesion contracts, the weaker party lacks not
only the opportunity to bargain but also any realistic opportunity to
look elsewhere for a more favorable contract; he must either adhere
to the standardized agreement or forego the needed
[relationship].... 48
An adhesion contract is a form contract created by the stronger of
the contracting parties. It is offered on a "take it or nothing" basis.
Consequently, the terms of the contract are imposed on the weaker
party who has no choice but to conform. These terms unexpectedly
or unconscionably limit the obligations of the drafting party. Be-
cause of these circumstances, some courts look past the wording of
the contract and consider the entire transaction in order to effectu-
ate the reasonable expectations of the parties.
49
However, adhesion contracts are not inherently unenforceable or
void on their face.50  "[A] contract of adhesion is fully enforceable
a renewal term. This was supposed to provide authors with an opportunity at the
time of renewal to renegotiate their transfers with respect to the renewal term.
However, the renewal scheme largely failed to protect authors, because it did not
prevent them from assigning their expectancy in the renewal copyright during the
original term of the copyright. Financial exigencies led many authors during the
original term, before they knew the value of their works, to bargain away their
expectancy in the renewal term [along] with their interest in the original term.
Id. at 859.
47. See Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV.
L. REV. 1173 (1983). There is a considerable difference between a contract of adhesion
and a standard-form contract. Where contracts of adhesion are, at least from one point of
view, inherently unfair, standard-form contracts are a necessity of modern business rela-
tionships. In fact, one might classify some relationships between businesses and between
businesses and consumers "standard-form relationships," such as shipping a package on an
overnight service or opening a credit-card account. These relationships simply would not
justify and do not need.negotiated-from-scratch agreements, especially where the industry
is government regulated.
48. Spinello v. Amblin Entertainment, 29 Cal. App. 4th 1390,1396-97 (1994) (empha-
sis supplied) (quoting from Madden v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 552 P.2d 1178 (Cal. 1976)).
"Adhesion contracts traditionally involve parties of vastly different bargaining position,
with the stronger party exercising his power in such a way as to take advantage of the
weaker party's lack of sophistication in such matters." Jerry Kravat Entertainment Servs.,
Inc. v. Cobbs, 459 N.Y.S.2d 993, 995 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1983) (emphasis omitted) (citing Jones
v. Star Credit Corp., 298 N.Y.S.2d 264 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1969)).
49. Wheelock v. Sport Kites, Inc., 839 F. Supp. 730, 735 (D. Haw. 1993) (quoting
Leong v. Kaiser Found. Hosps., 788 P.2d 164, 168 (Haw. 1990)).
50. It would be unreasonable to suggest that the use of standard form contracts is,
in itself, objectionable or unconscionable. * * * Although standard form con-
tracts are not objectionable in the abstract, they do tend to be one-sided docu-
ments. * * * The contract may so decisively favor the stronger party that it
becomes oppressive. The exact nature of the oppressive or unfair element[s] may
vary greatly. *** The common factor found.., is the "unconscionability" of the
bargain.
according to its terms unless certain other factors operate to render it
otherwise. A finding of undue oppression or unconscionability may
be such a factor ....
C. Strict or Narrow Construction
When weak bargaining position has caused a party to enter into a
contract of adhesion, that party may later receive some benefit. A
court, although unwilling to void the contract on grounds of uncon-
scionability, will construe the provisions of the contract narrowly
against its drafter. For example, in a case concerning the licensing of
U.S. film and television rights in South Africa, the court stated:
Because of the unequal economic positions of the parties, [the
plaintiff's] inability to bargain over the terms of the contracts, and
the fine print nature of the documents which disabled [the plaintiff]
from understanding the contract and caused him to rely on defend-
ant's representations as to the legal effect of the documents, these
contracts can be described as contracts of adhesion. Provisions of
adhesion contracts can rarely be understood to be the expressions
of all the desires and expectations of the parties. For this reason,
oral evidence should be admitted to determine the intention of the
parties to these contracts, and once admitted, the contracts should
be narrowly construed against the party drafting them .... "Where
one of the parties is in a disadvantageous bargaining position be-
cause the provisions are standardized and stereotyped, such con-
tracts should be narrowly construed against the writer.
'
,
52
Are exclusive long-term songwriter-music publisher agreements
ever voided on any or all of the foregoing bases? Yes. In England,
courts have voided such contracts in three cases known as the "Eng-
lish Music Trilogy." 53 In A. Schroeder Music Publishing Co. v. Ma-
caulay (Macaulay),54 Clifford Davis Management Ltd. v. WEA
Records Ltd. (Davis),55 and O'Sullivan v. Management Agency and
Music Ltd. (O'Sullivan),56 the courts voided the contracts as uncon-
scionable restraints of trade. The contracts were "[o]ppressively one-
sided and [because] the songwriters ... were not represented by attor-
A.H. Angelo & E.P. Ellinger, Unconscionable Contracts: A Comparative Study of the Ap-
proaches in England, France, Germany, and the United States, 14 Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMP.
L.J. 455, 457-58 (1992) [hereinafter Unconscionable Contracts].
51. Spinello, 29 Cal. App. 4th at 1397 (citing Graham v. Scissor-Tail, Inc., 623 P.2d 165
(Cal. 1981)).
52. Waldbaum v. Worldvision Enters., No. 76 CIV 3772, 1978 WL 956, at *8 (D.C.N.Y.
Nov. 21, 1978) (quoting with approval 4 WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CON-
TRACrS § 626 (3d ed. 1961)).
53. Gilenson, supra note 43, at 534.
54. [1974] 3 All E.R. 616 (Eng. H.L.).
55. [1975] 1 All E.R. 237 (Eng. C.A.).
56. [1985] 3 All E.R. 351 (Eng. C.A.).
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neys or advisers and lacked equality of bargaining power with the
publishers."57 Further, "[t]here was no indication in either of the [first
two] English decisions that there had been substantial activity by the
music publisher which resulted in the distribution and sale of success-
ful artistic creations produced by the songwriters."58
In Macaulay, the songwriter contracted with the music publisher
to write songs for five years, but the standard-form contract contained
no provision requiring the music publisher to engage in any exploita-
tion of the songwriter's compositions.59 While there are no cases in
the United States on this precise subject, there is precedent for this
proposition. In M. Witmark & Sons v. Peters,60 a songwriter-music
publisher contract was held unenforceable because the contract re-
quired so much from the songwriter and so little from the music pub-
lisher by way of exploitation obligations.61 Nonetheless, standard-
form contracts containing little or no exploitation obligation on the
part of the music publisher have been the rule in the United States for
many decades.62
The Davis decision involved a suit by Clifford Davis, the former
manager of Fleetwood Mac. Christine McVie and Robert Welch
signed music publishing contracts with Davis when he was Fleetwood
Mac's manager.63 Davis alleged that Fleetwood Mac members Chris-
tine McVie and Robert Welch were still under music publishing con-
tracts with him and that Fleetwood Mac could not release an album
57. Bonner v. Westbound Records, Inc., 394 N.E.2d 1303, 1312 (11. App. Ct. 1979).
58. Id. at 1313. In using the language "distribution and sale of successful artistic cre-
ations produced by the songwriters," the Bonner court shows its ignorance of what music
publishers should do for songwriters. Id. Had the court better understood the nature of
such agreements it might, instead, have stated: "recording and release of the songwriter's
compositions by artists on major labels."
59. [In his opinion, Lord Diplock] emphasized the difference between freely ne-
gotiated contracts and standard form contracts offered on a "take it or leave it"
basis and suggested that in the latter there was greater need for vigilance on the
part of the courts to see that these forms were not used to facilitate unconsciona-
ble bargains.
Unconscionable Contracts, supra note 50, at 468 (footnote omitted).
60. 149 N.Y.S. 642 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1914).
61. Id. at 644.
62. My advice to up and coming songwriters signing with a publisher... for the
first time is to limit the number of songs [conveyed] as much as possible. Your
bargaining power is probably at its weakest. Your first deal will probably be one-
sided, against you. Avoid tying up your entire catalog, past, present and future.
As you achieve success and your bargaining position strengthens, you will be able
to negotiate future contracts that are more advantageous to you.
Robert R. Carter, Jr., Song Rights: Legal Aspects of Songwriting, SONGWRITER NOTES,
May 1994, at 5.
63. Id. at 536.
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containing their latest songwriting efforts without his permission.'
Davis sought an injunction preventing the release of the album in
England.6" In reversing the injunction granted by the trial court, the
appellate court relied upon the conflict of interest inherent in Davis'
position as both' the group's manager, and McVie's and Welch's music
publisher simultaneously, and on its view that the terms of the con-
tracts were "manifestly unfair."66 The court based the unfairness idea
on the fact that "the composers were bound for ten years while the
publisher had no corresponding obligation. The court determined
that the consideration for the copyright transfers was 'grossly inade-
quate.' As a result, the court held that the inequality of bargaining
power rendered the agreements unenforceable and set aside the copy-
right assignments. '67
In O'Sullivan, the issue was whether personal management, rec-
ord production, and music publishing contracts should be set aside as
"unreasonable restraints of trade" because of the "undue influence"
of Gordon Mills, singer-songwriter Gilbert O'Sullivan's personal man-
ager and major shareholder in the production and publishing compa-
68nies. O'Sullivan was victorious in both the trial and appellate
courts.69
[T]he recording and publishing companies "knew they were dealing
with a young and inexperienced man who was content to put him-
self entirely in their hands and relied entirely on them to give him a
fair deal."70 * * * The court held the contracts voidable and or-
dered an accounting of profits to O'Sullivan less reasonable remu-
neration for work performed by the defendant companies. It also
ordered the return of the master recordings and copyrights to
O'Sullivan.71
64. Gilenson, supra note 43, at 535-36.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 536-37.
67. Id. at 537. See also Buchwald v. Katz, 503 P.2d 1376 (Cal. 1972), involving the
band Jefferson Airplane. "The court.., held that the manager obtained publishing agree-
ments from the group in violation of his fiduciary duty as he did not inform the group of
other publishing offers that would have been to their advantage." Gilenson, supra note 43,
at 544 n.50.
68. Gilenson, supra note 43, at 537-38.
69. Id. at 538-39.
70. Id. at 539 (footnote omitted).
71. Id. (footnotes omitted).
[Another] example of... economic conflict involved singer-songwriter Bob Dy-
lan and his personal manager Albert Grossman. Dylan signed his first publishing
deal, with Dutchess Music, for a $500 advance. Dissatisfied with this original
deal, Grossman convinced Dylan, who had yet to achieve a significant level of
success, to repurchase his publishing rights from Dutchess. Six months after en-
tering the Dutchess agreement, Dylan repurchased the publishing rights for $500.
Grossman then reached an agreement with M. Witmark & Sons Publishing, which
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Sometimes, having no contract is better for the songwriter. Take
the case of Essra Mohawk, who had a "change of heart" about con-
veying one of her songs to a publisher.72 In November, 1985, Mohawk
wrote the words and music to Change Of Heart.7" The following Janu-
ary, she made a demo of that song plus a few others. On February 13,
1986, Mohawk played the demo tape for Walter Kahn, a recording
studio owner in Philadelphia. 74 Kahn expressed interest in Change Of
Heart and, on February 14, called Mohawk and proposed to "record
and shop" the song in exchange for the publishing rights.75 No formal
agreement was reached at that time.76 On February 16, Mohawk and
Kahn began working on a new demo of Change Of Heart, and Kahn
told Mohawk he would send her a publishing contract on the song.
He did so on February 19.7 7 Mohawk reviewed the contract and told
Kahn it was unacceptable.78
On February 20, Kahn informed Mohawk that he would turn the
contracting matter over to his attorney, an entertainment-industry
specialist, and that she could negotiate with him.79 Shortly thereafter,
Kahn's attorney called Mohawk and discussed her concerns. He indi-
cated that he would send her a revised document.8" On February 24,
Kahn told Mohawk he wanted to resolve their differences before do-
ing further work on the Change Of Heart demo, but he continued to
work on the production.81
paid Dylan a $1,000 advance and Grossman 25% of the publishing royalties. At
the end of the three-year contract, Grossman convinced Dylan to start his own
publishing company. With the formation of Dwarf Music, Dylan's own publishing
company, Grossman's stake increased to 50% of Dylan's total publishing income.
This was in addition to his 20% managerial commission. Furthermore, the mana-
gerial commission was applied against Dylan's own 50% interest in the publishing
royalties, giving Grossman a double commission on a single source of cash flow.
Grossman's advice was largely self-serving, exploiting Dylan's business naivete
for his own benefit. Because Dylan was incensed by the exorbitant percentage
taken by Grossman, he refrained from publishing songs for a five-year period to
avoid sharing the income with Grossman (footnotes omitted).
Id. at 544 n.129.
72. Mohawk v. Kahn, No. CIV.A.87-1405, 1987 WL 30121, at *1 (E.D. Pa. June 2,
1987).
73. Id.
74. Id. at *2.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
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In early March, Kahn's attorney notified him that he could not
make the revisions to the contract without a $1,500 retainer, where-
upon Kahn decided he would make the necessary revisions himself.8"
During the first two weeks of March, Kahn and Mohawk continued to
work on the demo, but Kahn did not present a revised contract to
Mohawk. They did not reach an agreement, but Kahn reiterated that
a contract had to be entered into before work could continue.83
By April 1, the new Change Of Heart demo was complete.' Mo-
hawk asked for and received a copy of the demo. 5 From April 7 to
April 11, Kahn pitched a number of songs, including Change Of Heart,
to several record companies in Los Angeles. There was some initial
interest, but no one put the song on hold.86 Later that month, "after
deciding never again to become involved in the recording of any songs
without signed agreements," Kahn moved to Los Angeles. He contin-
ued to pitch the Change Of Heart demo until June 11.
On May 7, Bonnie Ross, a friend of Mohawk's, called Mohawk to
ask if she could pitch any of Mohawk's songs to singer-songwriter
Cyndi Lauper.87 Ross and Mohawk met that evening, and Mohawk
played Ross the Change Of Heart demo produced by Kahn.88
Later that month, Ross played Change of Heart for Lauper, and
Lauper expressed interest in the song.89 On May 27, Mohawk agreed
to allow Lauper to make some changes to the lyrics and music and to
assign a 50% interest in the copyright to the song to Lauper's music
publishing company in return for Lauper's promise to record the
song.90 The contract specified that Lauper and Mohawk would be co-
publishers of the song and that Mohawk would receive 100% of the
writer's share of royalties.9' Five days earlier, Mohawk advised Kahn
to discontinue pitching Change Of Heart because Lauper planned to
record and release the song.92 After Mohawk executed the contract
with Lauper, Mohawk executed a separate agreement assigning ten
percent of all royalties she might receive from Change Of Heart to
Bonnie Ross. 93
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at *3.
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at *4.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
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Upon hearing that Lauper was to record the song and that he was
to receive nothing in the bargain, Kahn "strenuously objected" and
advised Lauper's associates that he owned the copyright to the song.94
Apparently undaunted, Lauper released an album containing the song
in September, and Change Of Heart was released as a single in No-
vember.95 On February 14, 1987, Change Of Heart reached number
three on the Billboard pop chart, and this lawsuit followed.96 After
the bench trial, the court found that there was no written conveyance
of the copyright from Mohawk to Kahn as required by the Act.97 The
court, while acknowledging that Kahn "[d]id his best to shop [the
song] in both California and New York," nonetheless found that in
producing and pitching the demo without a written agreement, he had
acted at his peril.98 Accordingly, the court found that Mohawk owed
no duty to Kahn, was not unjustly enriched, and had not acted uncon-
scionably.9 9 In fact, the court stated that to require Mohawk to com-
pensate Kahn would be "unconscionable."' °
III
The Contents of a Standard-Form Long-Term
Exclusive Songwriting-Music Publishing
Agreement
The following analysis attempts to address various problems in-
herent in songwriter-music publisher contracts by intensely scrutiniz-
ing individual provisions within a contract. 10
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id. at *6.
99. Id. at *7-*9.
100. Id. at *9.
101. The italicized contract clauses appearing in Section III are derived from four sepa-
rate contracts (see the footnote following each quoted provision for the specific source of
that provision). None of the contracts were comprehensive or well organized, in the au-
thor's view. In addition, none of them contained all of the topics found in this ,section,
although each topic (save droit moral) included in this section was found in at least one of
the four contracts. For purposes of contrast, the most one-sided of similar provisions in the
four contracts was used in this section. Much of the bracketed material represents stylistic
changes made by the author for purposes of stylistic consistency throughout the entire
"contract."
How do you avoid being intimidated by the "standard" form? As soon as you are
handed a "standard" contract and a pen to sign it with, say "thank you" and that
you'll have your lawyer look it over at once. Then go out and find a competent
music attorney!
Carter, supra note 62, at 5. However, not even a "competent music attorney" can improve
a contract that the music publisher offers to the songwriter on a "take it or leave it" basis.
A. General Provisions
1. Nature of Agreement
Publisher hereby employs Writer to render Writer's services as a
songwriter and composer and otherwise as may hereinafter be set
forth. Writer hereby accepts such employment and agrees to render
such services exclusively for Publisher during the term hereof and
upon the terms and conditions set forth herein. 102
There is no landmark or leading-case litigation at the appellate
level considering this language, but it is potentially controversial be-
cause of the major effect it could have on the ultimate ownership of
songs. This language could be construed to mean that the relationship
between the music publisher and the songwriter is a "work made for
hire:" the relationship of an "employer/employee" rather than, for ex-
ample, that of a "corporation/independent contractor." If the rela-
tionship is employer/employee, the termination provisions of the Act
would not come into effect. 10 3 In other words, it is clear that songwrit-
ers acting as their own employer can regain their copyrights after 35
years. However, should a songwriter create works of authorship as an
employee of a company, the songwriter could never own the copy-
rights in the first place. 1°" Such copyrights would have been the prop-
erty of the music publisher from the moment of creation. In such
cases, no copyright interest ever existed in the songwriter that could
later be terminated. 10 5
102. MEDOW, supra note 33, § 170-3.
[This provision e]stablishes an "employment" relationship between the parties.
In many current forms, the publisher does not "employ" the writer, but merely
"engages" his services. The principal reason for a publisher to choose an employ-
ment form [of contracting] for the relationship is found in the... "writer for hire"
provisions of the [Act] .... By definition under the [Act], the copyright vests in
the "author" of a work. If, however, an individual creates a work while in the
employ of another and within the scope of his employment, the "author" is the
employer, not the individual. * * * [W]ords alone are not sufficient to create the
relationship. The publisher must actually be in a position of controlling the result
of the writer's activities as a songwriter in order to validate his status as an em-
ployer of a "writer for hire." * * * Many publishers will insert the employment
language and claim to be the employer of a "writer for hire" knowing that they do
not fulfill the criteria and leaving their status as an employer for determination at
a later time by the courts if the writer decides to challenge that status.
Id. § 170-3 to -5 (footnotes omitted).
103. See NSAI HANDBOOK, supra note 23, at 15.
104. 17 U.S.C. § 203 (1988).
105. In a 1990 dispute over part of the copyright to the 50s and 60s rock classic Good
Golly Miss Molly, the court had to decide whether co-writer Robert A. Blackwell had
written the song as a "work made for hire." Marascalco v. Fantasy, Inc., No. CIV. 88-675,
1990 WL 257290 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 24, 1990).
Fantasy [the eventual successor in interest to Venice, the song's original pub-
lisher] asserts that Blackwell co-wrote the Song within the course and scope of his
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Given all the language in the standard-form contract concerning
songwriters conveying copyrights to music publishers, 10 6 this construc-
tion might seem problematic for use by a music publisher in litigation.
However, there is a somewhat logical, if duplicitous, argument in
favor of the proposition: first, that the work made for hire construc-
tion concerns only songs written during the term of the agreement;
and that second, the conveyance language concerns songs the song-
writer has written or co-written before becoming an employee of the
music publishing company10 7 and any copyrights or portions of copy-
rights the songwriter might own vis-a-vis songs written by others. 08
There are other problems with this language. Under current
copyright law, songs written as "works made for hire" have a copy-
right duration period of 75 years,10 9 while songs written otherwise
have a copyright life extending 50 years beyond the date of death of
the last surviving author." 0 The music publisher is willing to trade the
shorter copyright life of the song for the extra 40 years (75 years ver-
sus termination after 35 years) of ownership that circumventing the
termination provisions of the Act would bring the publisher."' Also,
never having owned the copyright, the songwriter would have no op-
portunity to bargain on such controversial subjects as the music pub-
lisher's "right" to change fundamental elements of a musical
employment with Venice. If this were true, then Fantasy would own the renewal
interest as Venice's successor in interest. However, based on the evidence
presented, Blackwell co-wrote the Song as an independent songwriter, and, there-
fore, was a co-owner of the Song's original copyright. In reaching this conclusion,
the court relies on the Standard Songwriter's Contract ... , executed in 1956, in
which Blackwell assigned his copyright interest, as an author of the Song, to Ven-
ice, as the Song's publisher. * * * [I]f Blackwell had written the Song in the scope
of his employment, he would have had nothing to assign, and the Contract, as it
relates to him, would have been meaningless.
Id. at 1. "One wonders how many songwriters have signed contracts accepting employ-
ment with publishers without understanding what they may be giving up in the process."
NSAI HANDBOOK, supra note 23, at 17.
106. See MEDOW, supra note 33, §§ 170-7 to -12.
107. Id. at § 170-7(a) (first paragraph).
108. Id. at § 170-8(c) (first paragraph). While there are no cases on point, surely this
argument would fail where the songwriter had executed individual copyright conveyance
forms to the music publisher on songs created during the term of the agreement.
109. 17 U.S.C. § 302(c) (1988).
110. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (1988).
111. See NSAI HANDBOOK, supra note 23, at 16. Contract language alone, however,
may not determine whether the relationship is one "for hire" or whether the creator is an
independent contractor. See Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730
(1989).
1995]
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composition and reduce the songwriter's share of royalties. Songwrit-
ers should avoid the "employment" language in this provision.
112
2. Definitions
For purposes of this Agreement, "party" means and refers to any
individual, corporation, partnership, association or any other organ-
ized group of persons or the legal successors or representatives of the
foregoing. Whenever the expression "the term of this Agreement" or
words of similar connotation are used herein, they shall be deemed to
112. NSAI HANDBOOK, supra note 23, at 19. A recent commentator indicated that the
"work made for hire" provision in music publishing contracts has been in such documents
since "the early years of the recording industry." Joseph B. Anderson, The Work Made for
Hire Doctrine and California Recording Contracts: A Recipe for Disaster, 17 HASTINGS
COMM/ENT L.J. 587, 588 (1995). Music publishing contracts, the commentator stated, in-
clude "work made for hire" provisions for the following reason:
[P]ublishing companies.., felt they needed to own, to as large an extent as possi-
ble, the music they intended to [market]. [Outright] [o]wnership of the music
gave the publishing companies the right to license it and collect on it as easily and
profitably as possible .... In the case of less well-known composers, the [publish-
ers] hired them as employees on a day-to-day basis to crank out tunes .... In the
case of well-known composers, the [publishers] took ownership interests in the
compositions and, in addition to flat-fee compensation, agreed to pay ... to the
[composers] (the article stated "artists" but surely meant "composers") a percent-
age, or royalty, of the money the [publisher] actually collected on the songs (foot-
note omitted).
Id. at 589.
While this may be true, Anderson's support for his propositions was not as thoroughly
documented as it might have been, and the article was further complicated by an inconsis-
tency in places regarding whether the author was referring to songwriters or recording
artists or perhaps both. If the author is asserting that "work made for hire" provisions
have been there all along and that much of songwriting, historically, has been on a "work
made for hire" basis, several competing ideas seem worth noting. First, simple assignment
of the copyright from the songwriter to the music publisher would have given the music
publisher the "right to license [the music] and collect on it." Second, there are apparently
no reported cases on the issue of "work made for hire" contract language as opposed to
"copyright conveyance" contract language in the historical context of songwriter-music
publisher relationships. Third, there exists a large body of case law on the subject of re-
newal rights under the 1909 copyright statute, a subject that seemingly would not have
come up with such frequency had most songwriting been accomplished on a "work made
for hire" basis where renewal would not have been under the control of the songwriters or
their heirs.
Hence, while there may routinely have been "work made for hire" provisions in song-
writer-music publishing contracts, the practice may largely have been discontinued in favor
of copyright conveyance from songwriters to music publishers, including renewal rights,
with the "work made for hire" language perhaps having been resurrected after passage of
the current copyright law and its non-assignability of termination rights. At any rate, this
interesting historical subject, specifically concerning songwriters as opposed to recording
artists or singer-songwriters, would seem ripe for research. Otherwise, Anderson did much
in the article to flesh out the duplicitousness and disingenuousness of some recording com-
panies' practice of engaging in employment relationships where all the advantages go to
the employer record company and all the disadvantages go to the employee recording
artist.
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mean and refer to the initial term of this Agreement and any and all
renewals, extensions, substitutions or replacements of this Agreement,
whether expressly indicated or otherwise. 113
While considerably incomplete, this provision is non-
controversial.
3. Term of Agreement
The initial term of this Agreement shall commence as of (date)
and shall continue through (date). Writer hereby grants to Publisher
[some number of] separate and irrevocable options, each to renew
this Agreement for a one (1) year term, such renewal terms to run
consecutively beginning at the expiration of the initial term hereof, all
upon the same terms and conditions as are applicable to the initial
term except as otherwise provided herein. Each option shall be exer-
cised only by written notice to be sent by Publisher to Writer not less
than ten (10) days prior to the commencement of the renewal term for
which the option is exercised.
114
Here, the options belong only to the publisher, and no specific
consideration is given for them. The NSAI Handbook suggests the
initial term should be no less than a year and indicates that "[i]t is
reasonable to expect a [music] publisher to ask for at least one 1-year
option . ... "115 The NSAI Handbook suggests songwriters should
"think seriously" before entering into an agreement for more than
three years original term plus publisher's options because any pub-
lisher's options beyond that time would "more than likely not com-
pensate you adequately because your value to the publisher would
have increased."'
1 16
The NSAI Handbook contains another suggestion for dealing
with option terms.
Asking a publisher to earn options has, to date, been rare[ly success-
ful], but do not preclude the possibility. Whether you are an ad-
vanced or entry-level songwriter . . ., try to get a clause in your
contract which requires the publisher to earn options based on the
number of songs cut, the amount of songwriter income earned or, in
lieu of either of those, an amount of money to purchase the
option.1 17
113. MEDOW, supra note 33, § 170-25.
114. Id. § 170-5 to -6. "Generally, publishers attempt to secure the longest possible
term of years." Id. § 170-6.
115. NSAI HANDBOOK, supra note 23, at 12.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 13. Publishers, of course, tend to see the matter differently.
Options customarily reside solely in the publisher. Since advances are customary
with an agreement of this type, a publisher who has spent time, effort and energy
developing a writer will generally not be willing to allow the writer to decide
whether the writer is willing to continue with the ... contract. If the writer had
the option to terminate ... at the first possible time after the moment of success,
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4. Copyright Conveyance
Writer hereby irrevocably and absolutely assigns, conveys and
grants to Publisher, its successors and assigns (a) all rights and inter-
ests of every kind, nature and description in and to all original musi-
cal compositions and all original arrangements of musical
compositions in the public domain which have heretofore been writ-
ten, composed or created by Writer, in whole or in part, alone or in
collaboration with others, including but not limited to the titles, lyrics
and music thereof and all world-wide copyrights and renewals and
extensions thereof under any present or future laws throughout the
world, to the extent any of the foregoing shall not heretofore have
been conveyed by Writer to an unrelated third party; and (b) all rights
and interests of every kind, nature and description in and to the re-
sults and proceeds of Writer's services hereunder, including but not
limited to the titles, lyrics and music of all original musical composi-
tions and of all original arrangements of musical compositions in the
public domain and all worldwide copyrights and renewals and exten-
sions thereof under any present or future laws throughout the world,
which shall be written, composed or created by Writer during the
term hereof in whole or in part, alone or ii collaboration with others;
and (c) all rights and interests of every kind, nature and description in
and to all original musical compositions and all original arrange-
ments of musical compositions in the public domain which are now
directly or indirectly owned or controlled by Writer, in whole or in
part, alone or with others, . . . as the employer or transferee of the
writers or composers thereof or otherwise, including the titles, lyrics
and music thereof and all world-wide copyrights and renewals and
extensions thereof under any present or future laws throughout the
world; all of which musical compositions, arrangements, right and
interests Writer hereby warrants and represents are and shall at all
times be Publisher's exclusive property as the sole owner thereof free
from any adverse claims or rights therein by any other party (all such
musical compositions and arrangements hereinafter being referred to
as "Compositions. ")
Without limiting the generality of the foregoing, Writer acknowl-
edges that the rights and interests hereinabove set forth include
Writer's irrevocable grant to Publisher, its successors and assigns, of
the sole and exclusive right, license, privilege and authority through-
out the entire world with respect to all Compositions, whether now in
existence or whether created during the term hereof as follows:
(a) To perform and license others to perform the Compositions
publicly or privately, for profit or otherwise, by means of public or
private performance, radio broadcast, television, or any and all other
means of media, whether now known or hereafter conceived or
developed.
(b) To substitute a new title or titles for the Compositions or any
of them and to make any arrangement, adaptation, translation, dram-
atization or transposition of any or all of the Compositions or of the
the writer would simply cause the [contract] to expire, thus "depriving" the pub-
lisher of the anticipated fruits of his labor in developing the writer.
MEDOW, supra note 33, § 170-6 to -7.
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titles, lyrics or music thereof, in whole or in part, and in connection
with any other musical, literary or dramatic material, and to add new
lyrics to the music of any Compositions or new music to the lyrics of
any Composition, all as Publisher may deem necessary or desirable
in its best business judgment.
(c) To secure copyright registration and protection of the Com-
positions in Publisher's name or otherwise, as Publisher may desire,
at Publisher's own cost and expense, and at Publisher's election, in-
cluding any and all renewals and extensions of copyright under any
present or future laws throughout the world, and to have and to hold
said copyrights, renewals and extensions and all rights existing there-
under, for and during the full term of all said copyrights and all re-
newals and extensions and all rights existing thereunder, for and
during the full term of all said copyrights and all renewals and exten-
sions thereof
(d) To make or cause to be made, and to license others to make,
master records, transcriptions, soundtracks, pressings and other
mechanical, electrical or other reproductions of the Compositions, in
whole or in part, in such form or manner and as frequently as Pub-
lisher shall determine, including the right to synchronize the Compo-
sitions with sound motion pictures and to use, manufacture, advertise,
license or sell reproductions for any and all purposes, including,
without limitation private and public performances, radio broadcast,
television, sound motion pictures, wired radio, phonograph records
and any and all other means or devices, whether now known or here-
after conceived or developed.
(e) To print, publish and sell, and to license others to print, pub-
lish and sell, sheet music, orchestrations, arrangements and other edi-
tions of the Compositions in all forms, including, without limitation,
the inclusion of any or all of the Compositions in song folios, compi-
lations, song books, mixed folios, personality folios and lyric
magazines with or without music.
(f) Any and all other rights now or hereafter existing in all Com-
positions under and by virtue of any common law rights and all copy-
rights and renewals and extensions thereof including [the grand
rights and] so-called small performance rights. 18
The first problem that arises from this rather long and arduous
provision is in (a) (first paragraph) where the songwriter conveys to
the music publisher all the songs she has ever written not previously
conveyed to another music publisher. The problem with this provi-
sion is twofold: (1) the songwriter may simply be unaware of this fact;
and (2) even if aware, there is no specific consideration flowing to the
songwriter from the music publisher in return for what may be a dec-
ade of hard work, not to mention the thousands of dollars the song-
writer may have spent on demos of these existing songs (that the
songwriter may even turn over to the music publisher for the music
publisher's use in exploiting such songs). The NSAI Handbook states
118. MEDOW, supra note 33, § 170-7 to -12.
that where a songwriter is "bringing an existing catalog into a new
deal, [the songwriter] should expect to be compensated,"' 19 whether
by outright purchase, up-front advance, larger monthly advance, co-
publishing, copyright conveyance per song (all or part) upon success-
ful exploitation, some combination of the foregoing, or by some other
method. 120
The second problem is in (b) (first paragraph) where, for songs
written pursuant to the agreement, the songwriter conveys all renewal
and extension rights under "any present or future laws throughout the
world." It is not a good idea, generally, to bargain away potential
benefits from future domestic legislation, foreign legislation, or inter-
national treaties, at least not without some kind of specific quid pro
quo.
The third problem is in (c) (first paragraph) where the songwriter
conveys to the music publisher any musical copyrights she may own of
songs she did not write, or that she wrote only a part of yet owns the
copyright interests of the co-writer(s), such as where she co-wrote a
song and the co-writer conveyed his half of the copyright to her in
return for her subsidizing the cost of producing a demo on the song.
The problem here is, again, that the songwriter may be unaware that
she is conveying any such copyright interests. Even if she is aware, no
specific consideration flows from the music publisher to the song-
writer in return for such copyright interests.
Beginning with "Without limiting. . .," most of the remainder of
this provision can be construed to be superfluous and should be
avoided in the interest of a more readable document. More or less,
this language grants the music publisher all the rights that copyright
owners have under the Act. It is, therefore, superfluous because a
simple and complete copyright conveyance automatically conveys
these rights.' 2 1 However, while superfluous, the specific inclusion in
this provision of lettered-paragraph (b) prompts a discussion of why
songwriters should try, in conveying copyrights, not to convey the en-
tire "bundle of rights"'12 2 granted to copyright owners by federal law,
specifically the right to prepare derivative works.' 23 While lettered-
paragraph (b) does not use the term "derivation," the language used
119. NSAI HANDBOOK, supra note 23, at 58.
120. Id. at 58-59.
121. The Tree International Exclusive Songwriter Agreement used in this article does
not contain this language. Tree International, Exclusive Songwriter Agreement, Music
PUBLISHING AND THE LAW: 1989 (American Bar Association Forum on the Entertainment
and Sports Industries) [hereinafter Tree].
122. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1988).
123. 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (1988).
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describes how a derivation occurs. The provision states that the music
publisher has the right to completely change any song concerning
which the copyright has been conveyed from the songwriter to the
music publisher. The publisher can substitute new lyrics, substitute a
new melody, or anything in between, i.e., to "derive" a second work
from the first work.
For example, a music publisher could hire another songwriter to
write a somewhat different melody than contained in an original song,
leaving the original songwriter's melody partly intact. This could re-
sult in a decrease of the original songwriter's royalties proportionate
to the degree of change effectuated by the copyright-owning music
publisher. This assumes, of course, that it is the derivation, and not
the original composition, that is ultimately, or in substitution of the
dormant original composition, exploited by the music publisher. The
law on this point is not at all well settled. In Cortner v. Israel,'24 sev-
eral songwriters co-wrote the theme to ABC's Monday Night Football,
titling the composition ABC's Monday Night Football Theme, and as-
signing the copyright to ABC by contract. 125 In the agreement, "ABC
was granted all publishing ... rights in the [composition] as its sole
and exclusive property .... , 126 ABC used the theme for several years
and paid the songwriters royalties called for by the agreement. 127 The
controversy began when ABC employed another songwriter "to write
a new, similar derivative theme for future use on the same program
.. 128 With the copyright to the derivative work residing completely
in ABC under the "work made for hire" provision of the Act,129 ABC
then began using the derivative work in place of the original composi-
tion.' 30 Here is where the court's opinion becomes murky.13 '
Since the creators of the original composition sued ABC, it is safe
to assume that ABC, once it began using the new theme, either
stopped making royalty payments to the creators altogether or re-
duced its royalty payments to them in relation to the degree of change
contained in the derivation. If royalty payments continued but at
124. 732 F.2d 267 (2d Cir. 1984).
125. Id. at 269.
126. Id.
127. Id. at 270.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. The court chastised the lawyers who prepared the conveyance documents in this
case, stating that the appeal "illustrates the confusion that can occur when lawyers indis-
criminately use multiple contracts (some on standard forms) in the transfer of copyright
interests without giving careful consideration to the consequences of their action[s]." Id. at
268. The court's own opinion was a bit short of quality writing, as well.
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some kind of proportionately reduced rate, on what logic did ABC
unilaterally decide how much to reduce the creators' royalties? Fur-
ther, the court does not indicate whether ABC's music publishing
arm, once ABC began to use the new theme, took any one or more of
the following actions: (1) Did ABC notify the creators' performing
rights organization(s) that the original theme was no longer being
used and that public performance royalties, therefore, should no
longer be split between ABC's music publishing arm and the creators
(as would be the usual situation); and (2) Did ABC then indicate that,
from that point forward, all performance royalties should be paid en-
tirely to ABC since it was using the new theme (which ABC had regis-
tered with the Copyright Office as a "work made for hire" completely
owned by ABC)? This is necessary information to truly understand
this case.
The court ruled that ABC, as the copyright owner, had the right
"to prepare derivative works based on the copyrighted work"'132 and
to "acquire ... the copyright to the new material in the derivative
work" '133 as a "work made for hire." The court also determined that
"the derivative composition [did] not infringe the preexisting compo-
sition."' 34 Accordingly, the court found no infringement and affirmed
the district court's grant of summary judgment for ABC. 135 Viewed
one way, the effect of this decision is that copyright-transferee music
publishers can expunge their contractual obligations to pay royalties
to the creators of the conveyed musical compositions by causing the
creation of a derivative work which the publisher owns completely as
a "work made for hire." This- potentially devastating result, however,
is based on a copyright infringement theory. Perhaps, as both the dis-
trict and circuit courts acknowledged, the plaintiffs in this case may
have had a valid cause of action in state court "for breach of an im-
plied obligation not to use the musical theme in a way that would
deprive [the plaintiffs] of their right to royalties."' 36 One solution, of
course, is to utilize specific contract language. There is much to nego-
tiate on this point, and there are a variety of ways to deal with the
problem, including, for example, a provision that the music publisher
be required to seek the original creator's permission before materially
changing the original composition, such permission not to be unrea-
sonably withheld by the original creator.
132. Id. at 271.
133. Id. at 272.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. (citing Nelson v. Mills Music, 104 N.Y.S.2d 605 (1951)).
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Lettered-paragraph (c) contains the same "future laws" problem
as in (b) (first paragraph) of this provision. Lettered-paragraph (d) is
a problem because it grants to the music publisher all rights in uses of
the compositions not yet conceived. This problem is explored later in
this article. 137 Paragraph (f) also-contains language that a songwriter
might specifically bargain to excise. Under the Act, this language is
superfluous and of no consequence. However, should Congress
amend current law, for instance, to remove the termination provisions
and reinstitute renewal periods, the section (f) language that indicates
the songwriter is conveying "all copyrights and renewals and exten-
sions thereof.. ." could mean the songwriter is conveying more than
she bargained away.138 There have been many disputes over the years
concerning the renewal features of the Copyright Act of 1909.131 If
current law remains the same, this should no longer be a problem, but
it never hurts to be conservative in situations like this.140
5. Existing Material
Upon the execution hereof, [Writer] shall deliver to [Publisher]
manuscript copies or recordings of all existing [Compositions] now
owned by [Writer] in whole or in part, together with a complete list of
the titles thereof, on which all other parties having an ownership in-
terest therein, if any, shall be identified and their interests specified. 141
This is generally non-controversial, assuming the songwriter un-
derstands that she is conveying her available previous work. One
question, however, concerns whether any "recordings" being deliv-
ered to the music publisher by the songwriter means demos owned by
the songwriter and, if so, whether the music publisher intends to use
them for exploitation purposes and, if so, how and to what extent the
songwriter should be compensated for them.
6. Material Created under this Agreement
[Writer] covenant[s], undertake[s] and agree[s] that, during the
term of this [A]greement, [Writer] will make and deliver to [Pub-
lisher] completed manuscripts or recordings of each [Composition]
promptly after the creation thereof 142
137. See infra note 370 and accompanying text.
138. NSAI HANDBOOK, supra note 23, at 10.
139. See Carter v. Goodman Group Music Publishers, 848 F. Supp. 438 (S.D.N.Y. 1994)
and Folkways Music Publishers, Inc. v. Weiss, 989 F.2d 108 (2d Cir. 1993) (The Lion Sleeps
Tonight).
140. Particularly if, as seems likely, Congress moves to some form of life plus 70 years.
141. Tree, supra note 121.
142. Id.
This is a non-controversial provision, assuming that the music
publisher does not later want to argue that this provision means the
songwriter is in breach of the contract unless she delivers a lead sheet
or demo, paid for by her, to the music publisher.
7. Individual Copyright Conveyances
If Publisher so desires, Publisher may request Writer to execute a
separate agreement in Publisher's customary form with respect to
each Composition hereunder. Upon such request, Writer shall
promptly execute and deliver such separate agreement, and upon
Writer's failure to do so, Publisher shall have the right, pursuant to
the terms and conditions hereof, to execute such separate agreement
in behalf of Writer. Such separate agreement shall supplement and
not supersede this Agreement. In the event of any conflict between
the provisions of such separate agreement and this Agreement, the
provisions of this Agreement shall govern. The failure of either of the
parties hereto to execute such separate agreement, whether such exe-
cution is requested by Publisher or not, shall not affect the rights of
each of the parties hereunder, including but not limited to the rights
of Publisher to all of the Compositions written, composed or ac-
quired by Writer during the term hereof. 143
This is a non-controversial provision.
8. Exclusivity
During the term of this Agreement, Writer shall not write or
compose, or furnish or convey, any musical compositions, titles,
lyrics or music, or any rights or interests therein, nor participate in
any manner with regard to same, for or to any party other than Pub-
lisher, nor permit the use of his name or likeness as the writer or co-
writer of any musical composition by any party other than
Publisher.1 "4
This provision poses several problems. It prohibits the songwriter
from conveying to a third party any copyright, unrelated to the agree-
ment, that she may own. Second, it fails to take into account that the
songwriter may previously have been under contract to another music
publisher. It makes no sense to prohibit the songwriter from cooper-
ating in the continuing exploitation of copyrights conveyed under a
previous contract; further, the songwriter is likely legally obligated to
help exploit such material. Finally, the songwriter, through her own
music publishing efforts (e.g., as a sole proprietor or through a self-
owned corporation), may have successfully exploited a song and still
own all or part of the copyright to that song. It would be equally
unfair to prohibit the songwriter from engaging in the further ex-
143. MEDOW, supra note 33, § 170-19.
144. Id. § 170-12 to -13.
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ploitation of such a copyright. If the music publisher wants to limit
the songwriter in this way, compensation should be paid to the song-
writer and probably to any relevant previous or other publishers as
well.
This article concerns contracts that are inclusive of all songs writ-
ten over the term of the agreement, i.e., while most of the same princi-
ples apply, single-song agreements are not covered. Obviously,
songwriters need to be aware of the ramifications of the type contracts
they might execute. Apparently, singer-songwriter Carly Simon was
once confused on the subject. On May 15, 1968, she signed a contract
with Elan Associates, Ltd., providing that for a term of years, Elan
"would enjoy the exclusive right to publish and obtain copyrights on
musical compositions written by Carly Simon." '145 Unfortunately, Si-
mon was already under an exclusive term agreement with Quacken-
bush Music, Ltd., a company she partly owned and that "had been
formed to publish and hold copyrights in all songs which she
composed.', 14 6
From 1969 to 1971, Quackenbush obtained the copyrights to
seven Simon compositions. 4 7 In May, 1971, Simon realized that the
Elan agreement, which she believed was a single-song agreement, was
actually an exclusive-term agreement. 14 8 Realizing her problem, Si-
mon sued Elan in state court in New York to void the Elan contract
on fraud grounds.14 9 A month later, Elan copyrighted the same seven
songs and sued Quackenbush in federal court for copyright infringe-
ment.150 Quackenbush argued that the federal court lacked subject-
matter jurisdiction because the controversy dealt with ownership of
copyrights and not copyright infringement.' 51 The court agreed and
dismissed the suit.' 2 Such misunderstandings need not occur if a
songwriter educates herself on the different types of copyright
agreements.
145. Elan Assocs., Ltd. v. Quackenbush Music, Ltd., 339 F. Supp. 461, 461 (S.D.N.Y.
1972).
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
i49. Id.
150. Id. at 462.
151. Id.
152. Id. Quackenbush's case against Elan in state court in New York did not result in a
reported opinion. See also Peay v. Morton, 571 F. Supp. 108 (M.D. Tenn. 1983) (Close
Enough to Perfect).
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9. Writer's Name and Likeness
Writer grants to Publisher, without any compensation other than
as specified herein, the perpetual right to use and publish and to per-
mit others to use and publish Writer's name (including any profes-
sional name heretofore or hereafter adopted by Writer), Writer's
photograph or other likeness, or any reproduction or simulation
thereof, and biographical material concerning Writer, and the titles of
any and all of the Compositions, in connection with the printing, sale,
advertising, performance, distribution and other exploitation of the
Compositions, and for any other purposes related to the business of
Publisher, its affiliated and related companies or to refrain therefrom.
This right shall be exclusive during the term hereof and nonexclusive
thereafter. Writer shall not authorize or permit the use of Writer's
name or likeness, or any reproduction or simulation thereof, or bio-
graphical material concerning Writer, for or in connection with any
musical compositions, other than by or for Publisher. Writer grants
Publisher the right to refer to Writer as Publisher's "Exclusive Song-
writer and Composer" or to use any other similar and appropriate
appellation, during the term hereof.153
First, the music publisher should not receive any "perpetual"
rights from the songwriter. All the copyrights conveyed under the
agreement by the songwriter to the music publisher will terminate or
expire. The word "perpetual" should be deleted. The exclusivity pro-
vision presumes the songwriter has not previously conveyed any musi-
cal copyrights to any other music publisher. The sentence should be
rewritten to remove the presumption. Further, the grant of rights
from the songwriter to the music publisher is unnecessarily large. This
can be an important issue should the songwriter ever become a re-
cording artist. In Kamakazi Music Corp. v. Robbins Music Corp.,"'
singer-songwriter Barry Manilow sued a music publisher for, inter alia,
using his name and likeness while continuing to sell print portfolios of
his music after the expiration of its license to do so. The court ruled
that since Manilow had consented to Robbins' use of his name and
likeness in the original license granted to Robbins, Robbins' contin-
ued use of his name and likeness was not actionable in addition to the
infringement claim that was the main cause of action.155
10. Droit Moral
Writer hereby waives the benefits of any provision of law known
as the droit moral . . . and the benefits of any similar law of any
country of the world. Writer further agrees not to institute, support,
maintain or permit any claim, proceeding, action or lawsuit anywhere
in the world on the ground [that] any publication or other use by
153. MEDOW, supra note 33, § 170-12.
154. 534 F. Supp. 69 (S.D.N.Y. 1982).
155. Id. at 77-78.
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Publisher or its assignees or licensees, including the full exercise of its
rights under this [A]greement, in any way constitutes an infringement
or violation of any of Writer's droit moral, droit d'auteur or similar
right or is in any way a defamation or mutilation of any... Composi-
tion or part thereof or contains unauthorized variations of the...
Compositions. If, despite the provision of the immediately preceding
sentence, such a proceeding and/or lawsuit is instituted, Writer specif-
ically WAIVES HIS OR HER RIGHT TO ANY EQUITABLE RELIEF includ-
ing injunction, and any claim to monetary damages[] Writer's sole
remedy and recourse for the alleged infringements and violations
SHALL BE TO REQUIRE THE REMOVAL OF THE WRITER'S NAME
FROM ALL CREDITS, ADVERTISING OR PUBLICITY OF OR RELATING
TO ANY SUCH VERSION OF THE MUSICAL COMPOSITION IN
QUESTION.
1 5 6
Literally translated from French, the term droit moral means
"moral rights." However, "the phrase 'personal rights' more accu-
rately translates droit moral than does 'moral rights,' and it is more
suggestive of the theoretical basis that underlies the concept. Further-
more, it avoids any misleading connotations that attach in English to
the word 'moral.'
' 157
Personal rights for works of authorship originated under Roman
law and later became law in France and other European countries.
These jurisdictions maintain a public policy that such rights are as im-
portant as the statutory economic rights in works of authorship.15 8
The United States has been hostile to any idea of "personal rights" for
authors of creative works, at least until its recent accession to the
Berne Convention. Article 6bis states:
Independently of the author's economic rights, and even after the
transfer of the said rights, the author shall have the right to claim
authorship of the work and to object to any distortion, mutilation or
other modification of, or other derogatory action in relation to, the
said work, which would be prejudicial to his honor or reputation.1 59
156. NSAI HANDBOOK, supra note 23, at 6-7.
157. Edward J. Damich, The Right of Personality: A Common-Law Basis for the Pro-
tection of the Moral Rights of Authors, 23 GA. L. REV. 1, 6 (1988) (footnote omitted).
158. Id.
[T]he work of the artist is inseparable from the artist's soul. The work is an ex-
tension of the creator, a representation of the person's inner spirit and vision and,
therefore, as much a part of the artist as [her] arm or mind. It is a projection of
the artist's personality and, as such, beyond and separate from the rights of own-
ership. By some, these rights are considered inalienable regardless of ownership.
NSAI HANDBOOK, supra note 23, at 2-3.
159. Patrick G. Zabatta, Moral Rights and Musical Works; Are Composers Getting
Berned?, 43 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1095, 1096 n.9 (1992) (citing Berne Convention for the
Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1986, art. 6bis).
The Berne Convention ... is the world's oldest international agreement concern-
ing the recognition and protection of intellectual property rights. Essentially, the
purpose of the Berne Convention is to create a uniform international body of law
with respect to the rights of authors in the works they create. Accordingly, mem-
Notwithstanding that article 6bis speaks to the creative works of
all types of authors, the only domestic legislation enacted since
America's accession to the Berne Convention and the enactment of
the Berne Convention Implementation Act was in a limited and non-
songwriting context. 160 Because such legislation could operate as a
limitation on the rights of copyright-owning music publishers, there is
a desire on the part of music publishers, at least in the context of the
quoted provision, to have songwriters contract away any "personal"
rights they may acquire in the future.
bers of the Union agree to enact laws that guarantee certain fundamental rights to
authors as minimum standards. The benefits of these laws must enure equally to
a member's own citizens and citizens of other members. Though other interna-
tional treaties also protect intellectual property, the Berne Convention is the most
expansive in terms of both its membership and the nature of the rights guaran-
teed to those who create works of intellectual property. "Moral rights" are
among those fundamental rights expressly described by the Berne Convention,
and as such are intended to be universally guaranteed by members of the Union.
Id. at 1095-96 (footnotes omitted).
160. It is generally agreed that the United States has never sought to protect the
personal rights of authors, only their economic interests, through copyright law
(perhaps with the exception of section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, though no one
seriously believes Congress, in enacting that statute in 1946, intended to adopt
any droit moral principles). The ... Berne Convention ... , [which] opened for
signature on September 9, 1886 [and was] last revised on July 24, 1971, finally was
joined by the United States on March 1, 1989. Accession meant acceptance, at
least in principle, of personal rights for literary and artistic works, but the imple-
menting legislation, the Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988 .... did
not go far enough in the minds of personal rights advocates in actually complying
with article 6bis of the Berne Convention .... (See also Berne Convention Imple-
mentation Act of 1988, Pub. L. 100-568, 102 Stat. 2854, codified in 17 U.S.C.
§§ 101, et seq., specifically at §§ 101, 104, 116, 116A, 205, 301, 401-408, 411, 501,
504 and 801.)
As a result, personal rights advocates sought federal legislation, specifically
in the area of visual art, resulting in the passage of the Visual Artists Rights Act
of 1990 (citation omitted). It is important to note that the law extends personal
rights protection only to visual art and not to the broader category of all literary
and artistic works. Personal rights advocates state that even the Visual Artists
Rights Act does not bring America in complete compliance with article 6bis. The
act specifically protects [only] paintings, drawings, prints or sculptures [and]
under certain highly limited circumstances. 17 U.S.C.A. § 101 (West Supp. 1992).
Don E. Tomlinson & Christopher R. Harris, Free-Lance Photojournalism in a Digital
World: Copyright, Lanham Act and Droit Moral Considerations Plus a Sui Generis Solu-
tion, 45 FED. COMM. L.J. 1, 35 n.192 (1992). See also Zabatta, supra note 159; Edward J.
Damich, The Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990: Toward a Federal System of Moral Rights
Protection for Visual Art, 39 CATH. U. L. REV. 945 (1990).
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B. Songwriting
1. Writer's Conscientiousness
Writer shall perform his required services hereunder conscien-
tiously and solely and exclusively for and as requested by Publisher.
Writer is a writer for hire hereunder, and all Compositions are ac-
knowledged by Writer to be works made for hire.16 1
This provision mirrors the language of the "nature of agreement"
provision162 and leaves no doubt that the music publisher specifically
desires a "work made for hire" relationship, for the reasons stated
earlier, rather than an "independent contractor" relationship.'63 This
language should be avoided. Another problem with this provision is
the "conscientiousness" language. "Conscientiousness" cannot be
meaningfully defined in a legal context and has no place in a contract
of this nature. "Exclusivity" is dealt with elsewhere in the agreement.
Therefore, this provision should be completely eliminated.
2. Uniqueness of Services
Writer acknowledges that the services to be rendered by Writer
hereunder are of a special, unique, unusual, extraordinary and intel-
lectual character which gives them a peculiar value, the loss of which
cannot be reasonably or adequately compensated in damages in an
action at law, and that a breach by Writer of any of the provisions of
this Agreement will cause Publisher great and irreparable injury and
damage. Writer expressly agrees that Publisher shall be entitled to ihe
remedies of injunction and other equitable relief to enforce this
Agreement or... any provision hereof which relief shall be in addi-
tion to any other remedies, for damages or otherwise, Which may be
available to Publisher.164
The NSAI Handbook views this provision as duplicitous 165 be-
cause it is incongruent and illogical that the songwriter should be will-
ing to waive all benefits under the droit moral concept if what the
songwriter is creating is "special, unique, unusual, extraordinary and
intellectual.' 1 66 Moreover, the way the "equitable relief" portion of
this provision is written ("Publisher shall be entitled to the remedies
of injunction and other equitable relief . . ."), it can be construed to
mean that the songwriter consents to an injunction without an oppor-
161. MEDOW, supra note 33, § 170-19.
162. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
163. See supra notes 102-112 and accompanying text.
164. MEDOW, supra note 33, § 170-21 to -22.
165.: See supra notes 156-160 and accompanying text.
166. Id.
tunity to be heard on the matter-not something any contracting
party would want to do.1 6 7
Under some circumstances, some music publishing companies
will "let a songwriter out" of a contract under which she no longer
wants to be bound. However, absent relevant contract language or a
court order, publishers are not legally obligated to do so. By contrast,
some other music publishing companies will go so far in the opposite
direction as to appeal the decision of a federal district court upholding
the decision of a bankruptcy court allowing the debtor to reject the
remainder of an executory music publishing contract.168
3. Minimum Commitment
During [the term hereof, Writer] shall deliver to [Publisher] no
fewer than fifteen (15) new and original "Wholly Owned" Composi-
tions or parts thereof aggregating fifteen (15) "Wholly Owned" Com-
positions (the "Minimum Commitment"). A "Wholly Owned"
Composition shall mean a Composition which is written and com-
posed solely by [Writer] and of which an undivided one hundred
(100%) percent of the entire right, title and interest throughout the
world, including the copyright in and to that musical composition, is
subject hereto as a Composition. A Wholly Owned Composition de-
livered in fulfillment of [Writer's] Minimum Commitment must be
capable of commercial exploitation in [Publisher's] reasonable busi-
ness judgment. A musical composition co-written by [Writer] and
one (1) or more songwriters other than [Writer] shall be deemed to
be only a fraction of a Wholly Owned Composition in partial fulfill-
ment of[Writer's] Minimum Commitment, in proportion to the inter-
est therein acquired by [Publisher] hereunder. 169
Assuming reasonable advances against royalties, this provision is
non-controversial.
4. Collaboration
[Writer] shall not collaborate with any other person in the crea-
tion of any musical composition without advising [Publisher]. Any
musical composition which is the result of such collaboration shall be
subject to the terms and conditions of this contract and [Writer] war-
rant[s] and represent[s] that prior to the collaboration with any other
person, [Writer] shall use [Writer's] best efforts to advise such other
person of this exclusive contract so that all such musical compositions
shall be published by [Publisher], where possible. In the event of
such collaboration with any other person, [Writer] shall notify [Pub-
167. MEDOW, supra note 33, § 170-21.
168. Delightful Music Ltd. v. Taylor, 913 F.2d 102, 106-07 (3d Cir. 1990) (not a decision
on the merits). See also Motown Record Corp. v. Brockert, 160 Cal. App. 3d 123 (1984).
169. Zomba Enterprises, Inc., Exclusive Songwriter's and Composer's Agreement, Mu-
SIC PUBLISHING AND THE LAW: 1989, at 12 (American Bar Association Forum on the En-
tertainment and Sports Industries) [hereinafter Zomba].
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Usher] of the extent of interest that such other person may have in any
such musical composition, and [Writer] shall use reasonable efforts
to cause such other person to execute a separate songwriter's agree-
ment with respect thereto, which agreement shall set forth the division
of the songwriter's share of income between [Writer] and such other
person, and [Publisher] shall make payment accordingly. 
170
There are two serious problems with this provision. First, were a
songwriter to co-write a song without having obtained the required
permission, it could be considered a breach of the agreement.17'
The NSAI Handbook states that:
[T]here is no reason for [a songwriter] to feel compelled to get writ-
ten permission from [her publisher] to cowrite. We feel that all writ-
ten-permission requirements in contracts should be deleted! Any
such requirements are impediments to creativity! * * * It is much
simpler to agree to discuss possible cowriters with your publisher. If
your publisher objects to a specific cowriter, ask to know the rea-
sons for [the] objections. They may well have merit and [the song-
writer] may choose not to write with the prospective cowriter.172
Second, the songwriter breaches the agreement if she does not
use "reasonable efforts" to acquire-free-her co-writer's portion of
the copyright for her music publisher. This is bizarre, especially con-
sidering that the music publisher refuses to be obligated to use its rea-
sonable efforts to exploit the copyrights conveyed under the
agreement by the songwriter to the music publisher.1 73 This provision
also overlooks the likelihood that the co-writer is himself under exclu-
sive contract to a music publishing company.
5. Co-writing Trips
Any and all travel costs and related expenses incurred by [Pub-
lisher] on [Writer's] behalf in connection with so-called "co-writing
trips" shall be fully recoupable by [Publisher] from any and all roy-
alties paid to [Writer] or due to [Writer] .... Such costs shall be at
[Publisher's] discretion and may not be incurred without [Pub-
lisher's] prior approval, which approval [Publisher] may withhold
for any reason whatsoever.174
170. Id. at 8-9. "A fairly onerous provision from the writer's point of view." MEDOW,
supra note 33, § 170-18.
171. Whether it is a contract breach or not, however, it is a problem in the creative
sense. Imagine sitting around jamming with a friend or two when a song pops out-or
even worse, suddenly having the opportunity to write with a truly major songwriter-and
having to say, "Ah, you'll have to pardon me for a few minutes while I go wake up my
music publisher and see if I can get permission to write with you."
172. NSAI HANDBOOK, supra note 23, at 65.
173. See infra notes 180-185 and accompanying text.
174. MCA MUSIC PUBLISHING, MUSIC PUBLISHING AND THE LAW: 1989, at 9 (Ameri-
can Bar Association Forum on the Entertainment and Sports Industries) [hereinafter
MCA].
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Since any resulting royalties would benefit the music publisher
just as much as the songwriter, it does not seem equitable that the
songwriter should bear all the costs of such trips.
C. Publishing
1. Advances Against Royalties
Conditioned upon, and in consideration of, the full and faithful
performance by Writer of all the terms and provisions hereof, Pub-
lisher shall pay to Writer the following amounts, in equal monthly
installments, all of which shall be recoupable by Publisher from any
and all royalties payable to Writer under this ... [A]greement be-
tween Writer and Publisher .... :
(a) (amount) ($ ) during the initial term hereof
(b) (amount) ($) during the first renewal term (if any).
(c) (amount) ($ ) during the second renewal term (if any).
(d) (amount) ($) during the third renewal term (if any).
(e) (amount) ($ ) during the fourth renewal term (if
any). 5
The problem here lies in the introductory provision beginning
with the language "[c]onditioned" and ending with "hereof" because
the music publisher gives itself permission to withhold advances
should it decide on its own that the songwriter has somehow not per-
formed her side of the agreement fully and faithfully. 17 6 This intro-
ductory provision should be excised and the sentence should begin
simply with the word "Publisher." If the songwriter has breached the
agreement, the music publisher has normal breach of contract
remedies.
2. Demonstration Recording Obligations
[Publisher], in [its] sole discretion, shall reasonably make studio
facilities available for [Writer] so that [Writer], subject to [Pub-
lisher's] supervision and control, may make demonstration rec-
ord[ing]s of the Compositions and also for [Writer] to perform at
such recording sessions. [Writer] shall not incur any liability for
which [Publisher] may be responsible in connection with any demon-
stration record[ing] session without having first obtained [Pub-
lisher's] written approval as to the nature, extent and limit of such
175. MEDOW, supra note 33, §§ 170-26 to -27.
176.
Publishers will generally not want to pay an entire year's advance in a lump sum
to the writer at the commencement of the contract year, preferring to retain some
control over the writer by having weekly or monthly monies to pay to the writer,
which can be cut off if the writer is not performing in accordance with the terms
of the agreement. As in any publishing deal, the relative bargaining power of the
parties will determine the relative level of any advances, if any are given.
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liability. In no event shall [Writer] incur any expense whatsoever on
[Publisher's] behalf without first having received written authoriza-
tion from [Publisher]. [Writer] shall not be entitled to any compen-
sation (other than to such compensation as may be otherwise
provided for herein or other than union scale, if applicable) with re-
spect to services rendered in connection with such demonstration...
recording sessions.177 All recordings and reproductions [of record-
ings] made at demo recording sessions [or thereafter] shall become
[Publisher's] sole and exclusive property throughout the world, free
of any claims whatsoever by [Writer] or any person deriving any
rights from [Writer], including claims for recording fees and/or other
services by [Writer]. 178 Publisher shall advance the costs for the pro-
duction of demonstration record[ing]s, subject to the foregoing, and
one-half (1/2) of such costs shall be deemed additional advances to
Writer hereunder and shall be recouped by Publisher from r oyalties
payable to Writer by Publisher under this Agreement .... 17
The words "in its sole discretion" beginning this provision render
any contractual obligation to produce demos illusory. Once again,
demo production is one of the foremost reasons that songwriters need
music publishers. The remainder of the provision is generally non-
controversial.
3. Exploitation Obligations
It shall be optional with [Publisher] as to which [Compositions]
shall be published.1 8 0 Nothing contained in this Agreement shall ob-
ligate [Publisher] to exploit, in any manner, any of the rights granted
to [Publisher] hereunder.'81
This is completely unacceptable language. It makes the contract
illusory at best and unconscionable at worst, 182 because there is no
exploitation obligation on the part of the music publisher. 183 The
177. Zomba, supra note 169, at 4.
178. MCA, supra note 174, at 9.
179. MEDOW, supra note 33, § 170-20.
180. Tree, supra note 121, at 1.
181. MCA, supra note 174, at 2.
182. See supra notes 54-71 and accompanying text.
Under the current arrangement, songwriter contracts are better likened to
indentured servitude! For this to change, we believe that, in all songwriter con-
tracts, there must be clauses detailing the mutual responsibilities of both parties
and the attending consequences should either party fail to perform. For too long,
the publisher has hidden behind a smokescreen of confounding legalese and has
shrunk from any accountability.
It is herewith noted that, when you fail to perform, you lose your gig and the
publisher keeps the catalog. When the publisher fails to perform, you lose your gig
and the publisher keeps the catalog! What is wrong with this picture? We suggest
that you reread the preceding remark and take a moment to think long and hard
about what you have read.
NSAI HANDBOOK, supra note 23, at 94-95.
183. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
"English Music Trilogy" cited earlier1 84 undergirds the idea that the
music publisher's obligation to exploit the copyrights simply cannot be
optional in a meaningful contract.'85
4. Royalties
Provided that Writer shall duly perform the terms, covenants and
conditions of this Agreement, Publisher shall pay Writer, for the serv-
ices to be rendered by Writer hereunder and for the rights acquired
and to be acquired by Publisher hereunder, the following compensa-
tion based on the Compositions:
(a) [ . cents ($.O[__J) per copy for each copy of
sheet music in standard pianonvocnotation and each dance orches-
tration printed, published and sold in the United States and Canada
by Publisher or its licensees, for which payment shall have been re-
ceived by Publisher, after deduction of returns.
184. See supra notes 54-56.
185. See also Mellencamp v. Riva Music, Ltd., 698 F. Supp. 1154,1157 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
In this case, singer-songwriter John Cougar Mellencamp, alleged, inter alia, that "defend-
ants breached [the songwriter-music publisher contract] by failing to actively promote his
songs .... ." Id. at 1156. In its discussion of the issue, the court stated:
It is not necessary to use the magic words of "fiduciary relationship," or to hold
that a "relationship of trust and confidence" was created by the contract, or to
find that [the music publisher] became a "trustee" of the copyright for the benefit
of the [songwriters] .... As Chief Judge Cardozo put it in Wood v. Lucy, Lady
Duff-Gordon, 222 N.Y. 88, 91, 118 N.E. 214 (1917): "The law has outgrown its
primitive stage of formalism when the precise word was the sovereign talisman,
and every slip was fatal. It takes a broader view today. A promise may be lacking
and yet the whole writing may be 'instinct with an obligation,' imperfectly ex-
pressed." Similarly, the special relationship here may not be specifically ex-
pressed, and yet the whole factual situation may be instinct with a duty which
should be imposed by law upon the publisher.
The law implies a promise on the [music publisher's] part to endeavor to make
the... copyright productive, since that is the very purpose of the assignment of[the
copyright] and the correlative obligation to pay royalties, In re Waterson, Berlin &
Snyder Co. v. Irving Trust Co., 48 F.2d 704 (2nd Cir. 1981). * * * Despite the
reference to "fiduciary relationship" and "relationship of trust," it is clear, in con-
text, that the court was talking about a publisher's implied-in-law contract obliga-
tion to use its best efforts to promote an author's work, where the publisher has
exclusive rights in the work. The single case cited in the court's discussion of the
"special relationship" between author and publisher, Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-
Gordon, 222 N.Y. 88, 91, 118 N.E. 214 (1917) (Cardozo, C.J.), is the seminal au-
thority on an exclusive licensee's implied promise to use reasonable efforts to
generate profits from the license.
Id. at 1158 (quoting Schisgall v. Fairchild Publications, 137 N.Y.S. 2d 312, 317-18 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1955) (footnote omitted).
Songwriters have long claimed that their relationship with publishers is fiduciary
in nature. Establishing a fiduciary relationship has important consequences be-
cause a breach by a fiduciary can result in punitive damages, rescission, and rever-
sion of the copyrights to the [songwriter].
Gilenson, supra note 43, at 544 n.3 (footnote omitted).
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(b) Ten percent (10%) of the wholesale selling price of each
printed copy of each other arrangement and edition printed, pub-
lished and sold in the United States and Canada by Publisher or its
licensees, for which payment shall have been received by Publisher,
after deduction of returns, except that in the event that any Composi-
tions shall be used or caused to be used, in whole or in part, in con-
junction with one or more other musical compositions in a folio,
compilation, song book or other publication, Writer shall be entitled
to receive that proportion of the foregoing royalty which the number
of Compositions contained therein shall bear to the total number of
musical compositions therein.
(c) Fifty percent (50%) of any and all net sums actually received
(less any costs for collection) by Publisher in the United States from
the exploitation in the United States and Canada by licensees of
mechanical rights, [grand rights,] electrical transcription and repro-
duction rights, motion picture and television synchronization rights,
dramatization rights and all other rights therein (except print rights,
which are covered in (a) and (b) above, and public performance
rights, which are covered in (d) below), whether or not such licensees
are affiliated with, owned in whole or in part by, or controlled by
Publisher.
(d) Writer shall receive his public performance royalties
throughout the world directly from the performing rights society with
which he is affiliated,186 and shall have no claim whatsoever against
Publisher for any royalties received by Publisher from any perform-
ing rights society which makes payment directly (or indirectly other
than through Publisher) to writers, authors and composers. If, how-
ever, Publisher shall collect both the Writer's and Publisher's share of
performance income directly and such income shall not be collected
by Writer's public performance society, Publisher shall pay to Writer
fifty percent (50%) of all such net sums which are received by Pub-
lisher in the United States from the exploitation of such rights in the
Compositions, throughout the world.
(e) Fifty percent (50%) of any and all net sums, after deduction
of foreign taxes, actually received (less any costs for collection) by
Publisher in the United States from the exploitation of the Composi-
tions in countries outside the United States and Canada (other than
public performance royalties, which are covered in (d) above),
whether from collection agents, licensees, subpublishers or others,
and whether or not same are affiliated with, owned in whole or in
part by, or controlled by Publisher.
(f9 Publisher shall not be required to pay any royalties on pro-
fessional or complimentary printed copies or record[ing]s or on
printed copies or records which are distributed gratuitously to per-
forming artists, orchestra leaders and disc jockeys or for advertising,
promotional or exploitation purposes. Furthermore, no royalties
186. Royalties from the public performance of a songwriter's music go directly to the
songwriter from the performing rights society to which that songwriter belongs (i.e., AS-
CAP (American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers), BMI (Broadcast Music,
Inc.), or SESAC (the letters no longer represent relevant words)). Music publishers re-
ceive their share of public performance royalties from these entities, as well.
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shall be payable to Writer on consigned copies unless paid for, and
not until such time as an accounting therefor can properly be made.
(g) Royalties as hereinabove specified shall be payable solely to
Writer in instances where Writer is the sole author of a Composition,
including the lyrics and music thereof However, in the event that one
or more other songwriters are authors together, with Writer of any
Composition (including songwriters employed by Publisher to add,
change or translate the lyrics or to revise or change the music), the
foregoing royalties shall be divided equally among Writer and the
other songwriters unless another division of royalties shall be agreed
upon in writing between the parties concerned and timely written no-
tice of such division is submitted to Publisher prior to payment.
(h) Except as herein expressly provided, no other royalties or
monies shall be paid to Writer.
(i) Writer agrees and acknowledges that Publisher shall have the
right to withhold from the royalties payable to Writer hereunder such
amount, if any, as may be required under the provisions of all appli-
cable Federal, State and other tax laws and regulations, and Writer
agrees to execute such forms and other documents as may be required
in connection therewith.
(j) In no event shall Writer be entitled to share in any advance
payments, guarantee payments or minimum royalty payments which
Publisher shall receive in connection with any subpublishing agree-
ment, collection agreement, licensing agreement or other agreement
covering the Compositions or any of them. 18 7
The introductory clause in this first sentence should be excised
for the same reasons that the introductory clause in the "advances
against royalties" provision should be deleted. There are additional
significant language problems in this provision. Essentially, lettered-
paragraphs (c) and (e) allow the music publisher to contract with itself
for the collection of royalties. So long as any such agreements are
arm's length transactions they are not offensive. However, such trans-
actions are often made and executed at something considerably less
than arm's length.188 In lettered-paragraph (d), the use of the term
"net sums" suggests that the music publisher is going to deduct some
unspecified and perhaps unjustified amount from the "gross sums" re-
ceived. If possible, this should not be permitted. A lesser share of
"gross" is always preferable to a greater share of "net. '189
187. MEDOW, supra note 33, § 170-14 to -17 (author's footnote added within quoted
material).
188. "Writers will attempt to limit the publisher generally so that the publisher may
only deal with its affiliated companies at arm's length." Id. § 170-10.
189. Winston Groom probably thinks so-at least now. Groom, the novelist who cre-
ated the "Forrest Gump" character, entered into a "book rights" contract with Paramount
Pictures for an up-front payment of $350,000 (which he received) plus three percent (3%)
of the net profits from the motion picture. According to a Paramount memorandum, as of
December 31, 1994, the motion picture had grossed $661 million at the box office but was
still $62 million in the red. Apparently, Groom was offered a "gift" payment of $250,000
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Lettered-paragraph (g) is a problem for two reasons, one of
which involves poor drafting and the other of which is much more
serious. This provision should state clearly, and it does not, what the
songwriter is entitled to if: (1) the composition was co-written, (2) one
or more of the co-writers is under contract to the same music pub-
lisher, and (3) one or more of the other co-writers is under contract to
another music publisher. The far more serious concern with lettered-
paragraph (g) is that it indicates that the songwriter's royalties can be
reduced at the unilateral discretion of the music publisher and in a
ratio likely decided by the number, ultimately, of co-writers. This
would occur as a result of the music publisher's employment of an-
other songwriter(s) to "add, change or translate the lyrics or to revise
or change the music," i.e., the creation of a derivative work.
Lettered-paragraph (i) allows the music publisher to retain some
portion of the songwriter's royalties for tax purposes. This is another
indication of the music publisher's desire to treat the relationship as
"work made for hire." Lettered-paragraph (j) indicates that the song-
writer is not entitled to share in a variety of categories of royalty pay-
ments to the music publisher, including income from some important
forms of licensing. An example is "synchronization" (or "sync")
rights, concerning the synchronization or matching of a copyrighted
musical composition to, for example, a motion picture or television
program. "Sync" rights are part of the bundle of rights conferred on
copyright owners.190 Lettered-paragraph (j) is simply ludicrous and
could gut much of the potential royalty income of the songwriter. Re-
ceiving income in this way and having no duty to apportion it to the
songwriter means that the music publisher effectively owns part of the
songwriter's royalties. Income either should not be received in this
way or a reasonable method should be devised to apportion such in-
come among the appropriate rights-holders.
In the United States, public performance royalties are normally
distributed on a 50/50 basis by the performing rights organizations di-
rectly to songwriters and music publishers. 191 In England, the Per-
forming Rights Society distributes all such income to music publishers,
who deduct a percentage of such income and then distribute the re-
by the studio, but he declined the offer. Groom's attorney said Groom "would like to work
this out amicably." 'Gump' Novelist Questions Studio Accounting, ASSOCIATED PRESS,
May 26, 1995.
190. 17 U.S.C. § 106A(a)(1) (1988). "Reproduction" right is the technically appropri-
ate term, but "synchronization" right is the term of common usage in the specific context
of "attaching" sound recordings to (usually) audio-visual works.
191. See Don E. Tomlinson, Joe's Eatery Versus Music Copyright Owners: No Pay, No
Play?, 10 ART L. AND AcCr. REP. 1 (Texas Accts. and Law. for the Arts 1995).
mainder among the appropriate songwriters. 192 Music publishers also
receive "black box" income, which is income originally received by
the Performing Rights Society from international sources without an
attendant statistical basis for re-distribution to music publishers.' 93 As
a result, the Performing Rights Society distributes the money to music
publishers "largely according to how much they earn in attributable
royalties from that society."'194 In other words, the "black box"
money is distributed to music publishers pro rata to their attributable
earnings for the current reporting period. The music publishers must
then try to figure out how to apportion the "black box" money among
their songwriters.
In 1990, singer-songwriter Pete Townshend, formerly of the Who,
and writer of such rock classics as My Generation and Pinball Wizard,
sued Westminster Music, the music publishing company holding his
catalog. Townshend felt he was not receiving his proportionate share
of "black box" income. In Townshend's view, Westminster "would
not receive so much 'black box' income if it were not for his copy-
rights giving them a high share of attributable royalties."' 195 Expres-
sing the sentiments of many songwriters on the subject .of music
publishing contracts, Townshend said: "Just because somebody is 20
or 21 and a novice is no reason not to take them through agreements
that are going to affect them for the rest of their lives."'1 96
5. Accounting
Publisher shall compute the royalties earned by Writer pursuant
to this Agreement and pursuant to any other agreement between
Writer and Publisher or its affiliates, whether now in existence or en-
tered into at any time subsequent hereto, on or before March 31st for
the semiannual period ending the preceding December 31st and on or
before September 30th for the semiannual period ending the preced-
ing June 30th, and shall thereupon submit to Writer the royalty state-
ment for each such period together with the net amount of royalties, if
any, which shall be payable after deducting any and all unrecouped
advances and chargeable costs under this Agreement or any such
other agreement. Each statement submitted by Publisher to Writer
shall be binding upon Writer and not subject to any objection by
Writer for any reason unless specific written objection, stating the ba-
sis thereof, is sent by Writer to Publisher within two (2) years after the
date said statement is submitted. Writer or a certified public account-
192. Simon Garfield, 'Who' Star Sues Music Firm Over Royalties, INDEPENDENT, Feb.
18, 1990, at 11.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id. See also Madara v. Singular Music Publishing Co., No. CIV.A.84-0006, 1987
WL 10115 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 28, 1987).
HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. [Vol. 18:85
1995] SONGWRITER-MUSIC PUBLISHER AGREEMENTS AND DISAGREEMENTS 127
ant in Writer's behalf may, at Writer's expense, at reasonable intervals
(but not more frequent than once each year), examine Publisher's
books insofar as the same concern Writer, during Publisher's usual
business hours and upon reasonable notice, for the purpose of verify-
ing the accuracy of any statement submitted to Writer hereunder.
Publisher's books relating to activities during any accounting period
may only be examined as aforesaid during the two (2) year period
following service by Publisher of the statement for said accounting
period. 1
Here, the main issue is the two-year limitation on liability and
inspection of records. In medical malpractice cases, the question
arises whether the statute of limitation has begun to run.' 98 Should it
begin to run on the date the surgeon negligently left a sponge in the
patient's abdomen, or on the date the patient reasonably did or should
discover that her continuing abdominal pain was the result of a sponge
negligently left inside her several years earlier in surgery? 199 If a court
holds that the statute of limitations began to run on the date the tort
first occurred, the statute may have expired, creating a complete de-
fense to the cause of action.2 0 If, on the other hand, the statute of
limitations is deemed to have begun running on the date the tort was
or should reasonably have been discovered, the cause of action will
not expire for a period of years subsequent to that time.2° ' The anal-
ogy here is that the songwriter may very well have no reasonable basis
for knowing or believing that there is a problem with royalty account-
ing for a period of years well in excess of the two year contract limita-
tion. According to the provision, possible liability exists for no more
than two-years from the date of the royalty statement, and inspection
of the music publisher's books is limited to the two-year period fol-
lowing the date of the royalty statement.20 2
While it is likely that most music publishers reasonably comply
with legitimate, contract-based requests to inspect their books, there
197. MEDOW, supra note 33, §§ 170-17 to -18.
198. See Gaddis v. Smith, 417 S.W.2d 577, 579 (Tex. 1967).
199. Id. at 578-79.
200. Id. at 581.
201. Id.
202.
In Contemporary Mission, Inc. v. Famous Music Corp., 557 F.2d 918, 925 (2d Cir.
1977), the [court] held that contractual provisions requiring [a party] to specify
the nature of an alleged breach within a limited period of time or be barred from
asserting it later were "hypertechnical." The court in Contemporary Mission thus
declined "to construe the notice provision as if it were a common law pleading
requirement under which every slip would be fatal."
Musica Latina Int'l, Inc. v. Blades, No. 84 CIV. 0719 (CBM), 1984 WL 336, at *3 (S.D.N.Y.
May 21, 1984).
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can be tremendous problems. In Charron v. Meaux,20 3 the plaintiff
songwriter brought an action against two music publishers to recover
royalties allegedly due and owing. Despite numerous motions, court
appearances, and three dishonored agreements, the music publishers
refused to show plaintiff the records until the court finally forced the
issue.20 4 The court, finding "a clear joint pattern of conduct by both
defendants designed to and which in fact has resulted in a long-contin-
uing and so-far successful frustration of the plaintiff's endeavor to ob-
tain by discovery the amount of royalties due and owing [him] ... 205
gave the defendants twenty days in which to comply and entered an
order that non-compliance would automatically result in the awarding
of a default judgment to the plaintiff.20 6 In describing the defendants'
conduct as "willful and deliberate, '20 7 the court stated:
It is clear that defendants.., are trying to wear plaintiff out by their
tactics. Plaintiff, an individual, has clearly been put to substantial
expense in terms of attorney's fees and accountant's fees only to
find himself in a "revolving door." This practice by these defend-
ants to cause the plaintiff to despair and perhaps abandon or com-
promise his suit, however, cannot be tolerated.
The court also found "particularly intolerable" the defendants'
intimation that "some of the relevant records may no longer be avail-
able for inspection. 20 9
Singer-songwriter Shirley Goodman was involved in what is no
doubt one of the more bizarre situations involving an accounting for
royalties. Goodman sued the family of the deceased Leonard Lee,
claiming that she and Lee co-wrote the rock 'n' roll classic Let The
Good Times Roll in 1956 while the two were performing together as
"Shirley & Lee." 210 Goodman, who apparently did not know that Lee
had copyrighted the song in his name alone or that the song had gen-
erated revenue through the years (over and above the money she may
have made from it as a recording artist in the 1950s and perhaps be-
yond),2 1' did not file suit until 29 years had already passed.21 2 The
circuit court determined that Goodman was the song's co-author and
awarded her half of the song's publishing income from 1956 on-
203. 66 F.R.D. 64 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
204. Id. at 65-68.
205. Id. at 65.
206. Id. at 68-69.
207. Id. at 68.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Goodman v. Lee, 988 F.2d 619 (5th Cir. 1993).
211. Id. at 621.
212. Id.
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ward.213 On remand, the district court awarded her approximately
$275 ,000.214
A similar case involved the 50s rock 'n' roll classic Why Do Fools
Fall In Love. When the original copyright on the song was filed in
1956, the songwriters were listed as George Goldner and Frank
Lymon.21- In truth, the song was co-written by Frank Lymon, Jimmy
Merchant, and Herman Santiago,1 6 all members of a group called
Frankie Lymon and the Teenagers.21 7 Merchant and Santiago filed
suit in 1987, 31 years after the original copyright was filed. 218 Defend-
ants in the case were Emira Lymon (Frank Lymon's widow), Morris
Levy, Big Seven Music Corp., ABZ Music Corp., Roulette Records,
Inc. (successors in interest to George Goldner), BMI (dismissed), and
Windswept Pacific Entertainment Co., Inc. (successor in interest to
the "Levy defendants:" Levy, Big Seven, ABZ, and Roulette).219
According to Santiago, when he and Merchant challenged [Gold-
ner's right to half the copyright], they were threatened with injury
or worse. * * * Merchant recalls being so "sickened" at hearing
Diana Ross' remake of Fools on a 1981 album-for which neither
he nor Santiago got a penny-that he switched to playing jazz sta-
tions in his cab. "The people who initially raped us as children still
had the rights to our creation," he says. 210
In 1992, a federal jury decided that Merchant and Santiago each
owned 25 % of the song (Lymon's estate had previously been found to
own 50% of the copyright) and were due an accounting and payment,
subject to clarification concerning which defendants were responsible
and to what extent.221 In 1994, a federal magistrate, in a ruling essen-
tially affirmed by the district court, held that Merchant and Santiago
were due more than $200,000 plus pre-judgment interest from the
Levy defendants and nearly $250,000 plus pre-judgment interest from
213. Id.
214. No. CIV.A.85-2966, 1994 WL 710738 (E.D. La. Dec. 20, 1994). This case has a
strange, unfortunate and convoluted history, its many twists and shouts being well worth
reading (in the context of this article and otherwise). In that light, also see No. CIV.A.85-
2966, 1991 WL 161399 (E.D. La. Aug. 14, 1991), 1991 WL 22927 (E.D. La. Feb. 15, 1991),
and 1990 WL 15259 (E.D. La. Feb. 13, 1990).
215. Merchant v. Lymon, No. CIV. 87-7199, 1995 WL 217508 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 11, 1995).
216. Id.
217. Getting Rich Slow: Two rock heroes are given their due-36 years late, PEOPLE,
Dec. 7, 1992, at 68.
218. Id. at 168.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. Merchant, No. CIV. 87-7199, 1995 WL 217508 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 11, 1995).
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Windswept.222 Due to statute of limitations considerations, they were
awarded nothing for the period 1956-1984.223
Not every royalty-accounting suit is won by the plaintiff, and not
all plaintiffs wait 30 years to sue.224 In 1957, Valjo Music Publishing
Corporation, owned by John Veliotes, a.k.a. Johnny Otis, sued Elvis
Presley Music, Inc., Mike Stoller, and Jerry Leiber, claiming that Otis
was co-writer, with Stoller and Leiber, of Hound Dog, originally re-
corded by Willie Mae "Big Mama" Thornton but made famous by
Elvis Presley.225 After a bench trial, the court found that Stoller and
Leiber were the sole writers of the song.226 While the court also found
that Stoller and Leiber had made Otis a one-third owner of the copy-
right to the song in 1952, the court concluded that Otis relinquished
any copyright claim on Hound Dog to Stoller and Leiber for $750 by
written instrument in 1956.227
In contrast to Goodman and Merchant, plaintiff David P. Jackson,
Jr., lost his copyright ownership and royalty accounting suit against
singer-songwriter Hoyt Axton concerning the 70s rock hit Joy To The
World precisely because he waited 21 years to sue (in comparison to
31 years in Goodman and 29 years in Merchant), with a decision on
the merits consequently not having been reached.228 In 1970, Axton
rented a recording studio and hired a number of musicians to produce
demos on several songs, including Joy To The World.22 9 Jackson, in
the suit, did not dispute that Axton wrote the lyrics to Joy to the
World, but contended that he "wrote much of the music" at the demo
session.230 Axton released the song on a solo album later that year,
registering the copyright to the song exclusively in the name of his
music publishing company, Lady Jane Music, and listing himself as the
sole writer.23'
During live performances of the song following its release on the
album, "Axton routinely told audiences that the song was written by
222. Id. at *8.
223. Id. The litigation and factual history of the case is reported at Merchant v. Lymon,
828 F. Supp. 1048 (S.D.N.Y. 1993).
224. See, e.g., King v. EMI Music Publishing, No. 67990, 1995 WL 502557 (Ohio App.
Aug. 24, 1995) (Time Won't Let Me).
225. Valjo Music Publishing Corp. v. Elvis Presley Music, Inc., 156 F. Supp. 568
(S.D.N.Y. 1957).
226. Id. at 568-69.
227. Id. at 568. The lawsuit, of course, arose after Elvis Presley's Hound Dog was re-
leased in 1957, selling millions of records.
228. Jackson v. Axton, 25 F.3d 884, 889 (9th Cir. 1994).
229. Id. at 885-86.
230. Id. at 886.
231. Id. The song later became a big hit for THREE DOG NIGHT, generating considera-
ble additional royalties.
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himself and 'D.P.J.J.R.,' Axton's nickname for Jackson," who was a
member of his band.z32 During this period, Axton once asked Jackson
to "sign a songwriter's agreement conveying Jackson's rights in the
song to Lady Jane Music in exchange for royalties . . ., but Jackson
refused. '2 33 Several years later, Jackson proposed to Axton that Ax-
ton buy Jackson's share of the copyright for a lump sum, but this time
it was Axton who refused, telling Jackson he was not a co-writer and
had no rights in the song.234 In 1975, though, Axton told a magazine
interviewer that Jackson co-wrote the song with him.235 Jackson said
that by 1976 he had become aware that he could file suit against Ax-
ton but did not because he "respected Axton and felt Axton would
eventually do the right thing. '236 For many years, Jackson and Axton
no longer worked together, but in 1991 Jackson began once again to
perform in Axton's band.237
Jackson decided to sue after so many years when "Axton claimed
sole authorship of another song that Jackson had clearly helped
write. '238 Axton defended the suit by asserting that Jackson's claims
were barred by the doctrine of laches and, in the alternative, by the
applicable statute of limitation.2 39 Further, Axton argued that "any
work done on the song [by Jackson] was merely 'work for hire."' 24 ° In
granting Axton's motion for summary judgment, the district court
ruled that Jackson's claim was barred by laches, finding that Jackson's
delay in filing suit was "presumptively prejudicial" to Axton.241 With
respect to actual prejudice, the district court found that memories had
faded and that relevant evidence had been destroyed.242
On appeal, Jackson cited Goodman for the proposition that "no
co-ownership claim was brought until decades after composition of
the work ... at issue, yet the court [did not] dismiss ... the claim on
statute of limitations or laches grounds. '243 Affirming the district
court's grant of summary judgment to Axton, the circuit court, noting
the case was one of first impression in the Ninth Circuit, agreed that
reliance on Goodman was inappropriate because Goodman "ad-
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. Id.
.242. Id.
243. Id. at 887.
dressed only subject-matter jurisdiction, not laches. ''244 The court
held that "laches may be a defense to an action seeking a declaration
of co-authorship (and resulting co-ownership) of a copyrightable work
[because c]laims of ownership are traditionally subject to the defense
of laches," citing several cases.245 In distinguishing between laches
and statutes of limitation, the court said that, "[t]hough both laches
and statutes of limitations may give defendants repose, laches, unlike
a statute of limitations, is premised on a showing of prejudice. '246
The court adopted Axton's argument that he had been prejudiced
by Jackson's delay in bringing suit in four specific ways: (1) that Axton
had arranged his business affairs around this copyright, having ulti-
mately sold it to Rondor Music International, Inc., also a defendant in
the case; (2) the faded memories of witnesses; (3) the unavailability of
at least one witness; and (4) the loss of pertinent documentary evi-
dence.247 The court was not impressed with Jackson's testimony with
respect to why he had waited so long to sue, to wit: (1) that Jackson
was not a "litigious person;" (2) that "divine justice would be served;"
and (3) that "he trusted Axton. ' 248
That Axton knew Jackson claimed to have helped write [Joy to the
World] is irrelevant. Even if Jackson did help compose the music, a
fact not yet established, Axton might have thought that Jackson's
efforts were merely work for hire, or Axton may have been mis-
taken and thought Jackson did little actual composition. Axton's
refusal to credit Jackson gave Jackson grounds, if any, to sue. Jack-
son's delay in suing is what has prejudiced [Axton], not Axton's ac-
tions with regard to a disputed claim.2 4 9
Application of the "innocent construction '250 principle to the
court's assertion that Axton may have "thought Jackson did little ac-
tual composition," must involve Axton's memory at the time of trial.
It would be ludicrous to suggest that Axton, who had written many
other songs by the time Joy To The World was composed,251 would not
know at the time of composition whether he had written a song by
244. Id.
245. Id. at 887-88.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Id. at 889.
249. Id. at 890.
250. Where there are two or more logical constructions of a writing, the "innocent con-
struction" principle adopts the construction which conveys the better intentions of the
writer, not the worse.
251. Axton's mother, songwriter Mae Axton, co-wrote (among other songs), the 50s
rock 'n' roll classic Heartbreak Hotel, originally recorded and made famous by Elvis
Presley.
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himself or whether he had co-written it with someone else.252 Because
252. Perhaps Axton wrote the melody to Joy To The World, as well, and perhaps what
Jackson did was put some chords with the melody Axton was singing to the lyrics he had
written. Perhaps, too, Jackson was at the same time "arranging" the song. Whether either
of these activities of Jackson (assuming, arguendo, that such was the case) should give rise
to copyright ownership interests is an apparently unresolved (perhaps even judicially
unasked) question of basic copyrightability. Given this court's view of Jackson having
prejudiced Axton by his substantial delay in filing suit, none of these important substantive
questions will be answered in this case (assuming no further appeals or any rehearings).
Does adding harmony to a song give rise to copyright ownership? That was the ques-
tion in Tempo Music, Inc. v. Famous Music Corp., 838 F. Supp. 162 (S.D.N.Y. 1993), which
involved a royalties dispute concerning the jazz classic Satin Doll. In a case complicated by
the unavailability of some of the principals due to death-and the passage of time gener-
ally-the court concluded, as a matter of law, that the addition of "harmony" to an existing
copyright could be the subject of a new and derivative copyright if the harmony added was
"original." The court stated:
Harmony is a derivative creation almost by definition. A composer generally
creates a harmony to accompany a particular melody, as opposed to developing
harmony in the abstract. That a particular work is a derivative work, such as the
version of Satin Doll in dispute, is, of course, no bar to copyrightability. Deriva-
tive works are explicitly included in the subject matter of copyright. However,
this principle is subject to two important limitations ....
First, to support a copyright, the original aspects of a derivative work must be
more than trivial. Second, the scope of protection afforded a derivative work
must reflect the degree to which it relies on preexisting material and must not in
any way affect the scope of any copyright protection in that preexisting material.
Id. at 167-68 (footnotes and citations omitted). One of the defendants argued that har-
mony could never be copyrightable because it is musically "common" and therefore inca-
pable of the originality intended by copyright law, arguing that only melody and structure
qualify as copyrightable elements of a song. Id. at 168. This defendant claimed that har-
mony was but a centuries-old concept applied formulaicly. Id. To this, the court replied:
The court is not convinced that harmony is unprotectable as a matter of law.
While we agree that melody generally implies a limited range of chords which can
accompany it, a composer may exercise creativity in selecting among those
chords. As [one expert] note[d], the choice of chords influences "the mood, feel
and sound of a piece" (citation omitted). Creating a harmony may, but need not,
be merely a mechanical by-product of melody. A composer may choose to re-
spond to the tension created by a dissonance by resolving it to a consonance in
accordance with "pre-established rules that have been accepted since the 17th
century" and that have formed "the basis of ... Western music." However, in
contemporary music, and particularly in the jazz music genre, musicians fre-
quently move beyond traditional rules to create a range of dissonant and innova-
tive sounds. * * * The choice of one particular harmonic relationship, such as the
selection of secondary dominants in Satin Doll, could be considered a creative
choice.
Id. (citation omitted). Notwithstanding an earlier case which stated, albeit in dicta, that
"neither rhythm nor harmony can in itself be the subject of copyright," the court denied
motions for summary judgment and ordered a trial on the issue of the originality of the
harmony as constituting copyrightability. Northern Music Corp. v. King Record Distribut-
ing Co., 105 F. Supp. 393, 400 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
We recognize the force of the argument that, in most instances, harmony is driven
by the melody. We note further that where the composition of the melody is
completed by one person and the harmony is thereafter furnished by another, the
harmony may be less likely to reflect originality than in those instances in which
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the court disposed of the case on the laches summary-judgment de-
fense, it did not reach the statute of limitation and "work for hire"
defense arguments.253
Another court, however, used the statute of limitations doctrine
to find in favor of the defendant. In Korman v. Iglesias,2 54 songwriter
Mimi Korman sued singer-songwriter Julio Iglesias, filing suit 12 years
after Iglesias allegedly contracted with her to translate the French
song J'ai Oublie de Vivre into Spanish.255 Korman translated the song,
naming the Spanish version Me Olvide de Vivir. 256 For her translation,
Korman was to receive a "percentage of the royalties" from the Span-
ish version of the song.257 Korman alleged that she signed a contract
to that effect in 1978 and that Iglesias' representative told her the con-
tract had to be executed by the Iglesias side in Spain and that he
would mail her a copy. Korman claimed she never saw the contract
again.E5 The song, including Korman's title and "a significant portion
of her lyrics," was released in 1979 and has been in distribution world-
wide since.2 59 "In most of the releases, Korman is credited as one of
the authors of the song, ' 260 but she received no royalties from the
song until 1992.261
Between 1979 and 1990, Korman made innumerable inquiries
concerning the royalties she felt she was owed. 62 She contacted
Iglesias, Iglesias' Spanish recording company, the Society General of
Authors in Spain (SGAE), CBS, Disco CBS, The American Society of
simultaneous composition of melody and harmony is utilized to create certain
musical effects. But an abstract per se rule removing harmonies entirely from the
scope of copyright protection would, we believe, be too broad and would perhaps
deprive appropriate protection to a composition which contains different suffi-
cient originality and creativity to warrant such protection.
Id. at 169. Of course, whether the addition of harmony is copyrightable and constitutes the
creation of a derivative work is a subject of considerable interest to songwriters. Assum-
ing, arguendo, that adding harmony does constitute a derivative work, the question then
would become how to and who should decide the extent to which the original composer's
royalties would be reduced, the answer to which would seem highly problematic. On an-
other issue, the court found that slight melodic changes were not copyrightable, citing Mc-
Intyre v. Double-A Music Corp., 166 F. Supp. 681 (S.D. Cal. 1958), Norden v. Oliver
Ditson Co., 13 F. Supp. 415 (D. Mass. 1936), and Cooper v. James, 213 F. Supp. 871 (N.D.
Ga. 1914).
253. Jackson, 25 F.3d at 890.
254. Korman v. Iglesias, 825 F. Supp. 1010 (S.D. Fla. 1993).
255. Id. at 1011-12.
256. Id. at 1012.
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. Id. at 1013.
262. Id. at 1012-13.
[Vol. 18:85
1995] SONGWRITER-MUSIC PUBLISHER AGREEMENTS AND DISAGREEMENTS 135
Composers, Authors, and Publishers (ASCAP) (of which Korman had
been a member since 1972), the French Society of Composers and Au-
thors and Publishers, and the Harry Fox Agency. 63 Despite these in-
quiries, Korman said, she never received any satisfactory answers as to
the status of the royalties.264 In 1987, SGAE informed Korman that
Iglesias' Spanish recording company "had signed a sub-publishing
contract with the French publisher which credited Iglesias as the sole
author of the song. ' '265 Korman hired an attorney and, in 1990, filed
this lawsuit in Florida.266 Because the case was a matter of contract
rather than copyright, the applicable law was two Florida statutes of
limitation, of four and five years length.267 Each began to run in 1980,
the time Korman reasonably learned of her claim.268 Since the suit
was not filed until 1990, the statute of limitations barred Korman's
claims.269
Other cases involving, inter alia, substantial royalty and account-
ing problems include Mother Bertha Music, Inc. v. Trio Music Co.,
Inc. ,270 The Gordy Co. v. Mary Jane Girls, Inc.,271 Mellencamp v. Riva
Music Ltd. ,272 and Croce v. Kurnit.273 Mother Bertha involved a dis-
pute between songwriter-music publisher Phil Spector and songwrit-
ers-music publishers Jerry Leiber and Mike Stoller.274 Both sides
argued that the other side was improperly accounting for royalties due
on such 50s rock classics as Chapel Of Love, Da Do Run Run, and
Why Don't They Let Us Fall In Love.275 Gordy was an immensely
complicated dispute between the corporate successor to Motown Rec-
ord Corporation and singer-songwriter-producer Rick James.276 The
royalty issues included improper accounting, the scope of auditing, au-
dit documents, unreported royalties, advances against royalties, re-
263. Id.
264. Id. at 1013.
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. Id. at 1013-18.
268. Id. at 1017.
269. Id.
270. Mother Bertha Music, Inc. v. Trio Music Co., 717 F. Supp. 157 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
271. The Gordy Co. v. Mary Jane Girls, Inc., Nos. CIV. 86-6814, CIV. 87-3438, 1989 WL
149290 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 6, 1989). See also Jabara v. Songs of Manhattan Island Music Co.,
No. CIV. 86-3412, 1989 WL 16614 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 24, 1989).
272. Mellencamp v. Riva Music Ltd., 698 F. Supp. 1154 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
273. Croce v. Kumit, 565 F. Supp. 884 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), affd, 737 F.2d 229 (2d Cir.
1984).
274. Mother Bertha, 717 F. Supp. at 157.
275. Id.
276. The Gordy Co. v. Mary Jane Girls, Inc., Nos. CIV. 86-6814, CIV. 87-3438, 1989 WL
149290 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 6, 1989).
coupment, foreign taxation, and other matters.277 Mellencamp
concerned allegations of royalty accounting problems, untimely roy-
alty reports and payments, and an alleged oral agreement settling roy-
alty and other disputes arising from the original contract.278 Croce
involved the term "net sums actually received," the appropriate basis
for calculating royalties, and whether the "catchall" royalty provision
in the agreement covered sheet music sold by a licensee of the copy-
right-owning music publisher.279
Other notable cases involving copyright ownership and/or royalty
questions include Richcar Music Co. v. Towns,280 and Frost Belt Inter-
national Recording Enterprises, Inc. v. Cold Chillin Records.
281 Jimi
Hendrix's father, James "Al" Hendrix, filed a lawsuit in Seattle in
1991 against the owners of his son's copyrights, claiming that he un-
knowingly gave up the rights to the copyrights (and Jimi Hendrix's
image, etc.). He attributed this unknowing relinquishment to the im-
proper actions of his former Los Angeles attorney, Leo Branton, Jr.,
who, with other entities, came to own the copyrights.282 The lawsuit
sought an accounting of the income generated since Jimi Hendrix's
death 23 years earlier. 283 In 1991, MCA offered $60 million to
purchase the copyrights and other Hendrix assets.284
Singer-songwriter Mike Love of the Beach Boys ended his long-
running dispute with former bandmate Brian Wilson in 1994 after
Love won a jury trial on the issue of whether Love should have re-
ceived songwriting credit on about three dozen Beach Boys' 60s clas-
sics, including Wouldn't It Be Nice, California Girls, 409, Dance,
Dance, Dance, and I Get Around.285 In lieu of a jury setting the
amount of damages, Love and Wilson agreed to a settlement whereby
Love would receive $5 million in cash and a share of future publishing
royalties.286 Other longstanding disputes have not been successful at
reaching a resolution. The decades-old royalties battle between song-
277. Id.
278. Mellencamp v. Riva Music Ltd., 698 F. Supp. 1154 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
279. Croce v. Kurnit, 565 F. Supp. 884 (S.D.N.Y. 1982), affd, 737 F.2d 229 (2d Cir.
1984).
280. Richcar Music Co. v. Towns, 385 N.Y.S.2d 778 (1976) (You've Got To Change Your
Evil Ways).
281. Frost Belt Int'l Recording Enters., Inc. v. Cold Chillin' Records, 758 F. Supp. 131
(S.D.N.Y. 1990).
282. Jimi Hendrix's Dad Wins First Round in Fight for Rights to Son's Image, Music,
JET, July 13, 1992, at 61.
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Ira Robbins, Beach Boys Agree on Love and Money, NEWSDAY, Dec. 22, 1994, at
B11.
286. Id.
[Vol. 18:8HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J.
1995] SONGWRITER-MUSIC PUBLISHER AGREEMENTS AND DISAGREEMENTS 137
writer Eddie Holland and music publisher Berry Gordy, Jr., has
"dragged on for seven years, spawned three additional, related suits,
clogged the court with 996 separate items filling 25 filing-cabinet-size
document drawers, and has left 57 motions still to be resolved" pre-
trial.287 In dispute are royalties on such 60s classics as Baby, I Need
Your Lovin'; Stop In The Name Of Love; Heat Wave; Sugar Pie,
Honey Bunch; and Standing In The Shadows Of Love-altogether 270
songs are involved, including about twenty-five "Top Ten" hits.288 The
songs still earn about $2 million per year, and disputes over that kind
of money make for hard-ball lawsuits. Consider, for example, that
"Holland's lawyer challenged Gordy to a fistfight while taking his pre-
trial statement. 28
9
Holland ... claims Gordy took advantage of him and his writing
partners, his brother Brian Holland and Lamont Dozier, in part by
using forged songwriting contracts. Holland wants Gordy and
Jobete, the music publishing company that Gordy owns, to give
back the rights to songs, including dozens of hits, the young men
wrote in the early 1960s. He also has been underpaid, Holland
claims, for songs the threesome wrote.., for Gordy-owned compa-
nies since then.
290
Gordy denies the allegations and claims that all the issues in Hol-
land's suit against him were settled in a 1972 case between Gordy and
what had come to be known in songwriting circles-almost reveren-
tially-as "Holland/Dozier/Holland. '291 In the 1972 case, a money
settlement was reached and the sides agreed to continue the royalty
arrangements in place since the mid-60s.292
Then there are the three suits that have been filed against Gordy
since 1988-one each by Brian Holland and Lamont Dozier and a
second suit by Eddie Holland, restating some of the charges in [a]
1988 suit that had been dismissed. All seek rights and back
royalties.293
No genre of popular music has been immune to songwriter-music
publisher problems, including the blues. Singer-songwriter Willie
Dixon, author of such blues classics as I'm Your Hoochie Coochie
Man, Little Red Rooster, Back Door Man, I Just Wanna Make Love To
287. Richard Willing, Motown Feud Strikes Sad Chord, THE DETROIT NEWS, Feb. 25,
1995, at B1.
288. Id.
289. Id.
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. Id.
293. Id.
You, Bring It On Home, and My Babe, offers perhaps the best case in
point.294
In 1994, Dixon's estate won a unanimous jury verdict finding that
Dixon was overreached when he conveyed a one-third interest in the
publishing income from some of his many hits to his manager in
1977.95 The manager claimed he earned the quid pro quo by going
above and beyond the call of duty while helping Dixon fight the legal
battle that resulted in Dixon reacquiring his songs from ARC
music.
296
Music royalty court fights have become increasingly common as art-
ists and their attorneys challenge details of contracts, some signed
decades ago. * * * Such disputes have been especially bitter for
blues artists, many of whom maintain they were shamelessly ex-
ploited by record executives when they were young. Indeed, in 1979
Dixon founded the Blues Heaven Foundation, which helps blues
artists recover their royalties and rights.297
Dixon's songs have been recorded by such artists as Mose Al-
lison, Muddy Waters, Elvis Presley, Eric Clapton, the Doors, the Roll-
ing Stones, Jimi Hendrix, Led Zeppelin, Lonnie Mack, the Everly
Brothers, and Johnny Rivers.298 Not every situation involving royal-
ties becomes a lawsuit. Arthur Alexander was the only songwriter to
have had songs cut and made into hits by the Beatles (Anna), The
Rolling Stones (You Better Move On), and Bob Dylan (Sally Sue
Brown). "[L]ike many R&B songwriters of his era, [Alexander]
claimed to have seen few royalties from any songs. ' 299 Alexander,
who died of heart failure in 1993 at age 53-after 15 years of general
anonymity driving a bus in Cleveland (ironically, the site of the Rock
'n' Roll Hall of Fame)-long ago attained "legend" status in the R&B,
294. Greg Kot, Case of Blues Sways Jury, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Dec. 6, 1994, at 24; Burt
A. Folkart, Bluesman Willie Dixon Dies, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 30, 1992, at 1.
295. Kot, supra note 294, at 24.
296. James Bates, Company Town Businessman or Just Blues Man? Dixon's Songs in
Royalty Dispute, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 11, 1994, at 1. It is at least ironic that the lawsuit re-
sulted from an agreement, found improper, which had its genesis in an agreement retriev-
ing Dixon's copyrights from their original publisher after a legal battle, i.e., Dixon found
himself, in classic blues lament, "out of the frying pan and into the fire."
297. Id.
Rhythm and Blues stars from the 1950s are still fighting their record labels to
recover unpaid royalties. The Rhythm & Blues Foundation was established as a
means of pressuring the music industry to redress the inequities pervading the
industry and to assist victimized artists.
Gilenson, supra note 43, at 544 n.15 (citing Bill Barol, One for the Soul Survivors: Righting
Old Wrongs in the Music Business, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 7, 1988, at 123).
298. Kot, supra note 294, at 24; Folkart, supra note 294, at B1.
299. Richard Younger, Arthur Alexander: True Legend, AM. SONGWRITER, Sept./Oct.
1995, at 19.
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rock, and country songwriting communities.3 0 "In 1987, Paul Mc-
Cartney said: 'If the Beatles ever wanted a sound, it was R&B ...
Arthur Alexander. ' ' 3 1 However, Alexander's legendary status did
not help him much in the royalties payment category.
"Gary Velletri of Bug Music, [who] oversees the Alexander cata-
log and [who] has been able to partially reclaim some of [Alexander's]
post 28-year copyrights, says: 'Arthur was a victim of [the] cross col-
lateralization of studio fees and poor business sense. When he was
young he signed too much."' 30 2 By that statement, Velletri apparently
meant that Alexander had signed too many one-sided music publish-
ing and sound recording contracts he did not understand. Ironically,
Alexander's other big hit as a songwriter was Everyday I Have To
Cry.3 °3 These and other songs were also recorded by such artists as
Otis Redding, the Who, and the Ike & Tina Turner Revue.31 "[Alex-
ander] never earned a penny from his hits in the 1960s and 70s and
was cheated out of his songwriter's royalties on those Beatles and
Stones recordings."3 5
6. Contractual Reversion
If Publisher fails to secure a cover recording of the Composi-
tions within the term of this Agreement, [W]riter may, during the fif-
teen (15) days following the expiration of said term, demand the
return of the Compositions in writing and if Publisher receives such
notice within said fifteen (15) day time period, Publisher agrees to
promptly reassign the [Clompositions and all Publisher's rights
therein to Writer and to execute any documents necessary to effect
such re-conveyance. Notwithstanding the foregoing, Publisher shall
not be obliged to reassign the Compositions to Writer until such time
as Writer shall repay to Publisher any advances or unrecouped dem-
onstration recording costs chargeable to Writer.30 6
Fifteen days is an incredibly short period of time in general, but is
perhaps unconscionably short when contrasted with the fact that the
term of the expired agreement was at least one year and probably
three years. The last sentence in the provision is utterly unworkable
for the vast majority of songwriters. It says that the songwriter can
have her unexploited copyrights back if she will return any un-
recouped advances in one lump sum. Assuming the unrecouped ad-
300. Id.
301. Id.
302. Id.
303. Id.
304. Michael Norman, From Soul to Silence: Singing Idol of Beatles Spurned Exploita-
tion, THE PLAIN DEALER, June 13, 1993, at 1H.
305. Id.
306. MEDOW, supra note 33, §§ 170-32 to -33.
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vances are significant, only the most successful songwriters could
accomplish such a feat. There are fairer ways to accomplish what both
parties need from contractual copyright reversion. One way is to al-
low the music publisher to keep all the copyrights for a certain period
of years from the date of conveyance of each copyright. This obviates
the problem of the music publisher having to return to the songwriter,
shortly after the contract has expired, the copyright to a song that was
conveyed to the music publisher by the songwriter perhaps only a few
months earlier.3 °7
Curiously, this provision uses the term "cover recording" to de-
scribe the circumstances under which a composition would not be sub-
ject to reversion. The curiosity is that, in the sound recording
industry, a "cover recording" is a composition that is re-recorded and
re-released (or "covered") by another artist, probably on another la-
bel and perhaps even in a different musical genre (e.g., Whitney Hous-
ton's 1992 pop "cover" of I Will Always Love You, written and
originally recorded by Dolly Parton). Use of the term "cover record-
ing" in this provision could allow the songwriter to reacquire copy-
rights that had been recorded and released only once, which, given the
pertinently short length of songwriter-music publisher agreements,
would be a real boon to the songwriter. This result, it would seem, is
not what the contract-drafting music publisher intended.
On December 16, 1971, Kingsley Rogers Rotardier assigned to
Godspell Music Corporation the copyrights to an entire musical score
he had written titled Every Kid You See On The Street Ain't Bad.3"'
Among the individual songs was a composition titled Live, Laugh and
Love.3" 9 On August 29, 1972, Godspell reassigned all of the copy-
rights in the musical score to Rotardier except the copyright to Live,
Laugh and Love, which Godspell retained under the condition that it
would also be reassigned to Rotardier on September 1, 1973, if God-
spell had "not cause[d] a commercial recording [of the song] to be
released or printed music in any form to be placed on sale" by that
time.311 On July 19, 1973, Godspell registered the copyright to Live,
Laugh and Love and then published and placed sheet music on sale
prior to September 1.311
307. See id. § 170-33.
308. Rotardier v. The Entertainment Co. Music Group, 518 F. Supp. 919, 920 (S.D.N.Y.
1981).
309. Id. at 920.
310. Id.
311. Id.
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Rotardier filed suit in 1981, claiming that while the one-year time
limit had been satisfied, Godspell, under the contract, could not pub-
lish the song without his consent.312 The Entertainment Company
Music Group, successor to Godspell's interest in the copyright, argued
that Rotardier's claim of copyright infringement had no basis and that
the court did not have subject-matter jurisdiction because the contro-
versy was contractual and not a federal claim of copyright infringe-
ment.313 The federal court agreed and dismissed the case.314
D. Miscellany
1. Representations and Warranties
Writer hereby warrants, represents, covenants and agrees as fol-
lows: Writer has the full right, power and authority to enter into and
perform this Agreement and to grant to and vest in Publisher all
rights herein set forth, free and clear of any and all claims, rights and
obligations whatsoever; all of the Compositions and all other results
and proceeds of the services of Writer hereunder, including all of the
titles, lyrics and music of the Compositions and each and every part
thereof, delivered and to be delivered by Writer hereunder are and
shall be new and original and capable of copyright protection
throughout the entire world; no Composition shall, either in whole or
in part, be an imitation or copy of, or infringe upon, any other mate-
rial, or violate or infringe upon any common law or statutory rights
of any party including, without limitation, contractual rights, copy-
rights and rights of privacy; and Writer has not sold, assigned, leased,
licensed, or in any other way disposed of or encumbered any Compo-
sition, in whole or in part, or any rights herein granted to Publisher,
nor shall Writer sell, assign, lease, license or in any other way dispose
of or encumber any of the Compositions, in whole or in part, or any
of said rights, except under the terms and conditions hereof 315
The problem here is the "non-infringement" language. It is a
promise by the songwriter that she has not and will not infringe upon
any other copyright. Under this language, it is a breach of the agree-
ment if a court rules that one of the conveyed songs infringes the
copyright to another song. Rarely do songwriters intentionally commit
copyright infringement. Absent willful infringement, any infringe-
ment found by a court should not constitute a breach of the agree-
ment. Otherwise, the provision is not controversial.
2. Indemnification
Writer hereby indemnifies, saves and holds Publisher, its succes-
sors and assigns, harmless from any and all liability, claims, de-
312. Id.
313. Id. at 920-21.
314. Id. at 921.
315. MEDOW, supra note 33, § 170-13.
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mands, loss and damage (including counsel fees and court costs)
arising out of or connected with any claim or action by a third party
which is inconsistent with any of the warranties, representations or
agreements made by Writer in this Agreement, and Writer shall reim-
burse Publisher, on demand, for any loss, cost, expense or damage to
which said indemnity applies. Publisher shall give Writer prompt
written notice of any claim or action covered by said indemnity, and
Writer shall have the right, at Writer's expense, to participate in the
defense of any such claim or action with counsel of Writer's choice.
Pending the disposition of any such claim or action, Publisher shall
have the right to withhold payment of such portion of any monies
which may be payable by Publisher to Writer under this Agreement
or under any other agreement between Writer and Publisher or its
affiliates as shall be reasonably related to the amount of the claim and
estimated counsel fees and costs. If Publisher shall settle or compro-
mise any such claim or action, the foregoing indemnity shall cover
only that portion (if any) of the settlement or compromise which shall
have been approved in writing by Writer, and Writer hereby agrees
not unreasonably to withhold any such approval. Notwithstanding
the foregoing, if Writer shall withhold approval of any settlement or
compromise which Publisher is willing to make upon advice of coun-
sel and in its best business judgment, Writer shall thereupon deliver to
Publisher an indemnity or surety bond, in form satisfactory to Pub-
lisher, which shall cover the amount of the claim and estimated coun-
sel fees and costs, and if Writer shall fail to deliver such bond within
ten (10) business days, Writer shall be deemed to have approved of
said settlement or compromise.
316
Regardless of the absence of willfulness on the part of the song-
writer, the music publisher demands in this provision that the song-
writer bear the entire burden of any problem arising under the
copyright of any musical composition conveyed to it under the agree-
ment. (The music publisher may also withhold royalties from the
songwriter pending the outcome of the case). This is akin to "having
your cake and eating it, too." The music publisher wants to own all
the copyrights, thereby having complete control of everything posi-
tive, but should anything negative happen, the burden of defense falls
completely upon the songwriter. This is patently ridiculous. If the mu-
sic publisher wants to bear less risk, there are reasonable options. For
example, it could let the songwriter retain half the copyright for shoul-
dering half the risk.
3. Power of Attorney
Writer hereby irrevocably constitutes, authorizes, empowers and
appoints Publisher or any of its officers [as] Writer's true and lawful
attorney (with full power of substitution and delegation), in Writer's
name, and in Writer's place and stead, or in Publisher's name, to take
316. Id. §§ 170-22 to -23.
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and do such action, and to make, sign, execute, acknowledge and de-
liver any and all instruments or documents which Publisher from
time to time may deem desirable or necessary to vest in Publisher, its
successors and assigns, all of the rights or interests granted by Writer
hereunder, including, without limitation, such documents as Pub-
lisher shall deem desirable or necessary to secure to Publisher, its suc-
cessors and assigns, the worldwide copyrights for all Compositions
for the entire term of copyright and for any and all renewals and
extensions under any present or future laws throughout the world.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, Writer acknowledges that he (or she)
is Publisher's employee for hire, that all Compositions are and shall
be works made for hire and that Publisher is accordingly the author
of all Compositions for all purposes of the 1909 or 1976 Copyright
Law or any succeeding Copyright law.3
17
In this provision, the music publisher acquires a broader power of
attorney than necessary. The provision should be changed to reflect
the appropriate limitations. Normally, it is unwise to allow anyone to
have a broad and perpetual power of attorney. Moreover, if, as previ-
ously indicated,318 the musical compositions are "works made for
hire," then no power of attorney is necessary because the songs are
the property of the employer from the time of creation. The drafter of
this provision apparently felt it necessary to reiterate that even though
the music publisher wants power of attorney from the songwriter (a
clear indication and admission of the absence of a "work made for
hire" relationship), the relationship is nonetheless employer/
employee.
4. Actions
Publisher shall have the exclusive right to take such action as it
deems necessary, either in Writer's name or in its own name or in
both names, against any party to protect all rights and interests ac-
quired by Publisher hereunder. Writer shall, cooperate fully with
Publisher in any controversy which may arise or litigation which may
be brought concerning Publisher's rights and interests acquired here-
under. Publisher shall have the right, in its discretion, to employ at-
torneys and to institute or defend against any claim, action or
proceeding, whether for infringement of copyright or otherwise, and
to take any other necessary steps to protect the right, title and interest
of Publisher in and to each Composition and, in connection there-
with, to settle, compromise or in any other manner dispose of any
such claim, action or proceeding and to satisfy or collect on any judg-
ment which may be rendered. If Publisher shall recover on a judg-
ment or as a result of a settlement with respect to any claim, action or
proceeding for copyright infringement initiated by Publisher, all of
Publisher's expenses in connection therewith, including, without limi-
tation, attorney's fees and other costs, shall first be deducted, and fifty
317. Id. §§ 170-13 to -14.
318. See supra text accompanying notes 102-112.
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percent f50%) of the net proceeds shall be credited to Writer's
account.319
Here, the music publisher gives itself the "exclusive" right to sue
for copyright infringement, effectively gutting the beneficial interest
the songwriter has in the copyright. What if the music publisher
chooses not to sue, even in the case of a clear copyright infringement?
Under this provision, the songwriter has no clear remedy. Therefore,
the right to sue should be mutual for both the music publisher and the
songwriter. Having the parties "reasonably cooperate" is better than
asking them to "cooperate fully." Moreover, any party expending at-
torney's fees while prosecuting a copyright infringement action should
be allowed to recoup these costs prior to the distribution of any settle-
ment or judgment. The recoupment should be for "reasonable" ex-
penses, not "without limitation."
5. Assignment
[Publisher] may assign any or all of [Publisher's] rights granted
hereunder to any person, firm or corporation.320
The clear intention here is that the music publisher should have
the right to sell the copyrights or other rights which are the subject of
the agreement and the songwriter should not. This language is grossly
one-sided.
6. Right of First Refusal
[Writer] hereby agree[s] that [Writer] shall not make any trans-
fer, sale, or assignment of [Writer's] rights hereunder to any other
person, firm, or corporation unless and until [Writer has] offered
such rights to [Publisher] hereunder upon equal or more favorable
terms and [Publisher] shall have refused such offer. 321
As with the assignment provision, this provision is grossly one-
sided and has no foundation in logic. It is simply selfish.
7. Suspension and Termination
If Writer shall fail, refuse or be unable to submit to Publisher...
[Compositions as required by this Agreement] or shall otherwise fail,
refuse or be unable to perform his material obligations hereunder,
Publisher shall have the right, in addition to all its other rights and
remedies at law or in equity, to suspend the term of this Agreement
and its obligations hereunder by written notice to Writer, or, in the
event such failure, refusal or inability shall continue for longer than
six (6) months, to terminate this Agreement by written notice to
Writer. Any such suspension shall continue for the duration of any
319. MEDOW, supra note 33, § 170-22.
320. MCA, supra note 174, at 6.
321. Id. at 4-5.
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such failure, refusal or inability, and, unless Publisher notifies Writer
to the contrary in writing, the then current term hereof shall be auto-
matically extended by the number of days which shall equal the total
number of days of suspension. During any such suspension Writer
'shall not render services as a songwriter and/or composer to any
other party or assign, or license or convey any musical composition
to any other party. 
2
As long as the number of songs required by the minimum com-
mitment is acceptably low, this is not a "deal killer" provision.323 The
number of songs required under the minimum commitment is logically
intertwined with the amount of advances against royalties the song-
writer receives.324
8. No Partnership or Joint Venture
Nothing contained herein shall be construed to constitute a joint
venture or partnership between [Writer and Publisher].3 25
This is a non-controversial provision.
9. Headings
The heading of clauses or other divisions hereof are inserted
only for the purpose of convenient reference. Such headings shall not
be deemed to govern, limit, modify or in any other manner affect the
scope, meaning or intent of the provisions of this Agreement or any
part thereof, nor shall they otherwise be given any legal effect.326
This is a non-controversial provision.
10. Entirety of Agreement
This Agreement supersedes any and all prior negotiations, un-
derstandings and agreements between the parties hereto with respect
to the subject matter hereof. Each of the parties acknowledges and
agrees that neither party has made any representations or promises in
connection with this Agreement or the subject matter hereof not con-
tained herein.32 7
This is a non-controversial provision.
322. MEDOW, supra note 33, §§ 170-25 to -26.
323. "Writer will attempt to delete this provision or require that the number of songs
required be defined at a low level." Id. §§ 170-25 to -26.
324. At a minimum, if any advances against royalties are being paid, if is safe "to say
that if a set number of songs is to be required, publishers look for 12 or more complete
songs in any one-year period .... " Id. § 170-26.
325. Zomba, supra note 169, at 13.
326. MEDOW, supra note 33, § 170-26.
327. Id. § 170-24.
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11. Modification
This Agreement may not be cancelled, altered, modified,
amended or waived, in whole or in part, in any way, except by an
instrument in writing signed by the party sought to be bound.3 2
This is a non-controversial provision.
12. Waiver
The waiver by either party of any breach of this Agreement in
any one or more instances shall in no way be construed as a waiver of
any subsequent breach of this Agreement (whether or not of a similar
nature).329
This is a non-controversial provision.
13. Effect of Invalidity
If any part of this Agreement shall be held to be void, invalid or
unenforceable, it shall not affect the validity of the balance of this
Agreement. 3
30
This is a non-controversial provision.
14. Controlling Law
This Agreement shall be deemed to have been made in the State
of (name), and its validity, construction and effect shall be governed
by the laws of the State of (name) applicable to agreements wholly
performed therein. This Agreement shall not be binding upon Pub-
lisher until signed by Writer and countersigned by a duly authorized
officer of Publisher.331
This provision is non-controversial so long as the state of con-
tracting is New York, California, or Tennessee because these courts
are familiar with the dynamics of entertainment law in general and are
perhaps more likely to understand the caution that should be ob-
served in adjudicating contract provisions borne of adhesion.
15. Notices
Any written notices which Publisher shall desire to give to Writer
hereunder, and all statements, royalties and other payments which
shall be due to Writer hereunder, shall be addressed to Writer at the
address set forth at the beginning of this agreement until Writer shall
give Publisher written notice of a new address. All notices which
Writer shall desire to give to Publisher hereunder shall be addressed
to Publisher at the address set forth at the beginning of this
[A]greement until Publisher shall give Writer written notice of a new
328. Id.
329. Id
330. Id. §§ 170-24 to -25.
331. Id. § 170-25.
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address, and a courtesy copy of all such notices shall also be given to
(address). All notices shall either be served by hand (to an officer of
Publisher if Publisher shall be the addressee) or by registered or certi-
fied mail, postage prepaid, or by telegraph, charges prepaid, ad-
dressed as aforesaid. The date of making personal service or of
mailing or of depositing in a telegraph office, whichever shall be first,
shall be deemed the date of service.332
This is a non-controversial provision.
IV
The Contents of a Bilaterally Bargained-For Plain-
Language Long-Term Exclusive Songwriting-
Music Publishing Agreement 333
A. Introduction
Negotiating and drafting bilaterally bargained-for contracts based
on mutual respect and a desired meeting of the minds involves several
goals: (1) a hard-driven bargain that avoids the inevitable downside of
a lop-sided, long-term executory contract; (2) attention to detail and
anticipation of potential problems in performance of the agreement;
(3) a non-complicated, "clean" or "readable" document-because it
will generate much less controversy down the road; (4) recognition
that it is better to give up minor benefits than to receive the benefits
in such a complicated fashion as ultimately to cause complex, expen-
sive, relationship-ending litigation; and (5) a realization that striving
for mutuality and bilateral fairness are the keys to ease of enforceabil-
ity and long-term contractual happiness.
B. The Ideal Agreement
The following is an agreement ("Agreement") between
("Writer") and Music
Publishing Co., Inc. ("Publisher") and is entered into in consideration
of the promises made in this Agreement and with the parties in-
tending to be legally bound.
332. Id. §§ 170-23 to -24.
333. The writing contained in this section represents the author's idea of how a
bilaterally bargained-for, plain language, meeting of the minds agreement between a non-
artist, early-career professional songwriter and a music publishing company might read.
There are many other ways to quite rationally-and bilaterally-draft many of these
provisions.
General Provisions
1. Nature of agreement.334 Writer is a songwriter seeking the
services of a music publishing company. Publisher is a music publish-
ing company seeking the services of a songwriter. Under this Agree-
ment, Writer is not an employee of Publisher for "work made for
hire" or other purposes; rather, Writer is an independent contractor.
This is a contractual relationship between businesses.
2. Legal status and domiciliary of parties. 335 Publisher is a corpo-
ration duly organized, validly existing, and in good standing under the
laws of the State of with corporate power to
carry on its business as it is now being conducted. Publisher has its
principal office and place of business at
Writer is an individual and a sole proprietor. Writer is a resident of
the State of
3. Definitions.336
a. "Term." Whenever the words "the term of this Agreement" or
words of similar meaning are used in this Agreement, such words are
referring to the initial term of this Agreement and any renewals of this
Agreement.
b. "Work made for hire." This phrase is defined in the Copyright
Act of 1976, as amended, codified at 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1976): "A 'work
made for hire' is... a work prepared by an employee within the scope
of his or her employment." The second definition of this phrase in the
Act concerns "specially commissioned works" and is not relevant to
this Agreement.
c. "Independent contractor." This is a term used in the context of
this Agreement to distinguish between an employee of an employer
and an individual doing business with a company.
d. "Professional demonstration recording" or "demo." In the
context of this Agreement, this is a recording of a musical composition
on professional-quality recording equipment by professional-quality
musicians and is of sufficient quality to properly and adequately pro-
334. This language puts to rest early and definitively any question concerning "work
made for hire."
335. It can be important to have each party indicate its/her legal status and place of
domiciliary because anything less than candor in this regard could be construed to be fraud
in the formation of the agreement-potentially exposing the wrongdoer to the equitable
remedy of rescission and to the tort sanction of punitive damages-or at least it could
operate as a breach of the agreement. See Mother Bertha Music v. Trio Music, 717 F.
Supp. 157 (S.D.N.Y. 1989).
336. All terms of art or other words or phrases not susceptible to clear self-explanation,
either in general or in the context of this Agreement, should be defined near the beginning
of the agreement.
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mote the recorded musical composition to "artists and repertoire" em-
ployees of record companies, recording artists, producers, and other
such decision-makers. In the recorded-music industry, such record-
ings are called "demos."
e. "Musical composition." In the context of this Agreement and
in its most basic form, this is a combination of words, music, beat, and
tempo. In the context of all copyrights conveyed by Writer to Pub-
lisher under this Agreement, "musical composition" includes both
wholly-written and co-written musical compositions.
f. "Wholly-written musical composition." This is a musical com-
position written completely by a single songwriter.
g. "Part of a wholly-written musical composition." In the context
of this Agreement, this assumes that the musical composition was
written by more than one songwriter, each of whom wrote a "part" of
it. Each songwriter's contribution can be expressed in percentage
terms, each owning that portion of the copyright.
h. "Minimum commitment." This is the number of musical com-
positions and/or parts of musical compositions that Writer, in the ag-
gregate, must write under this Agreement to comply with the
minimum number of musical compositions called for by this
Agreement.
i. "Creative control." In the context of this Agreement, this is
ultimate authority over all aspects of demo production.
j. "Major label." In the context of this Agreement, this is any
sound recording and releasing company which, during the calendar
year preceding the date of expiration or termination of this Agree-
ment, placed a sound recording in the "Top Ten" for any week in Bill-
board Magazine's Hot 100 Singles, Hot Country Singles, Hot R&B
Singles, and/or Hot Adult Contemporary categories.
k. "Subpublisher." This is a third-party music publishing com-
pany, usually but not always outside the United States, which, in cer-
tain situations, collects royalties for Publisher and remits such
royalties to Publisher after deducting a reasonable fee for its services.
Subpublishers may or may not be owned or controlled by or affiliated
with Publisher.
1. "Controlled composition." This is a song co-written by a song-
writer and a recording artist, or by a songwriter and a producer, or co-
written by all three (or on which the artist or producer or both are
sharing in the songwriter's songwriter's royalties even where he or
they did not actually participate in the writing of the song). Record
companies usually contractually require their recording artists to grant
the record company a reduced mechanical royalty rate (often 75% of
the current rate) on compositions "controlled" by the artist or
producer.
m. "Float." This is the interest earned by the music publisher on
royalties ultimately paid to the songwriter but that sometimes sit in
the music publisher's bank account for considerable periods.
n. "Release." This is a unit of musical compositions, e.g., a com-
pact disc, that a record company has begun to market to the public for
sale.
o. "Single." This is a musical composition that has been released
to radio stations and others by a record company for promotional pur-
poses. Three to five of the songs on a compact disc usually- are re-
leased as "singles," which are the featured tracks of a particular
compact disc, with the remaining songs being relegated to the status of
"album cuts."
4. Term of agreement. 337 This Agreement begins on January 1,
1996, and ends on December 31, 1999. Publisher, at its sole discretion,
may renew this Agreement by notice to Writer during September or
October, 1999, and by payment to Writer of $ accompany-
ing the notice. Such renewal extends the ending date of this Agree-
ment to December 31, 2000. In the event Publisher extends this
Agreement as specified in the previous sentences, Publisher, at its sole
discretion, may renew this Agreement a second and final time by no-
tice to Writer during September or October, 2000, and by payment to
Writer of $ accompanying the notice. Such re-
newal extends the ending date of this Agreement to December 31,
2001. Subject to SUSPENSION AND TERMINATION, renewal beyond that
point requires amending this Agreement or making a new agreement.
5. Copyright conveyance.338 Subject to Reservations and New
uses of copyrighted material, Writer hereby conveys to Publisher all of
337. Under this language, the music publisher must pay the songwriter for any renewals
of the agreement. After three years, if the music publisher is desirous of extending the
agreement, the music publisher should be willing to pay some reasonable compensation to
the songwriter for the right. There is more than one way to base a quid pro quo in this
regard.
I try to make the publisher's exercise of an option contingent on some set per-
formance goals. For example, you might require that the publisher not be able to
renew the contract unless the publisher has been able to place at least one of your
songs with a major-label recording act during the previous contract period.
Carter, supra note 62, at 5.
338. This language makes it abundantly clear what the songwriter is conveying to the
music publisher. Any copyrights of material written previous to the execution of the
agreement must be spelled out, making it clear that the songwriter is under no obligation
to the music publisher to convey to the music publisher any copyrights or parts of copy-
rights not specifically listed. Neither is the songwriter obligated to the music publisher
concerning any copyrights the songwriter may own or acquire during the term of the agree-
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Writer's copyright interests in Writer's previous musical composi-
tions-and previous arrangements of musical compositions in the
public domain-that are listed under Existing material in this Agree-
ment. Writer specifically reserves all rights in all other of Writer's
existing musical compositions and existing arrangements of musical
compositions. Subject to Reservations, Writer hereby conveys to Pub-
lisher all of Writer's copyright interests in all of Writer's musical com-
positions-and arrangements of musical compositions in the public
domain-created during the term of this Agreement. In addition to
Writer's previous musical compositions-and previous arrangements
of musical compositions in the public domain-not listed under Ex-
isting material in this Agreement, Writer specifically reserves and
does not convey to Publisher any of Writer's interests in musical com-
positions-and arrangements of musical compositions in the public
domain-that Writer has acquired from others or may acquire from
others during the term of this Agreement.
6. Reservations. 339  Notwithstanding Copyright conveyance,
Writer hereby specifically reserves to herself those parts of the copy-
ment that do not concern musical compositions or parts of musical compositions written by
the songwriter before or during the term of the agreement. In other words, unless it has to
do with musical compositions or parts of musical compositions written by the songwriter,
the songwriter is free to act as she may please with respect to musical copyrights, up to and
including being in the music publishing business (not that such would necessarily be a nor-
mal occurrence, at least during the early stages of a songwriter's career).
339. If the songwriter's benefits under a copyright conveyed to a music publisher can be
"derivatived" out of existence, the songwriter should be in control of whether the music
publisher is allowed to produce a derivative and, if so (whether the songwriter voluntarily
agrees or is ordered by an arbitrator to agree), what effect any such derivative would have
on the songwriter's royalty position. At the absolute least, the music publisher should not
be allowed to have unilateral control over the extent to which the songwriter's royalty
share is diminished by any additions to and/or deletions from the subject work. On the
subject of the songwriter retaining control over certain uses of the copyrights conveyed by
the songwriter to the music publisher under the agreement:
Publishers resist these attempts, generally citing the investment they have in the
writer and his material and the comparative expertise of the publisher and writer
in determining the proper method and manner of exploiting songs. * * * A com-
mon compromise is to require the writer's consent to the use of songs in so-called
"X" rated films and in commercials for political candidates, religious groups, alco-
holic beverages, personal care products and the like.
MEDOW, supra note 33, § 170-11. A situation involving singer-songwriter Carl Perkins and
his composition Honey Don't drives home the point.
[W]hat if a composer's song is used as background music for a scene depicting the
rape of a child? While the licensing of the song Honey Don't was beyond the
control of composer Carl Perkins, he would ordinarily consider its use in a film to
be "great." However, says Perkins, in the context of "Prince of Tides," "people
are asking me, 'Carl, why would you have a song in such a filthy place in a movie
[a child molestation scene]?' They are shocked, especially since they all know I
started [a] child-abuse center. I am very damaged by this and very hurt." If Per-
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right bundle of rights known as the right to prepare derivative works,
"synchronization" rights, and other licensing rights insofar as they
pertain to reduced mechanical royalty rates for "controlled
compositions."
a. Should Publisher desire to produce a derivative work based on
any musical composition the copyright to which has been conveyed by
Writer to Publisher under this Agreement, Publisher shall notify
Writer of the same. If Writer and Publisher cannot agree within a
reasonable time concerning whether a derivative work should be pro-
duced by Publisher and the various ramifications of such action, the
parties agree to submit the dispute to arbitration.
b. Should Publisher desire to issue a "synchronization" license
concerning any musical composition the copyright to which has been
conveyed by Writer to Publisher under this Agreement, Publisher
shall notify Writer of the same. If Publisher and Writer cannot agree
within a reasonable time concerning whether the license should be
granted, the parties agree to submit the dispute to arbitration.
Writer's concern is that no musical composition of hers be associated
in any way with any other work of authorship which is: (1) obscene or
pornographic-or objectionable in any similar or related way; (2)
political or religious in nature; (3) in promotion of tobacco, alcohol, or
feminine hygiene products; and (4) otherwise objectionable to a rea-
sonable person. With respect to this and the preceding paragraph,
should the parties be unable to agree on the selection of an arbitrator
or on any of the other particulars of any arbitration contemplated
under this provision, either party may file suit for purposes of asking a
court of competent jurisdiction to decide such matters. The parties
agree that any such court rulings shall not be appealable. Should the
arbitrator determine that either party acted unreasonably in forcing
the issue to arbitration, the arbitrator may require such party to pay
all or part of the reasonable cost of the unreasonably-forced arbitra-
tion, including any court action and all reasonable attorneys' fees.
Judgment upon any award rendered or on any decision in the nature
of a declaratory judgment made by the arbitrator may be entered in
any court of competent jurisdiction and is not appealable.
kins were to bring suit for infringement of his integrity rights [a part of the droit
moral concept] because he feels the use of his song in this context harmed his
reputation, the central issue would be whether the use of "Honey Don't" dam-
aged his honor or reputation as a songwriter (emphasis added), not his reputation
in the community as a children's advocate. [Since droit moral for songwriters is
not recognized in. the U.S.,] [i]t thus seems that Perkins could not prevail ....
Zabatta, supra note 159, at 1125.
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c. Without Writer's express written consent, which Writer may
withhold for any reason, Publisher shall not issue a mechanical license
for the recording and release of any musical composition the copy-
right to which has been conveyed by Writer to Publisher under this
Agreement in which the mechanical royalty rate is in any way reduced
from the federal statutory rate in effect at the time of proposed
licensing.
7. Security interest.340 With respect to the registration by Pub-
lisher in the U.S. Copyright Office of each copyright conveyed by
Writer to Publisher under this Agreement, Publisher agrees to exe-
cute and file, together with the filing of the Copyright Registration
application and Assignment in favor of Publisher, a Copyright Secur-
ity agreement and Assignment in favor of Writer. The perfection of
this security interest in Writer per copyright is in consideration of ac-
crued and accruing but unpaid royalties as specified in this
Agreement.
340. This language is unique and may or may not be appropriate. First, this is a fairly
new idea in relation to songwriter-music publisher agreements. See NSAI HANDBOOK,
supra note 23, at 100-01. Second, the mortgaging of copyrights in this way is not an estab-
lished legal procedure. There is much confusion.
The current state of the law governing security interests in intellectual property is
unsatisfactory. There is uncertainty as to where and how to file, what constitutes
notice of a security interest, who has priority, and what property is covered by a
security interest. This area of the law is further complicated by the fact that both
federal and state law impact on these issues.
Lee A. Schott & Harry C. Sigman, Preliminary Discussion Draft of Proposed Changes to
Article 9 Relating to Treatment of Security Interests in Intellectual Property, 878 A.L.I. 415,
423 (1993).
Generally, the federal statutes creating intellectual property do not include clear
provisions for promptly taking and perfecting security interests comparable to the
arrangements set forth in UCC Article 9. At the same time, UCC Section 9-
302(3) defers to federal title registration law with respect to security interests in
... copyrights.
Alan W. Armstrong, Financing Intellectual Property, Personal Property Leases, and Some
Related Issues, 171 A.L.I. 113, 116 (1990). That said, the following procedure may do the
trick.
Security interests in copyright are governed by 17 U.S.C. § 205 which permits the
recording of any license as well as the copyright itself or an interest in the copy-
right and provides that the recording in the Copyright Office "gives all persons
constructive notice of the facts stated in the recorded document .... " The Act
deals, as well, with priorities between conflicting transfers and exclusive and non-
exclusive licenses. Although there is little caselaw involving copyright security
interests (or "mortgages" as they are called), recording under the ... Act appears
to be the only method available to perfect a security interest in copyrights. How-
ever, UCC filing as well may prove a useful prophylactic. * * * A Copyright
Security Agreement... and assignment... filed with the Copyright Office should
suffice for purposes of satisfying the federal law requirements.
Id. at 118.
8. Existing material.341 At the time this Agreement is signed by
both Writer and Publisher, and in compensation for the copyrights to
Writer's previous musical compositions-and previous arrangements
of musical compositions in the public domain-that are listed in this
provision, Publisher shall pay Writer the total sum of $
At the time this Agreement is signed by both Writer and Publisher,
Writer shall deliver to Publisher audiotape recordings of Writer's pre-
vious musical compositions-and previous arrangements of musical
compositions in the public domain-that are listed at the end of this
paragraph. For the particular audiotapes designated on the following
list by Writer and Publisher as demos, Publisher shall pay Writer a
total demo acquisition compensation of $ , and, once paid,
all rights in such demos shall belong to Publisher.
DEMO COMPENSATION
PER MUSICAL
MUSICAL PROFESSIONAL COMPOSITION OR
COMPOSITION[ ] OR DEMONSTRATION ARRANGEMENT IF
ARRANGEMENT[] RECORDING: APPLICABLE
Yes []No []
Yes []No []
Yes []No []
9. Material created under this Agreement. 342 During the term of
this Agreement, Writer, promptly after Writer has created a musical
composition-or arrangement of a musical composition in the public
domain-in whole or in part, shall deliver to Publisher an audiotape
recording of that musical composition.
10. Individual copyright conveyances.3 43 Publisher may from time
to time request Writer to execute an individual copyright conveyance
341. This is clear payment for the acquisition by the music publisher of certain of the
songwriter's previous musical compositions. It also calls for clear payment to the song-
writer by the music publisher for the songwriter's previous demos that the music publisher
intends to use in the exploitation of the songwriter's previous musical compositions.
342. In this context, audiotape recordings could vary in production values from a
"scratch" recording of, say, voice and guitar or voice and piano to a recording that more
closely approximates an actual demo. Because the music publisher is not obligated to
demo or exploit every musical composition presented to the music publisher by the
songwriter, the songwriter may desire (but is certainly not obligated), at the songwriter's
own expense, to provide the music publisher with a higher production-value recording in
the hope that the music publisher will, through this effort of the songwriter's, adopt the
view that the song is commercially exploitable.
343. Music publishers believe, and they are no doubt correct, that each musical
composition should be registered with the U.S. Copyright Office independently of all
others. The conveyance of copyrights in general and individually by the songwriter to the
music publisher under the agreement constitutes an assignment from one party to another,
but it does not affect registration. While copyright is technically existent at the moment of
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using Publisher's standard-form agreement concerning each or any of
Writer's musical compositions-or arrangements of musical
compositions in the public domain-conveyed by Writer to Publisher
under this Agreement. Writer agrees to do so. Individual copyright
conveyances shall supplement and not supersede this Agreement. In
the event of any conflict between the provisions of any individual
copyright conveyance and this Agreement, this Agreement shall
govern. Nothing concerning this paragraph shall negatively affect
Publisher's rights to or Writer's reserved rights in the copyrights
conveyed by Writer to Publisher under this Agreement.
Notwithstanding any provision in this Agreement to the contrary, if
any, and for purposes of this Agreement, the date of effective
copyright conveyance of any musical composition conveyed by Writer
to Publisher under this Agreement is the date that Writer submits to
Publisher an audiotape recording of a musical composition accepted
by Publisher under either Minimum commitment or Demonstration
recording obligations.
11. Exclusivity. 34" In reasonable connection with songwriting,
Writer agrees to engage herself exclusively for the benefit of Publisher
during the term of this Agreement. Writer is free to enter into other
agreements, short- and/or long-term, that do not constitute a breach
of this Agreement, including, but not limited to, contracts to perform
as a musician or recording artist.
12. Writer's name and likeness. 34 5 In connection with the
exploitation by Publisher of the musical compositions conveyed by
fixation, the formal copyright registration of each musical composition set to begin earning
royalties is simply commercially essential. For a variety of reasons, it may be necessary to
know precisely when the songwriter effectively conveyed a musical composition to the
music publisher. This language leaves no doubt as to the effective date. This language is
not meant to conflict with the formal copyright assignment provisions of the Act; rather, it
is meant to indicate when, for purposes of the agreement, equitable title has passed as
between the songwriter and the music publisher.
344. Many songwriters, for purposes of additional income and otherwise for general
career development, engage in non-songwriting music-related activities during the term of
agreements such as this. It should be clear from the language of this provision that to do so
is not a breach of the agreement.
345. There is no need for "exclusivity" under this provision. It should simply be stated
that in connection with copyrights conveyed by the songwriter to the music publisher, the
music publisher has the right to the reasonable use of the songwriter's name and likeness.
Nothing more. The music publisher, especially given the ease with which visual images
now can be manipulated by simple computer assistance, should not be allowed to alter any
visual images of the songwriter-at least without the songwriter's permission. An old case
concerning the more traditional alteration of such a visual image (in another
entertainment-industry context) illustrates the point:
Plaintiff Sinclair, a movie actor, sued the defendant for invasion of privacy over
the use of a photograph of him for advertising purposes. The photograph was
Writer to Publisher under this Agreement, Writer grants to Publisher
and Publisher's designees the right to reasonably use and publish
Writer's name (including any pseudonyms), unaltered visual image,
biographical material, and relevant musical composition titles. For
such use, Writer shall receive no compensation other than as specified
in this Agreement under Royalties. Writer shall have the right of pre-
approval of any photograph or other visual image Publisher may be
desirous of using in connection with this provision.
13. Droit moral.3 4 6 Writer hereby waives any and all benefits
under the droit moral concept inside the United States and outside the
altered to show him telegraphing friends and admirers that his new movie would
be playing at a certain theater. Sinclair was embarrassed by the implication of the
alteration, comparing it to a lawyer requesting friends witness his performance at
court. Sinclair had contractually agreed that the producers of his new movie
Escape Me Never could use the original photograph of Sinclair for publicity
purposes in conjunction with the movie. The defendants contended that the
producers, armed with a release signed by Sinclair, had authorized this use.
However, the court found that Sinclair had authorized only use of the "true"
picture, not a composite picture "brought about by double printing or new matter
added to a true photograph."
Lisa B. A. Potter, Note, Altered Realities: The Effect of Digital Imaging Technology on
Libel and Right of Privacy, 17 HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. 495, 513 n.101 (1995) (citing
Sinclair v. Postal Tel. & Cable Co., 72 N.Y.S.2d 841, 842 (1935)) (emphasis added). See
also Don E. Tomlinson, Lies, Audio and Video Tape: Some Downsides of Digital Mass
Communication, S.W. MASS COMM. J., 9-2, 1-14 (1994); Don E. Tomlinson, Computer Ma-
nipulation and Creation of Images and Sounds: Assessing the Impact, The Annenberg
Washington Program, Washington, D.C., 1993.
346. Droit moral is a murky subject. Currently, such rights-in the context of
songwriting-do not exist in the United States. This language, then, is a compromise
between the music publisher wanting the songwriter to waive any personal rights she may
have or later acquire, worldwide, and the songwriter seeking to preserve all such rights.
Unless the U.S. Supreme Court rules that authors have had personal rights in the United
States all along (an extremely unlikely prospect), any such rights in the United States for
songwriters are in the future. The waiver by the songwriter of international personal rights
would free the music publisher from having to worry about the assertion by the songwriter
of such rights in far-flung places, and the specific preservation of such rights, if any and if
ever, by the songwriter with respect to the United States likely would be more important to
the songwriter and easier to deal with by both sides of the agreement. The absence of
personal rights means that once a songwriter conveys an entire copyright to a music
publisher, the music publisher may change the composition in any way the music publisher
desires. "Under U.S. law, when you transfer all of the rights in your song to someone else
... the purchaser has the right to alter the song's music and lyrics [and even its title]."
Robert R. Carter, Jr., Song Rights: Legal Aspects of Songwriting, SONGWRITER NOTES,
Sept. 1994, at 4.
Most songwriters . . . are sensitive about the artistic integrity of their
compositions. The creative process can be a painful catharsis, exploring and
expressing the deepest personal experiences and feelings. Similarly, most lawyers
... are sensitive about money. They don't [or shouldn't] want their writer-client's
share of song revenue suddenly diluted by a "co-writer" who has modified a line
here and there. Publishers are understandably sensitive about having maximum
flexibility in their efforts to find users for a song. Minor cosmetic changes,
HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. [Vol. 18:85
1995] SONGWRITER-MUSIC PUBLISHER AGREEMENTS AND DISAGREEMENTS 157
United States in relation to the musical compositions conveyed by
Writer to Publisher under this Agreement; however, should, in the
context of songwriting, a statute enacted by the Congress of the
United States or a decision of the Supreme Court of the United States
adopt the concept of droit moral, during the term of this Agreement
or at any time Publisher owns all or part of the copyright to any
musical composition conveyed by Writer to Publisher under this
Agreement, Writer hereby reserves and claims any and All benefits
under the droit moral concept-but only in the United States. Should
Writer claim any droit moral benefit under this provision and
Publisher disagree either that Writer should be able to claim the
benefit or concerning the manner in which Writer seeks to manifest
any such claimed benefit, the parties agree to submit the dispute to
arbitration. If the parties cannot agree on the selection of an
arbitrator or on any of the other particulars of any arbitration
contemplated under this provision, either party may file suit for
purposes of asking a court of competent jurisdiction to decide such
matters. The parties agree that any such court rulings shall not be
appealable. Should the arbitrator determine that either party acted
unreasonably in forcing the issue to arbitration, the arbitrator may
require such party to pay all or part of the reasonable cost of the
unreasonably-forced arbitration, including any court action and all
reasonable attorneys' fees. Judgment upon any award rendered or on
any decision in the nature of a declaratory judgment made by the
arbitrator may be entered in any court of competent jurisdiction and is
not appealable.
B. Songwriting347
1. Uniqueness of services. 348 Writer acknowledges to Publisher
that the writing of musical compositions is a unique service of an intel-
lectual character and that this uniqueness gives the writing of musical
translations into different languages, or subtle changes to conform a song to the
mood or style of a particular recording artist can make the difference between a
song lying dormant or being [recorded] and generating significant income.
Id. Notwithstanding the assertion by Carter that the songwriter's share of revenue can be
decreased by such alteration and notwithstanding the result in Cortner v. Israel, 732 F.2d
267 (2d Cir. 1984), whether and to what extent the songwriter's share can be "diluted" by
such activities is not well-settled law.
347. These are the principal promises made by the songwriter to the music publisher
concerning the act of songwriting itself.
348. To the extent that the songwriter is retaining future personal rights in the U.S., if
any and if ever, the language in this provision is more palatable. This language also makes
it clear that the music publisher may seek injunctive relief but that the songwriter is not
somehow defaulting to it.
compositions under this Agreement by Writer a value that, when lost,
cannot be reasonably or adequately compensated in damages in an
action at law by Publisher and that a breach of this Agreement by
Writer concerning the writing of musical compositions could cause
Publisher irreparable harm. Therefore, in addition to any legal reme-
dies which may be available to Publisher for any relevant breach of
this Agreement by Writer, Writer acknowledges that Publisher shall
be entitled to seek injunctive relief.
2. Minimum commitment. 34 9 During each year of the term of this
Agreement, Writer shall deliver to Publisher no fewer than
new wholly-written musical compositions and/
or parts of wholly-written musical compositions aggregating
musical compositions, which number of musi-
cal compositions shall constitute the minimum commitment under this
Agreement. To count against the minimum commitment, a musical
composition, whether written in whole or in part by Writer, must, in
Publisher's reasonable business judgment, be capable of commercial
exploitation.
3. Collaboration.35 ° While Publisher prefers that Writer discuss
and clear co-writers with Publisher in advance of any co-writing ses-
sion, Writer may co-write with anyone of Writer's choosing, and any
failure of Writer to discuss or clear any co-writer with Publisher shall
not constitute a breach of this Agreement. Writer is not obligated by
this Agreement to co-write with anyone, including writers of Pub-
lisher's choosing.
4. Co-writing trips. 351 Writer is free to travel for co-writing pur-
poses, and Writer is responsible for all expenses incurred on any such
trip. By separate agreement, Publisher may compensate Writer for
some or all of such expenses, recoupable as an advance against royal-
349. The minimum commitment number should reflect that quality is clearly more im-
portant than quantity in songwriting. The use of the word "reasonable" in this provision
makes it clear that the music publisher cannot cause a breach of the agreement simply by
arbitrarily and capriciously stating that, of all the musical compositions submitted to the
music publisher by the songwriter, less than the minimum commitment are commercially
exploitable. See Jabara v. Songs of Manhattan Island Music Co., No. 86 CV 3412, 1989 WL
16614 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 24, 1989).
350. This is one of those provisions that needs to be included in the agreement more for
general understanding between the parties than for any breach that would result from any
particular conduct on the part of the songwriter.
351. Sometimes in long-term agreements, as here, it just is not feasible to know what
other agreements the parties might want or need to make relative, for example, to co-
writing trips. One good way to handle such a situation is to state a flat rule and then
indicate that the parties are free to make specific separate agreements on the subject. Such
language illustrates feelings of mutual good will.
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ties or not, but under this Agreement Publisher is under no obligation
to do so.
C. Publishing352
1. Advances against royalties. 35 3 Beginning with Friday, January
12, 1996, and on every other Friday thereafter during the term of this
Agreement, Publisher shall pay to Writer as an advance against royal-
ties 1/26 (one twenty-sixth) of the annual amounts as listed below, all
of which payments together shall be recoupable by Publisher from any
and all royalties payable to Writer by Publisher under this Agreement:
a. $ during the first year of this Agreement.
b. $ during the second year of this Agreement.
c. $ during the third year of this Agreement.
d. $ during the first renewal term (if any).
e. $ during the second renewal term (if any).
2. Writer's room. 3 4 Publisher shall provide Writer with a com-
mercial facility in or reasonably near Publisher's offices-including
reasonable furniture, a telephone and supplies-suitable for and
facilitative of the writing of musical compositions alone or with up to
several co-writers. Under this Agreement, Publisher is not obligated
to allow Writer access to secretarial assistance or office help, although
Publisher may do so routinely or from time to time. Any such access
allowed by Publisher may be withdrawn at any time and for any rea-
son. Writer is not obligated to make regular use of such writer's
room.
352. These are the principal promises a music publisher makes to the songwriter
concerning how the relationship will benefit the songwriter.
353. Note that this provision is in no way conditioned on the songwriter not being in
breach of the agreement in the music publisher's opinion-an entirely unworkable idea.
Note also that "if you are transferring all songs previously written by you, the advance
should be higher [or there should be some kind of compensation] than if you are transfer-
ring only future compositions." Robert R. Carter, Jr., Song Rights: Legal Aspects of Song-
writing, SONGWRITER NoTEs, June 1994, at 5.
354. Notwithstanding that the songwriter is not an employee of the music publisher, the
music publisher may nonetheless want to provide the songwriters it has under contract
with such facilities and amenities as a way to engage in reasonably regular consultation
with them and to facilitate their writing, alone or with others. Most songwriters would
appreciate the gesture, especially since not all music publishers relate to songwriters per-
haps the way most once did, at least in Nashville.
[Plroducer/publisher [Tom] Collins says, "Now you see publishing companies who
are just collection agencies. All they are [are] bankers. They aren't developing
songwriters. We don't have many publishers [anymore] who say 'rewrite that
third verse.' You're not hearing that a lot anymore, (but) that's what I do."
Valerie V. Hansen, Ethics on 16th Avenue: As Nashville's Music Industry Grows, So Does
the Potential for Unsavory Business Practices, NASHVILLE Bus. & LIFESTYLES, Mar. 1,
1991, at 62.
3. Demonstration recording obligations. 355 For all of Writer's
musical compositions listed under Existing material in this Agreement
as having no professional demo, and for all of Writer's musical com-
positions created under this Agreement that Publisher has accepted
under-or over and above-Minimum commitment, Publisher shall
promptly produce a demo. Writer, at Publisher's sole discretion, may
produce or co-produce and/or perform on such demos. Any expense
incurred by Writer in connection with such demos must be approved
in writing in advance by Publisher. Other than union scale, if applica-
ble, Writer shall not be entitled to any compensation in connection
with any services performed as a part of the production of such de-
mos. All demos produced under this Agreement shall be owned by
Publisher. Publisher shall have creative control in connection with the
production of any demo under this Agreement.
Publisher agrees to maintain the original multi-track master re-
cording of each and every demo produced under this Agreement from
the date of original production through at least 120 days after the ex-
piration or termination of this Agreement or after the later expiration
of the applicable language in Contractual reversion. Publisher also
agrees to cause a two-track DAT (digital audio tape) "safety copy" of
each such demo to be made and safely stored in a location separate
from the location of the original multi-track master recording. Pub-
lisher agrees to use any demos produced under this Agreement only
as demos and specifically not as master recordings of Writer or any-
one else to be released by Publisher or its assignees for sale or com-
pensation of any kind. With respect to any of Writer's musical
compositions not accepted by Publisher under Minimum commitment
in this Agreement, Publisher shall not be obligated to produce a
demo. With respect to any of Writer's musical compositions submit-
ted to Publisher by Writer after Writer's minimum commitment has
been met in any year of this Agreement and concerning which musical
compositions Publisher, in its reasonable business judgment, views as
not capable of commercial exploitation, Publisher shall not be obli-
gated to produce a demo.
355. This language leaves no doubt as to the music publisher's demo obligations; that is,
when a demo is called for under the agreement and when it is not. It also speaks to their
cost and to the songwriter's involvement in their production, i.e., the songwriter has no
creative control, but she has no financial obligation, either. As a practical matter, the mu-
sic publisher likely will ask the songwriter to produce the demo, so, under this language,
the songwriter pays nothing for demo production (at the time of production or later) yet
probably gets to produce, or at least co-produce, the demo anyway.
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4. Exploitation obligations. 6 Publisher shall be obligated to use
its reasonable best efforts in the exploitation of all copyrighted musi-
cal compositions conveyed by Writer to Publisher under this Agree-
ment. The failure by Publisher to use its reasonable best efforts to
exploit the musical compositions conveyed by Writer to Publisher
under this Agreement shall constitute a breach of this Agreement by
Publisher, such breach resulting in, at Writer's sole discretion, termi-
nation of this Agreement and cancellation of any obligation of Writer
to Publisher concerning any recoupment of advances against royalties
under this Agreement and the return from Publisher to Writer of the
copyrights to all musical compositions conveyed by Writer to Pub-
lisher under this Agreement not, at the time of Publisher's breach,
356. Some argue this is an unarticulable concept because of the relative indefinability of
"reasonable best efforts" in this context. The music publisher cannot be "obligated" to
place every one of the songwriter's conveyed copyrights on a major-label CD so that royal-
ties would be generated. On the other hand, the entire contract is illusory, if not uncon-
scionable, unless the music publisher is obligated to do something with the songwriter's
songs. But obligated to do what? And for the whole catalog? Per song? Some songs? It
would seem fair that the music publisher be obligated to use its "reasonable best efforts" in
the exploitation of the songwriter's songs, and the least injudicious method of defining the
absence of "reasonable best efforts" would seem to be on a case-by-case basis and predi-
cated on a serious overall, but not necessarily complete, lack of effort on the music pub-
lisher's part. In the case of such a breach, the songwriter should be able to essentially
rescind the agreement. Perhaps the best legal theory where the agreement is silent on this
subject or expressly obligates the music publisher to do little or nothing is that the "reason-
able best efforts" obligation is present nonetheless on an "implied" basis.
The NSAI Handbook offers some specific definitions of "reasonable best efforts" in
the songwriter-music publisher context, among them: (1) daily communication with the
songwriter concerning pitching activities and the results and particulars of such pitching;
(2) facilitating the involvement of the songwriter in the music publisher's pitching activi-
ties; (3) committing to pitch each of the songwriter's demoed songs or returning unpitched
songs to the songwriter so that the songwriter, at least at some point, could pitch them
herself; (4) non-recoupable support for songwriting "on the road" with established record-
ing artists; and (5) that the music publisher should commit to pitch the songwriter in addi-
tion to the song. NSAI HANDBOOK, supra note 23, at 97-99. It should be noted, of course,
that some of the NSAI's suggestions in this regard would be better left to the personal
relationship developed between the parties because of the difficulty, if. not impossibility, of
legally and meaningfully including them in the agreement itself.
The NSAI Handbook also suggests that a "bankruptcy" provision be added to song-
writer-music publisher contracts that would have the effect of automatically reconveying to
the songwriter all the copyrights conveyed by the songwriter to the music publisher under
the agreement. Id. at 99-100. Of course, while this is an understandable and even perhaps
laudable goal, any such provision, given federal bankruptcy law, likely would be invalid on
its face as a matter of law. However, this suggestion by the NSAI does serve to point out
quite graphically just what it is songwriters may be conveying when they convey the copy-
rights to their songs to music publishers-everything. Finally, the NSAI Handbook sug-
gests that, as a hedge against being completely poured out in a bankruptcy situation,
songwriters should try to negotiate contract language that would give them a perfected
security interest in the copyrights conveyed by the songwriter to the music publisher under
the agreement. Id. at 100-01.
having been exploited, that is, placed in a royalty-earning or royalty-
accruing position. In addition to legal remedies, Writer shall be enti-
tled to seek injunctive relief in the enforcement of this provision.
5. Publisher's rejections.357 The copyrights to any of Writer's
wholly-written musical compositions rejected by Publisher under Min-
imum commitment or under Demonstration recording obligations
shall remain the property of Writer; however, Writer shall not convey
or seek to exploit any such musical compositions until the expiration
or termination of this Agreement. With respect to any musical com-
positions written by Writer and one or more co-writers during the
term of this Agreement and rejected by Publisher under either Mini-
mum commitment or under Demonstration recording obligations,
Writer's copyright interest shall remain the property of Writer. While
Writer shall not convey or seek to exploit any such musical composi-
tions until the expiration or termination of this Agreement, Writer
shall not be in breach of this Agreement should any such musical com-
position be successfully exploited by the co-writers and/or co-copy-
right owner(s) of any such musical composition.
6. Independent promotion. 58 Publisher shall have the right, at
Publisher's sole discretion, to contract for the promotion of any one or
more of Writer's musical compositions conveyed by Writer to Pub-
lisher under this Agreement and that has been recorded and released
as a single by a major label. Writer agrees that the total cost of any
such promotion, up to a maximum of $ , shall
be charged 50% (fifty percent) to Writer as an advance against royal-
ties. Nothing contained in this provision shall limit Publisher's right to
cause the independent promotion of any such single release at any
level of expenditure, but in no event shall Writer's share of any such
promotional expenses exceed $ ,as an advance
357. Music publishers are not omniscient. As a result, they may turn down what the
songwriter believes is some of her best work. When this occurs, the songwriter should not
be precluded from exploiting the material herself-at least at some point. This language
makes the governance of this situation very clear. It is grossly unfair, for example, for the
music publisher to turn down-for demo or minimum commitment purposes-a musical
composition co-written by the songwriter and then to receive royalties in connection with
that musical composition upon its being successfully exploited by its other writers or
publishers.
358. Recording artists, producers, and record companies are not the only ones who
want their latest single release to keep climbing that Billboard chart; music publishers and
songwriters have a serious interest, as well. As a result, music publishers and songwriters
may, on occasion, desire to spend some money promoting the song as high as it will go on
the charts. This language simply governs such undertakings and reflects, in general, the
music publisher's greater ability to expend funds and take risks.
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against royalties or otherwise, without Writer's express written con-
sent, which consent Writer may withhold for any reason.
7. Royalties.35 9 In connection with the musical compositions con-
veyed by Writer to Publisher under this Agreement, Publisher shall
pay Writer:
a. cents ($ ) per copy for each
copy of sheet music in standard piano/vocal notation and each dance
orchestration printed, published and sold in the United States and
Canada by Publisher or its licensees for which payment has been re-
ceived by Publisher and after deduction of returns.
b. percent ( %) of the whole-
sale selling price of each printed copy of each other arrangement and
edition printed, published and sold in the United States and Canada
by Publisher or its licensees for which payment has been received by
Publisher and after deduction for returns. In the event that any such
musical compositions shall be used, in whole or in part, in conjunction
with one or more other musical compositions in a folio, compilation,
song book, or other publication, Publisher shall pay Writer that pro-
portion of the foregoing royalty which the number of Writer's musical
compositions contained in the publication shall bear to the total
number of musical compositions contained in the publication.
c. Fifty percent (50%) of all sums received-less the reasonable
cost of collection, if any-by Publisher in the United States from ex-
ploitation in the United States and Canada by all licensees of all
rights-except print rights and public performance rights, both of
which are covered in other sections of this provision.
359. In the vast majority of situations, sheet-music royalties constitute an almost insig-
nificant amount of money and probably should not, therefore, be the subject of much ne-
gotiation. "[W]ith the advent of the phonograph record and other music-delivery
technologies, the importance of sheet music as a... revenue earner has decreased dramati-
cally." William K. Knoedelseder, Jr., Music Copyrights Can Be Gold Mines to Current
Owners, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 29, 1985, at 1. "Fifty percent" of all other exploitation proceeds
collected by the music publisher is (or should be) the industry standard-and it is fair.
(The payment of public performance royalties to the songwriter generally does not involve
the music publisher). The percentage split of royalties paid by the music publisher, while
rarely a subject of negotiation between the songwriter and the music publisher, nonethe-
less can be a subject of negotiation. Subpublishing agreements can be a matter of serious
concern for the songwriter where the subpublisher is (or stacks of subpublishers are)
owned by or in some way connected to the music publisher. If the music publisher involves
enough owned or affiliated subpublishers in the collection of foreign (or even domestic)
royalties, the songwriter can be subpublished all the way to the royalty poorhouse. The
other sections of this provision are generally non-controversial. Whatever problems may
exist with royalty calculations and payments in contracts between songwriters and music
publishers, at least in this agreement the royalty payments are based on the gross revenue
received by the music publisher and not the net revenue.
d. Writer shall receive public performance royalties throughout
the world directly from the performing rights organization with which
Writer is affiliated. In the event Publisher receives both the Writer's
and Publisher's share of performance income from any source, Pub-
lisher shall pay Writer fifty percent (50%) of all sums received.
e. Fifty percent (50%) of all sums received-less the reasonable
cost of collection, if any, after the payment of foreign taxes, if any, and
less any reasonable payments to subpublishers, if any-by Publisher
in the United States from exploitation in countries outside the United
States and Canada by all licensees of all rights-except public per-
formance rights, which are covered in another section of this provi-
sion-and regardless of the source of the revenue, type of revenue-
such as advance payments, guarantee payments or minimum royalty
payments-or when paid to Publisher. To the extent Writer's share of
such income cannot reasonably be ascertained, Publisher shall pay
Writer proportionate to Writer's ascertained or reasonably ascertain-
able share of all mechanical royalties received by Publisher during the
relevant accounting period. Should any subpublishers making pay-
ments to Publisher be owned or otherwise affiliated with Publisher, all
payments for services rendered by any such subpublisher shall be
based on arm's length agreements. Any such agreements not made at
arm's length shall subject this Agreement, at Writer's sole discretion,
to termination, forfeiture of any unrecouped advances, and reversion
of all copyrights conveyed by Writer to Publisher under this
Agreement.
f. Assuming Publisher receives no tangible compensation there-
fore, Publisher shall not be required to pay to Writer any royalties on
professional or complimentary printed copies or recordings or on
printed copies or recordings distributed gratuitously for advertising,
promotional, or exploitation purposes.
g. In any situation where Publisher owns more than one-or all-
parts of the copyright to a co-written musical composition, a part of
which was written by Writer, Publisher shall pay Writer according to
the proportionate copyright interest in such musical composition con-
veyed by Writer to Publisher.
8. Accounting.36° Publisher shall compute the royalties earned by
Writer under this Agreement on or before July 31 for the semiannual
360. Under this language, there is no arbitrary time limit on the songwriter's ability to
inspect the music publisher's books. While the contract relationship between the music
publisher and the songwriter may expire in most ways at some point, the royalty and ac-
counting provisions remain in effect for many years. Under such conditions, it is not un-
reasonable to expect the music publisher to maintain adequate books and records to allow
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period ending the preceding June 30 and on or before January 30 for
the semiannual period ending the preceding December 31. Once
computed, Publisher shall forthwith submit to Writer a royalty state-
ment for the appropriate royalty accounting period together with the
net amount of royalties, if any, payable after deducting unrecouped
advances under this Agreement. The royalty statement submitted by
Publisher to Writer shall specify in plain language: (1) the date of issu-
ance and amount of each "advance against royalties" which is un-
recouped as of the statement date, including the total amount of such
unrecouped advances; (2) the date(s) received, source(s), accounting
the complete reconstruction of the royalty accounting and payment facts at any time the
music publisher does or could owe-or did or could have owed-royalties to the song-
writer, including subsequent to any conveyance of any such copyright by the music pub-
lisher (or any assigns) to any third (or later) party.
The complicated royalty calculations publishers insist on often come back to
haunt them. The provisions that were so complex you couldn't understand them
are also so complex that the publisher's employees will not be able to dot every i
and cross every t. Most audits reveal some technical irregularity. * * * The less
time you have to inspect the books and lodge a specific written objection, the
more likely it is you will miss some irregularity and lose your right to sue. * * *
[A]ccounting irregularities can be useful, not only in forcing the publisher to pay
you, but in getting out of a bad contract altogether because of the publisher's
breach.
Carter, supra note 353, at 5. This provision obviously is one of the more important parts of
the agreement. The extent to which a musical composition earns royalties matters little to
the songwriter if the music publisher refuses to pay them over. As a result, and especially
as a result of experience, songwriters with the bargaining strength to do so may negotiate a
severe penalty for a music publisher's non-payment or late payment of royalties. There
was such a provision in the contract between Melanie Schekeryk (better known as singer-
songwriter "Melanie") and her music publisher. Kama Rippa Music, Inc. v. Schekeryk, 510
F.2d 837 (2d Cir. 1975). Melanie executed a songwriter-music publisher agreement with
Kama Rippa in May, 1968. Id. at 839. Sometime during the term of the agreement, the
contract was amended by the addition of the following language concerning the payment
of royalties by Kama Rippa to Melanie.
The payment of royalties when due are [sic] of the essence. Accordingly, if Pub-
lisher fails to account and pay royalties in accordance with this [provision] and
such failure and default continues following thirty (30) days written notice of such
failure and default, this agreement shall terminate and all rights in and to the
compositions theretofore covered shall revert to the Writer. This provision may
be specifically enforced.
Id. In August, 1973, Kama Rippa withheld Melanie's royalty payments because it believed
she was in breach of a subsequent (recording) contract. Id. at 840. This litigation ensued.
Kama Rippa indicated it also believed the subsequent agreement formed a part of the
original agreement and that its obligation to pay Melanie royalties was contingent on her
performance of the subsequent agreement. Id. at 841. The court held that Kama Rippa's
duty to pay Melanie royalties under the original agreement, as amended, was not contin-
gent upon her performance of the subsequent agreement. Id. at 842. As a result, the court
upheld the forfeiture clause, ordered Kama Rippa to return all of Melanie's copyrights to
her, enjoined Kama Rippa from asserting that it had any remaining interest in such copy-
rights, and enjoined Kama Rippa from seeking to collect royalties on such copyrights. Id.
at 843.
period(s) reflected, and gross sum(s) received-all with respect to
each copyright concerned under this Agreement on which royalties
were paid to Publisher by any source during the accounting period
reflected by the royalty statement, if any, including the total amount
of such receipts, if any; (3) a figure reflecting Writer's share, per copy-
right, of the gross sums received and the total amount of Writer's
share for all copyrights concerned under this Agreement on which
royalties were paid to Publisher during the accounting period; and (4)
a final figure reflecting either the net amount of advances against roy-
alties remaining unrecouped or reflecting the net amount of royalties
due Writer. Writer agrees that Writer is not entitled to any share of
the float, and Publisher agrees that Publisher's retention of the float
forms a specific part of the consideration in this Agreement flowing
from Writer to Publisher. Publisher agrees that under no circum-
stances shall interest of any kind ever accrue in favor of Publisher
regarding any advances against royalties or unrecouped advances
against royalties.
Writer or a certified public accountant in Writer's behalf may, at
Writer's expense, at reasonable intervals, during Publisher's usual
business hours, and upon reasonable notice, examine Publisher's
books and records insofar as Publisher's books and records concern
Writer and for the purpose of verifying the accuracy of any royalty
statement submitted to Writer under this Agreement. Publisher
agrees to maintain books and records insofar as they concern Writer
for the entire period Publisher is collecting royalties belonging in part
to Writer, including subsequent to the expiration or termination of
this Agreement. Should any audit reveal an underpayment to Writer
of more than $[20,000 (Twenty thousand dollars)], Publisher shall re-
imburse Writer for the reasonable cost of the audit. Upon notice,
Publisher shall immediately remit to Writer any underpayment dis-
covered by Writer's audit, including [ten percent (10%)] interest per
annum, commencing with the reasonable date(s) of underpayment,
compounded annually.
9. Contractual reversion.361 If, upon the expiration or termina-
tion of this Agreement, Publisher has failed to secure a release on a
361. Mainly, this falls into the category of the frustration songwriters feel over un-
pitched demos. The simple truth is that the chances of a songwriter's demos being pitched
after the songwriter's contract with the music publisher has expired and not been renewed
are far less than when the contract was in effect and the songwriter was being paid ad-
vances against royalties. Certainly, there are exceptions, but they are just that-
exceptions.
"Your publisher may resist the idea [of reversions under any circumstances]. I argue
that the songs are of no value to anyone if they are merely gathering dust in the publisher's
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major label of any one or more of the copyrighted musical composi-
tions conveyed by Writer to Publisher under this Agreement, Writer
may, at any time during any of the three full calendar months follow-
ing the month of expiration or termination of this Agreement, request
in writing the return of the copyrights to any such musical composi-
tions. In such event, Publisher shall promptly reassign all such copy-
rights to Writer. Notwithstanding the language in the previous two
sentences, no copyright conveyed by Writer to Publisher in the last
year of the term shall revert under this provision unless and until it
remains unrecorded and unreleased by a major label one (1) year af-
ter the expiration or termination of this Agreement. Writer shall have
three months from that time to invoke the reversion dictates of this
provision, at which time they shall otherwise expire. At the time of
any reversion under this provision, should there remain any un-
recouped advances, Writer shall execute a separate agreement in
which Writer agrees to repay Publisher any such unrecouped advances
off the top of the first royalties received by Writer from any source,
until paid, on any such musical compositions. Nothing contained in
this paragraph shall reduce or take away Publisher's right to deduct
unrecouped advances from royalties earned on Writer's musical com-
positions successfully exploited by Publisher during the term of this
Agreement. In no event, however, shall Publisher be compensated
twice for any unrecouped advances.
Writer shall have the right, at Writer's sole discretion, to
purchase from Publisher the original multi-channel (e.g., 8, 16, 24
tracks) master recording and DAT "safety recordings" of any or all of
Publisher's demos of any musical compositions reassigned to Writer
under this provision. Compensation shall be Publisher's reasonable
cost of production reduced by ten percent (10%) per year beginning
with the first anniversary of the month of original production. If the
parties cannot agree on the amount of compensation for any such
demo, the issue shall be submitted to arbitration. If the parties cannot
agree on the selection of an arbitrator or on any of the other particu-
lars of any arbitration contemplated under this provision, either party
may file suit for purposes of asking a court of competent jurisdiction
to decide such matters. The parties agree that any such court rulings
shall not be appealable. Should the arbitrator determine that either
party acted unreasonably in forcing the issue to arbitration, the arbi-
office." Carter, supra note 62, at 5. Under such a reversion, it seems only fair that since
the music publisher paid the songwriter an advance to write such songs, the music pub-
lisher should be paid back. The method used here for accomplishing the "pay-back" is
entirely reasonable.
HASTINGS COMMIENT L.J.
trator may require such party to pay all or part of the reasonable cost
of the unreasonably-forced arbitration, including any court action and
all reasonable attorneys' fees. Judgment upon any award rendered or
on any decision in the nature of a declaratory judgment made by the
arbitrator may be entered in any court of competent jurisdiction and is
not appealable.
D. Miscellany
362
1. Representations and warranties. 363 To the best of Writer's cur-
rent knowledge, information and belief, the copyrights to the musical
compositions conveyed by Writer to Publisher under this Agreement
are free and clear of any and all claims or encumbrances. In the con-
text of contemplating the writing of musical compositions, Writer
promises that Writer is not under contract to any other music publish-
ing company and that, to the best of Writer's current knowledge, in-
formation and belief, Writer has every right to enter into and perform
this Agreement. Publisher promises that, to the best of its current
knowledge, information and belief, it has every right to enter into and
perform this Agreement.
2. Indemnification.364 Neither Writer nor Publisher shall indem-
nify the other with respect to any claim or action brought against
either or both by a third party in relation to any of the copyrights
conveyed by Writer to Publisher under this Agreement. Each shall
362. These are items that seem to fit best in this category; that they are labeled
"miscellany" is not meant to indicate any lack of importance.
363. As long as it is true that the songwriter has no reason to believe that any copy-
rights conveyed to the music publisher under the agreement are encumbered in any way or
subject to some other third-party claim, it is unreasonable to place the songwriter in a
breach position. This language avoids that. Further, both parties should promise that
there is no reason they cannot enter into and perform the agreement. This language
speaks to fraud in the formation of the agreement.
364. Absent willful infringement or fraud in the formation of the agreement, there is no
reason the songwriter should indemnify the music publisher. If the music publisher wants
less risk, the music publisher should enter into a co-publishing arrangement with the song-
writer. As long as the music publisher owns the entirety of the copyright, the songwriter
should not be liable to the music publisher for unforeseen events. Further, if infringement
is being alleged, the plaintiff should sue the songwriter in addition to the music publisher
because the plaintiff will want to recover monies paid to the songwriter under the music
publishing agreement and public performance monies paid to the songwriter by the song-
writer's performing rights organization. "As for . . . indemnification, the first thing you
should do is make the indemnification language mutual." Robert R. Carter, Jr., Song
Rights: Legal Aspects of Songwriting, SONGWRITER NoTEs, July/Aug. 1994, at 5. The mu-
sic publisher, in appropriate circumstances, might successfully sue the songwriter for "con-
tribution;" that is, assistance in paying a judgment. Finally, the music publisher, owning
many copyrights, is far better able to financially withstand losing a copyright infringement
lawsuit than the songwriter. Music publishers can buy insurance to cover this risk. The
cost of such insurance to most songwriters surely would be prohibitive.
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give the other reasonably prompt notice of any claim or action
brought by a third party against either or both in relation to any of the
copyrights conveyed by Writer to Publisher under this Agreement.
3. Power of attorney.365 To act in Writer's name and in Writer's
place and stead, Writer* hereby appoints Publisher and Publisher's
designees as Writer's true and lawful attorney-with full power of
substitution and delegation-only to take and do such action and only
to make, sign, execute, acknowledge, and deliver any and all instru-
ments or documents necessary to vest in Publisher, worldwide, the
copyrights conveyed by Writer to Publisher under this Agreement.
4. Actions. 36 6 Publisher and Writer, together or independently,
shall have the mutual right to take such action as they deem necessary
against any party to protect the copyrights concerned in this Agree-
ment. Within reason, each party shall cooperate with the other in any
controversy which arises or in any litigation which is brought concern-
ing any of the copyrights concerned in this Agreement. Either party
shall have the right, in its sole discretion, to employ attorneys and to
institute or defend against any claim or action and to take any other
necessary steps to protect the various interests in any of the copyrights
concerned in this Agreement. Neither party shall have the right to
settle, compromise, or in any other manner dispose of any such claim
or action and to satisfy or collect on any judgment which may be ren-
dered without the express written consent of the other, which consent
shall not be unreasonably withheld. With respect to any copyrights
concerned in this Agreement, should either party receive any funds in
satisfaction of judgment or as a result of settlement with respect to
any claim or action, all of both parties' reasonable expenses in connec-
tion with any such claim or action, including reasonable attorney's
fees and reasonable costs, shall first be deducted and paid to or re-
tained by the expending party, as the case may be, and fifty percent
(50%) of the remaining proceeds shall then be paid forthwith by the
receiving party to the other party.
365. Where the songwriter's signature may be needed on an individual domestic or in-
ternational copyright registration form, the music publisher needs power of attorney for
that specific purpose in the event the songwriter is unavailable-by incapacity, death, or
otherwise-to execute such a document when needed or should the songwriter refuse to
execute such a document. No larger power of attorney is needed for any reason.
366. The first sentence in this provision is legally unnecessary, but its presence presents
no harm in the agreement. Under normal circumstances, the songwriter would have every
reason to cooperate with the music publisher because as the music publisher makes money
on the copyright so does the songwriter. The third and fourth sentences are probably le-
gally unnecessary, but it never hurts to spell out such provisions. The final sentence is to
ensure that the music publisher does not seek to construe that this situation is not covered
under the royalties provision.
5. Assignment.367 Subject to Right of first refusal, Publisher may
assign any or all of the copyrights conveyed by Writer to Publisher
under this Agreement to any person or business organization.. Subject
to Right of first refusal, Writer may assign any or all of Writer's roy-
alty rights under this Agreement. to any person or business organiza-
tion. Because of the personal nature of the relationships
contemplated by this Agreement, and other than as indicated in the
previous two sentences, neither party shall have the right to assign all
or any part of this Agreement to any person or business organization.
6. Right of first refusal.36 8 Publisher hereby agrees not to assign
any or all of the copyrights conveyed by Writer to Publisher under this
Agreement to any person or business organization without first offer-
ing such rights to Writer upon equal or more favorable terms and
Writer shall have refused such offer or failed to act within thirty (30)
days of notice of Publisher's intent to assign to a third party. Writer
hereby agrees not to assign any or all of Writer's royalty rights under
this Agreement to any person or business organization without first
offering such rights to Publisher upon equal or more favorable terms
and Publisher shall have refused such offer or failed to act within
thirty (30) days of notice of Writer's intent to assign to a third party.
7. Suspension and termination.369 If Writer shall fail, refuse, or
be unable to submit to Publisher musical compositions as required by
this Agreement or shall otherwise fail, refuse, or be unable to perform
Writer's material obligations hereunder, Publisher shall have the
right, in addition to all its other rights and remedies at law or in eq-
uity, to suspend the term of this Agreement and its obligations by
written notice to Writer, or, in the event such failure, refusal, or in-
ability shall continue for longer than six (6) months, to terminate this
Agreement by written notice to Writer. Any such suspension shall
continue for the duration of any such failure, refusal or inability, and,
unless Publisher notifies Writer to the contrary in writing, the then
current term of this Agreement shall be automatically extended by the
number of days of suspension. During any such suspension, Writer
shall not render services as a songwriter to any other party or assign or
367. Clearly, both parties should be able to assign or otherwise encumber the rights
they own.
368. Simple mutuality.
369. This is a good provision because it automatically allows the music publisher to, in
effect, extend the contract to cover any significant periods of inactivity on the songwriter's
part. In truth, any good songwriter can write a "song" any time, but there is some credence
to "creative block" or "writer's block." The idea is to write "hit" songs. The provision also
allows the music publisher a way out of the agreement should a "block" or some other
disability cause the songwriter to be materially unable to perform over the longer term.
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license or convey to any other party any musical composition which,
but for the suspension, Writer would be obligated to convey to Pub-
lisher under this Agreement.
8. New uses of copyrighted material.37 ° The parties acknowledge
that new uses of copyrighted material are created from time to time
through, for example, the marriage of existing communication tech-
370. "[Als technology continues to develop, new income sources may develop as well-
revenue sources that we can't even begin to imagine. You don't want to be shut out from
those sources of income." Carter, supra note 353, at 5. The parties could, of course, settle
such matters on their own by amending the agreement. See Repp v. F.E.L. Publications,
Ltd., 688 F.2d 441 (7th Cir. 1982) (concerning the effect of a new type of licensing on the
songwriter-music publisher agreement).
A federal law enacted in 1992 recognized a new technology-digital audio recorda-
tion-and fashioned a remedy which, inter alia, includes a new revenue stream for song-
writers and music publishers. The Audio Home Recording Act of 1992 (AHRA), 17
U.S.C. §§ 1001-1010 (Supp. V 1993), rather than being a bold pronouncement by Congress
on a subject of great importance, is more in the nature of a settlement agreement. See
Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984). Because the stakes
were so high on both sides, the two industry segments chose "the bargaining table to ham-
mer out the blueprint for the [AHRA]" rather than risking an adverse court decision. See
William 1. Hochberg, Battle Royal-ty: The Multi-Billion Dollar Audio Home Taping Feud
Between Continental Europe and the U.S.-U.K. Axis, 27 BEVERLY HILLS BAR Ass'N J. 157
(1993). The AHRA was largely a result of negotiations between the sound recording in-
dustry and the manufacturers of blank digital audio recording media and digital home au-
dio recording equipment. See Joel L. McKuin, Home Audio Taping of Copyrighted Works
and The Audio Home Recording Act of 1992: A Critical Analysis, 16 HASTINGS COMM/ENT
L.J. 311, 325 (1994). See also Christine C. Carlisle, The Audio Home Recording Act of
1992, 1 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 335 (1994).
The first major component of AHRA concerns electronic safeguards against digital
.copies being made from first- and later-generation digital copies; it is called the Serial
Copy Management System (SCMS). See 17 U.S.C. § 1002(a)(1) (Supp. V 1993). All home
digital recording equipment imported or sold in the U.S. must contain the SCMS computer
chip. Id. While SCMS is not a panacea (because, for example, one could theoretically
make an infinite number of DAT copies from one CD), it does seem to solve the problem
of exponential piracy-"perfect" digital copies being made from digital copies that are any
number of generations removed from the original CD. The second major component of
AHRA mandates that royalties be collected on blank digital audio recording media and on
digital home audio recording equipment. Id. § 1004. Such royalties are to be deposited
into the United States Treasury and the Copyright Royalty Tribunal is to act as the disburs-
ing agent. Id. § 1005. The royalty on blank digital audio recording media is three percent
(3%) of the import value or of the domestic manufacturer's FOB price to wholesalers. Id.
§ 1004. The royalty on digital home audio recording equipment is two percent (2%) of the
import value or of the domestic manufacturer's FOB price to wholesalers, including a mini-
mum royalty of one dollar ($1) and a maximum royalty of eight dollars ($8) per machine.
Id. For digital home audio recording devices that contain, for example, dual recording
decks, the maximum royalty is twelve dollars ($12). Id.
Once the money is collected into the royalty pool, it is distributed to approved claim-
ants, id. § 1007(a)(2), as follows: record companies, 38.83%; featured recording artists,
25.59%; music publishers, 16.66%; songwriters, 16.66%; non-featured musicians, 1.75%;
and non-featured vocalists, .92%. Id. § 1006(b). The third major component of AHRA
counter-balances the royalty system by prohibiting sound-recording copyright infringement
actions of a non-commercial nature. Id. § 1008. In other words, home tapers are free to
HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J.
nologies or the invention of new communication technologies. Be-
cause the exact nature of any new uses of musical copyrights
contemplated by this Agreement is not foreseeable, the parties agree
that all issues arising therefrom shall be submitted to arbitration-
should the parties be unable to agree on their own and within a rea-
sonable time-including but not limited to whether such use is a
"new" use falling outside the copyright conveyance by Writer to Pub-
lisher under this Agreement. Should the arbitrator rule that the use is
a "new" use within the meaning of the preceding sentence, Writer
agrees to convey some or all of the rights to any such "new" use to
Publisher should the arbitrator so decide. Should the arbitrator deter-
mine that the use is not a "new" use, then it shall be governed as is
any copyright right under this Agreement. If the parties cannot agree
on the selection of an arbitrator or on any of the other particulars of
any arbitration contemplated under this provision, either party may
file suit for purposes of asking a court of competent jurisdiction to
decide such matters. The parties agree that any such court rulings
shall not be appealable. Should the arbitrator determine that either
party acted unreasonably in forcing the issue to arbitration, the arbi-
trator may require such party to pay all or part of the reasonable cost
of the unreasonably-forced arbitration, including any court action and
all reasonable attorney's fees. Judgment upon any award rendered or
decision in the nature of a declaratory judgment made by the arbitra-
tor may be entered in any court of competent jurisdiction and is not
appealable.
9. Continuing force and effect. 371 Notwithstanding the expiration
or termination of this Agreement, the following provisions of this
Agreement shall have continuing force and effect:
home tape. In this regard, AHRA draws no distinction between digital audio home taping
and analog audio home taping. Id.
371. Undoubtedly, the copyrights themselves last much longer than the term of the
agreement to write songs between the songwriter and the music publisher. Consequently,
it is very important to spell out exactly which provisions of the comparatively short-term
contract will survive the expiration or termination of the agreement itself. Should there be
a dispute decades later between, say, the estate of the songwriter and a successor in interest
to the original music publisher (perhaps even several times removed), the court will look
first to the initial contract between the original parties for a solution-or at least for gui-
dance. Where the original contract is silent or unclear on whether, which and to what
extent particular provisions were to survive, the parties will be at the mercy of a factually
and historically ignorant judge and/or jury. Up-front certainty is much the better policy.
That there are two dozen or so provisions in the agreement that need to survive the expira-
tion or termination of the agreement is testimony to the importance of the language con-
tained in an agreement that, assuming at least some fairly successful exploitation, will
impact the songwriter for the rest of her life and her family or other heirs, successors, or
assigns for at least another 50 years.
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(1) Definitions; (2) Copyright conveyances]; (3) Reservations; (4)
Security interest; (5) Individual copyright conveyances; (6) Writer's
name and likeness; (7) Droit moral; (8) Independent promotion; (9)
Royalties; (10) Accounting; (11) Contractual reversion; (12) Indemni-
fication; (13) Power of attorney; (14) Actions; (15) Assignment; (16)
Right of first refusal; (17) New uses of copyrighted material; (18) Con-
tinuing force and effect; (19) Headings; (20) Entirety of agreement;
(21) Modification; (22) Waiver; (23) Effect of invalidity; (24) Control-
ling law; (25) Attorneys' fees; and (26) Notices.
10. No partnership or joint venture.3 72 Nothing contained in this
Agreement shall be construed to constitute a joint venture or partner-
ship between Writer and Publisher; rather, the relationship is one of
contractor-independent contractor with the independent contractor
retaining, inter alia, a beneficial interest in all copyrights of musical
compositions conveyed under this Agreement by the independent
contractor (Writer) to the contractor (Publisher).
11. Headings. 373 The headings of the provisions of this Agree-
ment are inserted only for the purpose of convenient reference. The
language of the headings themselves shall not be deemed to govern,
limit, modify, or in any other manner affect the scope, meaning, or
intent of the provisions of this Agreement or any part of this Agree-
ment, nor shall it otherwise be given any legal effect.
12. Entirety of agreement.374 This Agreement supersedes any
and all prior negotiations, understandings, and agreements between
Writer and Publisher with respect to the subject matter of this Agree-
ment. Writer and Publisher acknowledge and agree that neither has
made any representations or promises in connection with this Agree-
ment not contained in this Agreement.
372. But neither is this relationship "work made for hire."
373. When a dispute arises concerning a contract, attorneys quite naturally look for any
rational argument that will further the interests of their clients. Since the headings obvi-
ously involve fewer words than the paragraphs that follow them, it is safe to say they are
more ambiguous than the paragraphs that follow them. Further, a lawyer might rationally
argue that a heading is in some conflict with the paragraphs that it follows. Since it could
be to one side's advantage for a heading to be ambiguous or conflicting, this language is
included to remove any such opportunity for argument. At the formation of the contract,
the neutrality insured by this provision inures to the benefit of both parties.
374. Often times in a contractual dispute one or both of the parties is wont to argue that
the other party made a representation not actually contained in the contract that has mate-
rially affected the operation of the agreement. This language removes that opportunity.
Optimally, what governs is what is in the contract; nothing more or less.
13. Modification.375 This Agreement may not be canceled, al-
tered, modified, amended, or waived, in whole or in part, in any way,
except by an instrument in writing signed by Writer and Publisher.
14. Waiver.3 76 The waiver by Writer or Publisher of any breach of
this Agreement in any one or more instances shall in no way be con-
strued as a waiver of any subsequent breach of this Agreement,
whether or not the breach is of a similar nature.
15. Effect of invalidity. 3 77 If any part of this Agreement shall be
held to be void, invalid, or unenforceable, it shall not affect the valid-
ity of the balance of this Agreement.
16. Controlling law.378 This Agreement shall be deemed to have
been made in the State of , and its validity,
375. This language is important because it takes away any opportunity by either side to
argue that the contract was orally amended at some point during its operation. Further, it
is entirely logical that if the original agreement was in writing, any amendment to it should
be in writing, as well. It should be noted, however, that under equity concepts, courts do
sometimes rule that a written agreement was modified by the actions of the parties
notwithstanding the inclusion in the original agreement of a provision such as this. See
Mellencamp v. Riva Music Ltd., 698 F. Supp. 1154 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (no oral agreement
reached, but even had there been, it may or may not (and outside equity, probably would
not) have been enforced by the court).
376. Only rarely do parties to contracts act on the opportunity to sue for breach of
contract where the breach was minor or even where the breach was more than minor but
was cured reasonably quickly. Most rational people understand that it is much better to
work out difficulties with the other side than to sue (the exception to this general idea
usually being that one side has powerful reasons to want out of the agreement). Without
the language contained in this provision, the defendant to an action for breach of contract
might argue that the defendant's own prior breaches of the contract constitute a waiver by
the plaintiff ever to sue for breaches of any such particular provisions. This language takes
away that opportunity and reflects the idea that plaintiffs should be able to "overlook"
breaches until "one too many" breaches has occurred. The way the standard-form song-
writer-music publisher contract is written, the songwriter will be in breach at the moment
of creation and remain so everyday the contract is in effect, meaning that at any time the
music publisher wishes to take advantage of any such breach, he may do so. On the other
hand, the music publisher can breach the contract only in major ways, leaving the song-
writer much less opportunity to sue.
377. There is a country saying about not "throwing the baby out with the bathwater"
which is applicable here. While one side to a breach of contract action might want to argue
that the legal voidness, legal invalidity, or legal unenforceability of one or more parts of
the agreement should void the entire agreement, the other side may desire to keep the
remainder of the agreement intact. These are long and complicated contracts with poten-
tially huge amounts of money involved, and it generally makes little sense to invalidate the
entire agreement simply because one part of it has failed. Should the failed part be so
major as to "gut" the agreement, however, a court could override this provision on equita-
ble grounds. As a practical matter, though, the parties would hopefully seek to repair the
agreement by renegotiating any failed provision.
378. It is far better to know at the beginning of the relationship which state's law will
govern the agreement. This is true for at least two reasons: (1) the contract law of the
chosen state may impact the language used in the drafting of the contract; and (2) the
parties will know at the outset the geographical location of the court in any dispute arising
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construction and effect shall be governed by the laws of the State of
which are applicable to agreements wholly
performed in the State of . This Agreement
shall not be binding until signed by Writer and by an officer of Pub-
lisher duly authorized to execute such contracts.
17. Attorney's fees. 379 If any action at law or in equity, including
an action for declaratory relief, is brought relating to this Agreement,
the prevailing party shall be entitled to recover reasonable attorney's
fees from the other party, which fees may be set by the court in the
trial of such action or which may be enforced in a separate action
brought for that purpose, and which fees shall be in addition to any
other relief which may be awarded.
18. Multiple originals. 3 8°0 This Agreement, and all other copies of
this Agreement, insofar as they relate to the rights, duties, and reme-
dies of the parties, shall be deemed to be one Agreement. This
Agreement may be executed in one or more counterparts, each of
which shall be deemed an original but all of which together shall con-
stitute one and the same Agreement.
19. Notices. 381 Any written notices which Writer or Publisher
shall desire to give to the other under this Agreement, including
changes of address, and all statements, royalties and other payments
which shall be due and owing to Writer from Publisher under this
Agreement, shall be addressed to Writer or Publisher, as applicable,
at the addresses set forth below. All notices shall be served either by
hand-to any officer of Publisher if Publisher shall be the addressee-
or by registered or certified mail, postage prepaid, or by telegraph,
under the agreement. It should be noted that the parties may not simply choose any state,
the general rule being that the state chosen must be either the state in which the contract
was formed, or the state in which the contract is to be substantially performed, or the state
in which either party to the contract lives or exists as a legal fiction.
379. This provision has an advantage and a disadvantage. The advantage is that it pro-
tects against the filing and prosecution of frivolous lawsuits; for example, where the eco-
nomically stronger party might want to harass the other party by filing colorable but
actually non-meritorious actions, having to pay all or both sides' legal fees serves as a
powerful deterrent. The disadvantage is that the economically weaker party may be disin-
clined to sue even where she feels she has been wronged and has a good case.
380. Since "originals" are better evidence than copies of originals, it is appropriate for
both sides to want an "original." This language makes that possible.
381. This language removes any doubt on the issue of how and where the parties are to
formally communicate with one another. The parties should keep each other updated on
any changes of address, and the parties should make absolutely sure they have followed
the appropriate communication procedures. Lawsuits can turn on the basis of following or
not following one or more of each and every provision in the agreement, including the
notices provision. As much care should be exercised in the operation and performance of
a sophisticated, ongoing agreement as in its negotiation and drafting.
charges prepaid, addressed as indicated. The date of personal service
or of mailing or of depositing in a telegraph office, whichever shall be
first, shall be deemed the date of notice.
20. Signatures.382 The parties whose signatures and names appear
on and under, respectively, the lines following the next sentence ac-
knowledge that, on the date(s) indicated below, they executed this
Agreement in consideration of the promises made in this Agreement
and with the intention of being legally bound. This Agreement shall
have no force and effect whatsoever unless both parties are in physical
possession of a fully-executed original of this Agreement by on or
before December ,1995.
WRITER: PUBLISHER:
Name of officer with authority to
Songwriter's name contract
Title of corporate officer
Date Date
V
Conclusions
Under current circumstances, the songwriter signing her first mu-
sic publishing contract will probably have done little, if any, real bar-
gaining. The "negotiation" might go like this: the songwriter has been
writing songs for a decade but has never before been signed to a major
music publisher. Naturally, the songwriter is thrilled that a major mu-
sic publisher wants to sign her. When the music publisher provides
her with a copy of the proposed contract, she takes it to a competent
music lawyer for review. Among other major revelations, her lawyer
tells her that, under the proposed contract, she is conveying to the
music publisher all of her previous compositions (there are a hundred
or so of them which she believes could be "hits") without being com-
pensated for them other than through the royalty-payment provision
in the contract. In addition to discussing all the other "revelations" in
the contract, she discusses with her lawyer how she might be compen-
sated for her decade of hard songwriting work.
382. If at all possible, the parties should execute the agreement in each other's presence
because, otherwise, one party signs and delivers the document to the other side, giving that
party the opportunity to hold the contract an indeterminate time and then do what is to its
advantage-sign it or not sign it. This language, however, obviates that problem.
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They settle on a strategy of proposing to the music publisher that,
with respect to the songwriter's existing catalog, a co-publishing rela-
tionship be agreed upon whereby the songwriter would retain a 50%
interest in all such copyrights. In return, the songwriter would acqui-
esce to all the other provisions in the proposed agreement to which
she originally objected, and additionally, she would forego any specific
up-front compensation for the 50% interest in the existing catalog
conveyed by her to the music publisher. Although unstated, the song-
writer is willing to negotiate her counter-proposal. When the counter-
proposal is made to the music publisher, the reply is:
Look, there are tons of good writers out there who want to work
here real bad. I'm sorry, but the contract will either be signed as
prepared by our attorney, or we'll just call up the next writer on our
list. This is just the way the business works. We want you, but we
want our contract, too.
In this situation, most songwriters beginning professional careers
would immediately stop trying to negotiate and sign the contract as is.
This unequal bargaining power raises the problem of adhesion. What,
if anything, can be done?
Songwriters in disadvantageous bargaining positions should try to
take small steps toward more equitable language in such agreements.
Under this method, however, anything even approximating contract
parity would be a long time in coming, if ever.383 Songwriters in more
advantageous bargaining positions should insist on completely equita-
ble treatment in their agreements with music publishers. This is called
bargaining strength.
Even when the songwriter-music publisher contract is not a prob-
lem, songwriters can get squeezed by artists or producers who some-
times extract half of the songwriter's songwriting royalties in return
for cutting the song.384 Songwriters should remember to maintain a
diary containing the dates and brief particulars of events that could
383. Ironically, although songwriters are viewed as perhaps the most essential
component-the foundation-of the music business, their political power is
equivalent to that of farmers and teachers, so the grumbling is done quietly and is
largely ignored. * * * "The competition in this industry is phenomenal," com-
ments one songwriter advocate. "I feel like the less complaining about what goes
on and the better writing they do, the better chance they have."
Hansen, supra note 354, at 62.
384. Songwriters can be pressured into splitting their writer royalties [with the pro-
ducer and/or the artist] if their other option is not getting the cut at all, especially
if the producer works with a major artist and the writer is just starting out. The
competitive factor is multiplied as there are many more talented, struggling song-
writers than there are Harlan Howards, Paul Overstreets, Roger Murrahs or Don
Schlitzes [some, of Nashville's finest].
affect the resolution of a dispute with the music publisher, e.g., dates
of demo production and dates of audiotape recording presentation to
the music publisher. Songwriters also should be very mindful about
staying in continuous compliance with the provisions of the
agreement.
That no relevant reported cases were found concerning a given
provision of the "contract" discussed in Section III does not mean
there have been no disputes on any such subject. First, it should be
noted that virtually no one sues over a single minor dispute, e.g., the
writer's room not being furnished with "reasonable" furniture.385 Fur-
ther, any such disputes could have been settled by the parties pre-
litigation, pre-trial, during trial, post-trial, or pre-appeal. Moreover,
these issues could have been subject to mediation or arbitration, or
some other form of alternative dispute resolution.
With that said, it seems clear that songwriters rarely sue music
publishers for reasons other than to determine authorship, to deter-
mine ownership of royalty rights, and to seek royalty accounting and
payment.386 Why? Is it because songwriters as a group simply do not
have the financial wherewithal to engage in protracted, expensive,
time-consuming, emotion-draining, relationship-ending litigation?
Surely, the answer is "yes. "387 If the stakes are high enough, a lawsuit
will result, but lawsuits are a poor option for songwriters. Major mu-
sic publishers, on the other hand, are able to prosecute or withstand
lawsuits comparatively easily.
A final alternative for songwriters is to become "independent" of
the major music publishing companies as have some recording art-
385. That hardly anyone sues over minor disputes, of course, means that such provi-
sions are more or less illusory. The real focus in any contract negotiation where the con-
tract is to be performed over a significant period of time should be on the provisions of the
contract that could result in a serious enough dispute to warrant the filing of a lawsuit.
Minor provisions are included in contracts sometimes by contractual necessity and some-
times for other, less legalistic, reasons. Generally, they are complied with by parties who
are performing the agreement in a spirit of genuine mutual goodwill.
386. Music publishers virtually never allege in a lawsuit, whether as counter-claiming
defendant or as plaintiff, that the songwriter has somehow treated the music publisher
unconscionably-even unfairly. Interesting.
There is never any doubt when the songwriter is in breach of contract. However,
because of prevailing attitudes and; because of the way songwriter deals are writ-
ten, rarely is a publisher found to have breached a contract. Aside from non-
payment of royalties, suspension of a songwriter's advance, and dissolution and/or
bankruptcy of the publishing company-and not always in these cases-the pub-
lisher resides in a redoubt of time-honored tradition and, for the most part, ap-
pears to be above reproach.
NSAI HANDBOOK, supra note 23, at 93.
387. Id. at 96.
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ists. 388 Songwriters might consider the formation of music publishing
companies owned by groups of songwriters. Although this is hardly a
novel idea, it is worth seriously exploring. Today's songwriters are
perhaps much more educated and sophisticated than their predeces-
sors; no doubt they could operate such organizations profitably and
efficiently.389 Organized in some effective fashion, songwriters could
effect monumental change in the recorded-music industry because the
entire industry starts and stops with songs.39° The best alternative to
any such radical course of action, however is fairness in contracting.
388. Jim Patterson, Musical Artists Learn Business, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Aug. 29, 1995.
389. Of course, any such companies would not be trouble-free. There would be dis-
agreements, but at least the fundamental relationship between the company and each of its
contractually-affiliated songwriters would have been formed eye-to-eye.
390. An entire industry is built upon your particular talents. From the highest paid
record company executive to the janitor who cleans the building that your pub-
lisher calls home, and all in between, I repeat ALL, rely upon you and all working
composers and lyricists to provide the basis for their living.
NSAI HANDBOOK, supra note 23, at 8.

